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EDITORIAL FOREWORD 
Robert S. Hartman responded in print only twice to his many critics. The 
first of these is the first essay to follow in this volume titled "Axiology as 
a Science." This article appeared originally in Philosophy of Science, 29:4, 
(1962), pp. 412-433, as a rejoinder to Hector Neri Castaneda's scathing 
review of La estructura del valor: fundamentos de la axiologia cientifica, 
published in Mexico in 1959, the Spanish version of The Structure of Value. 
The second, also included here, was the short "Reply to Eckhardt and 
Brumbaugh," in The Journal of Human Relations, 21 :2 (Second Quarter 
1973), pp. 220-225, a rejoinder to William Eckhardt's "The Place of Values 
in Human Relations" and Robert S. Brumbaugh's "Robert Hartman's 
Fonnal Axiology: An Extension" that appeared in the same issue of that 
journal. Hartman's reply to Eckhardt and Brumbaugh is incorporated into 
Hartman's "Formal Axiology and Its Critics" to follow in Part I. Several 
years ago, the incomplete manuscript of this article was called to my 
attention by Frank G. Forrest, who gave me a copy. 
Although he did not publish most of his responses to his critics, Robert 
S. Hartman nevertheless was a prolific writer of such responses. Many of 
these rejoinders were in letters, copies of which now exist in the Hartman 
archives in the Special Collections Library of The University of Tennessee, 
Knoxville. 
Hartman clearly intended to respond in print to his critics. Near the end 
of his life, he worked on a manuscript, unfinished unfortunately, titled 
"Formal Axiology and Its Critics," published in edited form here for the 
first time as Chapter Four of this volume. This extensively edited version 
of Hartman's responses to his critics is not a comprehensive rejoinder to all 
critics of formal axiology, but it covers most of them. An incredible and 
almost inexhaustible wealth of unpublished documents authored by Hartman 
in English, German, and Spanish exists in the archives at the Special 
Collections Library at The University of Tennessee. My sincere thanks to 
the librarians in that unit for their immense assistance and patience with my 
research efforts! I also want to thank other Hartman scholars like John W. 
Davis, Robert E. Carter, and Frank G. Forrest for providing me with 
essential research materials. I also express my deep appreciation to Frank 
G. Forrest and Mark A. Moore for the essays they contributed to this 
volume. 
The responses and other essays to follow are prefaced in all instances by 
my introductory editorial comments in italics, which should help to place 
them in historical and philosophical perspective. I have completed, as best 
I could, Hartman's very incomplete footnotes. Interpretive footnotes of my 
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own are placed within brackets [ ], as are important transitional words in 
the main text that I found it necessary to supply. In editing the letters, as 
integrated into the centerpiece article in Part I, "Formal Axiology and Its 
Critics," I changed all second person references to third person references, 
as Hartman himself would have done had he finished the article. I also 
consistently refer hereafter to myself in the third person. For persons 
unfamiliar with Hartman's revolutionary approach to understanding human 
values, I include the following "Introduction," which was originally 
published informally in January 1995 in Center 0 View, the newsletter of 
The Center for Applied and Professional Ethics, here at the University of 
Tennessee. 
Part I of the present volume consists of one critical article and two 
additional articles in which Hartman himself replied to his critics. All of 
the material in Part I was written before Hartman's death. Part II consists 
of articles presented in recent years at annual meetings of the Robert S. 
Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology. These articles show 
that the critique of formal axiology goes on, and that, in response to critical 
challenges, slow but steady progress is being made with the Hartmanean 
project of developing a formal science and calculus of values. I hope and 
believe that the foundations and the future promise of formal axiology will 
be much more secure with the publication of this book. 
I want to thank my colleagues in the Department of Philosophy at the 
University of Tennessee, including especially George Brenkert our 
Department Head, for a faculty research leave during the spring semester 
of 1995 which made it possible for me to complete this book. I also thank 
Marie Horton, a departmental Secretary, for helping me so cheerfully with 
much of the scanning and typing. Finally, I thank the publishers and 
copyright owners listed in the following" Acknowledgments" for permission 
to use the lengthier material included in this book. 
Rem B. Edwards 
The University of Tennessee 
May 1995 
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Rem B. Edwards 
An initial bit of explaining may be helpful to readers who are unfamiliar 
with Robert S. Hartman's unique and highly creative approach to value 
theory. In early fall of each year, the Department of Philosophy at The 
University of Tennessee in Knoxville is temporarily invaded by 
"Hartmaniacs" as they sometimes call themselves, though "Hartmaneans" 
is preferred, who are attending the annual meeting of the Robert S. Hartman 
Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology. Robert S. Hartman was a 
Research Professor of Philosophy at The University of Tennessee from 1968 
until his untimely death in 1973. During that period, his thinking about 
values had an enormous impact on many of his graduate students and a few 
of his younger colleagues, who formed the R. S. Hartman Institute and 
who, with others attracted to his work, have continued over the years to 
apply and further develop Hartman's formalistic perspective on values. 
Annual meetings of the Institute are held regularly at the University of 
Tennessee in Knoxville, since this is where Hartman last taught in the 
United States, and his papers are in the University of Tennessee Special 
Collections Library, thanks to the generosity of Mrs. Rita Hartman. From 
30 to 40 persons usually attend the annual Institute meetings. Some 
Hartmaniacs are philosophers, some psychologists, some business 
consultants, some college professors or administrators, and so on. About 
a third of the active members are Hartman's former students or colleagues. 
Many of his former students have developed flourishing consulting 
businesses based upon the personality test, the Hartman Value Profile 
[HVP], which Hartman developed. Hartmaniacs consider both the 
psychological and philosophical aspects of Hartman's work. Several 
Hartmaneans have developed prosperous investment businesses applying the 
intensional logic which they learned from Hartman to stock and 
commodities markets. Hartmaneans come from as far away as Sweden, 
Mexico, and Spain to attend the annual meetings. 
Very few of the present faculty and graduate students in Philosophy at 
The University of Tennessee seem to understand what the R. S. Hartman 
Institute is all about. Each Hartmaniac is regarded, perhaps, in something 
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resembling the way that Nathanial Hawthorne viewed the Transcendentalist 
in the early 19th Century--as a "terrible giant" who: 
... makes it his business to seize upon honest travellers and fatten them 
for his table with plentiful meals of smoke, mist, moonshine, raw 
potatoes, and sawdust. He is a German by birth, and is called Giant 
Transcendentalist [or Giant Hartmaniac, perhaps]; but as to his form, 
his features, his substance, and his nature generally, it is the chief 
peculiarity of this huge miscreant that neither he for himself, nor 
anybody for him, has ever been able to describe them ... [He looks] 
somewhat like an ill-proportioned figure, but considerably more like 
a heap of fog and duskiness. He shouted after us, but in so strange 
a phraseology that we knew not what he meant, nor whether to be 
encouraged or affrightened. 1 
Let me try to make Robert S. Hartman, his ideas, and the members of 
the Robert S. Hartman Institute a bit less mysterious. Robert S. Hartman 
was a German by birth, forced to flee for his life from Nazi Germany in 
1933. His fascinating autobiography, Freedom to Live: The Robert 
Hartman Story, edited by Art Ellis, was published in 1994.2 
Throughout this short introduction to Hartman's formal axiology and its 
applications, I must greatly oversimplify. Let me begin with a few of 
Hartman's most important and original ideas. First, unlike most 20th-
Century moral philosophers, Hartman believed that a science of values 
could be developed. It would be a formal science, akin to logic and 
mathematics, rather than a natural or empirical science, like biology and 
astronomy. The Axiom of this formal science is: Value is concept (or 
standard) fulfillment. 
The meaning of this axiom, and how it applies in practice, is best 
understood in relation to another fundamental Hartmanian notion, the 
Hierarchy of Value. The Hierarchy of Value is very simple and common-
sensical. It says, basically, that people are more important than things, and 
that things are more important than ideas or blueprints of things. Hartman 
incorporated these simple and obvious substantive value commitments into 
an incredibly powerful and profound philosophical (or scientific) system of 
axiology. Hartman recognized three kinds of value, intrinsic, extrinsic, and 
systemic, which he often symbolized as I, E, and S respectively. Individual 
people are intrinsic values; useful things, actions, and social roles in public 
spacetime are extrinsic values; and conceptual constructs like mathematics, 
logic, moral rules, cultural conventions, institutional structures, 
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philosophical ideas, religious dogmas, and all thoughts as such, are systemic 
values. Degree of value depends on richness in properties, Hartman 
thought; unique persons are richer in properties than things and social roles, 
and things and social roles are richer in properties than ideas about them, 
or any ideas as such. Thus, in the hierarchy of values, people (intrinsic 
values) rank first; things, actions, and social roles (extrinsic values) rank 
next; and ideas, rules, constructs (systemic values) rank last. 
How does the Hierarchy of Values relate to Hartman's basic Axiom? 
There are three kinds of concepts that may or may not be fulfilled-Singular 
Concepts or Unicepts of unique individuals, Analytic or Empirical Concepts 
abstracted from things, processes, actions, and social roles, and Constructed 
Concepts of a great variety of systemic objects and relations. Concepts or 
meanings are the standards by which valued objects or entities are 
measured. Using "thing" broadly to mean any kind of entity, we can say 
that: Good things completely fulfill their concepts; fair things mostly fulfill 
their concepts; average things are fifty fifty; poor things fulfill less than half 
of their meanings; and no good things hardly fulfill their meanings at all. 
For example, a really good car has all the good-making properties that 
we could want in a car-a fuel-efficient engine, adequate power, an 
automatic transmission, cruise control, good brakes, many safety features, 
ample room for passengers and luggage, a stylish and pleasingly colored 
body, an AM-FM radio/cassette system, and so on; and everything works. 
A fair car has almost all of these; an average car has enough properties to 
get by; a poor car with very few desirable properties is very troublesome; 
and a no good one is a junker. A no good car can be a very good junker! 
If an automobile is defined as "a vehicle used for passenger transportation 
with its own engine," then an entity must exemplify the definitional 
properties of being a vehicle, being capable of transporting passengers, and 
having its own engine, in order to be a car at all; but if it has only the 
definitional properties, it is not much of a car. To be a good car, it must 
have all of the additional expositional properties just mentioned-and then 
some. Hartman thought that we can measure the goodness, fairness, 
poorness, or no-goodness of things by determining the degree to which they 
measure up to the normative set of their expositional properties. 
Consider our own Singular Concepts of ourselves as unique individuals. 
Our intrinsic goodness consists in living up to, or being true to, the concepts 
that we have of ourselves. Conscience, that part of ourselves that sets 
standards for ourselves, is the normative core of our self-concept. We are 
true to ourselves, true to authentic conscience-as opposed to socially or 
personally distorted conscience-in varying degrees. Thus, we may fulfill, 
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or fail to fulfill, concepts of self in varying degrees. The Hierarchy of 
Value is the universal substantive normative core of conscience, Hartman 
thought. Some Hartmaniacs today give this insight an interesting empirical 
twist and argue that the long course of human evolution selects for 
individuals who put people first, things, acts, and roles second, and ideas 
and constructed forms third; and evolution selects against individuals who 
do not accept and live by this natural value hierarchy. 3 Extensive cross 
cultural studies of human subjects in many cultures provide powerful 
support for this evolutionary hypothesis, 4 but how can such things be 
measured? 
The degree to which individual persons, and groups of persons, exhibit 
the Hierarchy of Values can be measured precisely with one of Hartman's 
most fruitful discoveries-a personality test based upon the Hierarchy of 
Values-The Hartman Value Profile or [HVPJ. Hartman discerned that the 
structure of a person's values is the real key to the structure of that 
individual's personality; and he developed the HVP to measure the degree 
of conformity to or deviation from the Hierarchy of Values. 
The HVP measures this conformity or deviation in two different 
dimensions, Self and World. To what extent do people value themselves in 
their total uniqueness, or in their possessions, products, actions, and roles, 
or in their cognitive or conceptual capacities? To what extent do they value 
such things in their own social, physical, and conceptual environment, and 
to what extent do they value them in other people? To answer these 
questions, test subjects are asked to rank from best to worst two sets of 
eighteen carefully constructed items that manifest the Hierarchy in both the 
Self and World dimensions. 
The three basic items in the Hierarchy (persons, things, and constructs) 
may be combined with one another in inexhaustible variety, both positively 
and negatively. Hartman called positive combinations that enhance value 
"Compositions;" and negative combinations that detract from value are 
"Transpositions." For example, newborn babies may be given a number 
that matches the number on their mothers' identification bracelets; and the 
result is the positive combination of the baby, an intrinsic value-I, or N1• 
with a number, a systemic value-S, or n. This combination can be 
symbolized as I'; and it has the numerical value in transfinite set theory of 
N1°. Or convicts (intrinsic values) may be given both numbers (systemic 
values) and striped clothing (extrinsic values-E, or k) to debase their 
worth. This can be symbolized as Ill,,; value combinations can be endlessly 
complex. The eighteen items on both Self and World parts of the HVP 
differ from these illustrations, but they represent all possible positive and 
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negative binary combinations of basic intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic 
values. The HVP measures the test subject's rankings against the ideal or 
objective rankings dictated by the system. 
Ideally, test subjects should manifest the objective value order rankings 
in both Self and World dimensions. Deviations in either or both dimensions 
indicate personality and performance deficiencies; and if these are 
sufficiently severe, deviations are diagnostic of particular mental illnesses 
or personality disorders. For example, persons who consistently regard and 
treat other persons (intrinsic values) as mere things (extrinsic values) are 
psychopaths, or schizophrenics; those who are well developed in the Self 
dimension but poorly developed in the World dimension are "atychal" or 
accident prone; and persons poorly developed in the Self dimension have 
low self-esteem that may manifest itself in drug and alcohol abuse, or in 
excessively docile, dependent, or conventional behaviors. 5 Evolution 
selects for development and balance in both Self and World dimensions.6 
Since the HVP was developed, it has been, and continues to be, 
extensively verified and used for many interesting purposes. In the hands 
of clinical psychologists, it is an invaluable tool for diagnosis, for setting 
therapeutic goals, and for measuring therapeutic progress. Clinicians and 
counselors use it to determine compatibility or incompatibility and 
weaknesses and strengths in social relations like marriage or employment. 
Studies of jail and prison inmates have identified personality types likely to 
engage in criminal behaviors like murder, rape, and pedophilia. Business 
consultants use the test to determine if potential employees match job 
descriptions and requirements, or whether present employees should be 
moved or promoted into new positions, and in designing training programs 
to compensate for employees' weaknesses. In the medical setting, the HVP 
is used to measure personality and value changes associated with serious or 
even terminal diagnoses and illnesses. During 1995, the test is being 
employed to study terminally ill patients who have had near death 
experiences, with patients not having these experiences serving in control 
or contrast groups. Patients who have had unexplained spontaneous 
remissions from terminal illnesses will also be studied. These studies 
should reveal something very important about the personalities and values 
of persons who find themselves in such circumstances. The potential for 
putting the HVP to good uses is limited only by the human imagination! 
More detailed information about the Hartman Value Profile and many other 
aspects of Hartman's work is available in the book on formal published in 
1991 by a number of Hartmaniacs titled Forms of Value and Valuation: 
Theory mul Applications, edited by Rem B. Edwards and John W. Davis. 7 
6 Introduction 
Needless to say, Hartman's work is also extremely fruitful in dealing 
with philosophical approaches to value theory. The emphases, strengths, 
and weaknesses of philosophical ethical theories may now be assessed and 
measured, given the conceptual framework of formal axiology. For 
example, Kant and other deontologists overvalue the systemic (rules); the 
Stoics undervalued the extrinsic; and almost all philosophers undervalue 
concrete individual persons in favor of abstractions like pleasures, desires, 
volitions, rationality, or constructs like society, the state, truth, beauty, duty 
for duty's sake, and so on. 
Hartman promised that a logical calculus of values could be developed 
from his seminal ideas; but his tragic premature death prevented him from 
fulfilling that promise. In recent years, Hartmaniacs have made giant 
strides in carrying this project to completion. One of the most controversial 
features of Hartman's formal axiology is his correlation of the Hierarchy of 
Values with transfinite mathematics and set theory. Intrinsic values, 
persons, have a non-denumerable infinity of properties, Hartman argued, so 
their characteristic number is Aleph-sub-one (N1); extrinsic values, things, 
roles, and so on, have a denumerable infinity of properties, so their 
characteristic number is Aleph-sub-zero (No), although this becomes k (for 
finite but indeterminate) in Frank G. Forrest's development of the formal 
axiological calculus; and conceptual constructs have a finite number of 
properties, so their characteristic number is n. When rules of inference in 
transfinite mathematics are brought to bear upon combinations of these 
numbers, a calculus of value results that can be used to determine, among 
other things, which choices and courses of actions will bring about the most 
(or the least) value. An applied value calculus using transfinite mathematics 
was finally worked out by Frank G. Forrest, an exceptional Hartmaniac, 
and published in 1994 in his book entitled Valuemetrics": The Science of 
Personal and Professional Ethics. 8 
Hartmaniacs are now assessing the strengths and the weaknesses of this 
approach, as the essays in Part II of this book will illustrate. An alternative 
finitistic calculus of values, also centered on the Hierarchy of Value, 
involves the mathematics of quantum wave mechanics. This calculus was 
developed recently by Dr. Mark A. Moore. His article, "A Quantum Wave 
Model of Value Theory," is published in Part II. 
Hartmaniacs are making steady progress in the development of formal 
axiology. Soon we will know whether it is all just smoke, mist, moonshine, 
raw potatoes, sawdust, fog, and duskiness-and whether we should be 
encouraged or affrightened. 
REM B. EDWARDS 7 
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AXIOLOGY AS A SCIENCE: REPLY 
TO HECTOR NERI CASTANEDA, 
1961 
Robert S. Hartman 
A version of Robert S. Hartman's The Structure of Value was originally 
published in Spanish as: La estructura de! valor: fundamentos de la 
axiologica cientifica, (Mexico, D.F., Fonda de Cultura Economica, J959). 
Jn J96J, Hector Neri Castaneda reviewed the Spanish version in Volume 28 
of Philosophy of Science, pp. 89-93. 
Jn his hypercritical review, Castaneda charged that Hartman's belief that 
a science of values could be constructed "is naive, his wholesale attack on 
moral philosophy ... blind and unjust, his talk of a science vague, and his 
actual theory ofvalue ... inadequate, his view of what is to be imitatedfrom 
natural science is very sophisticated. "1 Castaneda contended that 
"Hartman's definition of 'good' is both counter-intuitive and useless" and 
"makes the term 'good' completely redundant "2 because a good thing like 
a chair has to have its properties to be a chair, and the question of its 
goodness is an entirely different matter. Where Hartman held that to be a 
chair, an object must have only the definitional properties of "chair," and 
that its goodness depends on its possession of additional e.xpositional 
properties, Castaneda found this distinction "too obscure. There is no 
satisfactory way of distinguishing between exposition and definition. "3 
Castaneda concluded that Hartman should have learned from Subjectivists, 
Emotivists, and lmperativists "their great insight-that values are not just 
redundant relations among comprehensions of concepts, but are intimately 
related to human feelings, attitudes, decisions, and choices. "' 
In his unfinished manuscript on "Formal Axiology and Its Critics," 
reprinted in edited form as Chapter Three of this book, Hartman wrote that: 
The Structure of Value appeared in Spanish in J959, in English in 
J 967, with a revised paperback edition in J 969. The Spanish edition 
met with unanimous applause throughout the continent; that is, there 
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were no negative reviews but rather enthusiastic positive ones-except 
by Neri Castafleda. The English edition met with the whole spectrum 
[of responses}. Of the thorough critiques of the book, I have answered 
one, namely, that of Neri Castafleda in Philosophy of Science. 
Hartman's rejoinder, the following essay, was published in Philosophy 
of Science, 29:4 (October 1962), pp. 412-433. The first four sections give 
an excellent summary of his position on the nature of science in general and 
value science in particular. This will be especially useful to persons who 
are unfamiliar with Hartman's Jonna/ axiology. He finally gets around to 
Castafleda beginning with Section 5, on "Science and Philosophy as 
Methods." 
A Rejoinder Note to Professor Neri Castaneda's Review of La Estructura 
del Valor: Fundamentos de la Axiologia Cienti.fica. 
With a new subject and, indeed, a new conception of a scientific subject 
matter, misunderstandings are natural. They usually arise when an old 
frame of reference is applied to the new approach; for the approach would 
not be new if it did not presuppose a new frame of reference. 
Professor Neri Castaneda applies the positivistic frame of reference to La 
estructura del valor, even though a section in the book entitled "Logical 
Positivism and Axiological Positivism" spells out the difference between the 
two approaches. 
1. The Argwnent of the Book 
The argument of the book may be summarized as follows. There is a 
difference between philosophy and science, which consists in the method 
and not in the content of the two disciplines. This difference is a logical 
difference, based on the nature of the concepts used in philosophy and those 
used in science. The former have been called, historically, analytic, the 
latter, synthetic. The former are categories (abstracted, implicative, and 
material concepts), the latter are axioms (constructed, deductive, and formal 
concepts). In the former, intension and extension vary inversely; in the 
latter, intension and extension vary directly. 5 The properties of things 
corresponding to this distinction are called, respectively, "secondary" and 
"primary" properties. Natural philosophy has changed, historically, from 
the use of philosophical concepts to the use of scientific concepts, in the 
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sense defined. The result has been the transition from natural philosophy 
to natural science, which is based on the distinction between "facts" of 
secondary properties, and "facts" of primary properties. The latter are 
"facts" on the level of pure theory (formal facts), the former are "facts" on 
the level of observation (material or phenomenal "facts"). In science both 
kinds of "facts" are combined; indeed, science is the combination of these 
two kinds of "fact." Thus, there is, beside formal and material fact, a third 
kind of "fact," scientific fact, as the combination of both formal and 
material facts. The distinction between the various kinds of "fact" in 
science showed up methodological fallacies in natural philosophy, as in 
alchemy, astrology, etc., which arose by confusing the various kinds of 
fact, especially, the confusion of analysis and the analyz.ed when, for 
example, a pure heart was called for as condition for a chemical reaction 
(the fallacy of method) or the confusion between different sciences, e.g., 
theology and chemistry, when the boiling of the substance had to be 
preceded by a prayer (the naturalistic fallacy), and others.6 
Value philosophy-the traditional moral philosophy-has to pass through 
the same development as natural philosophy. This development would give 
for value results analogous to those which the corresponding development 
gave to fact, namely, the distinction between "value" as category and 
"value" as axiom; "value" as analytic and "value" as synthetic concept: 
"value" as consisting of secondary value properties and "value" as 
consisting of primary value properties. "Value," then, would have to 
appear on three levels, that of pure theory (formal value), that of value 
sentiment (material or phenomenal value), and the combination of both 
(axiological value). These distinctions have to clarify methodological 
fallacies contained in moral philosophy, in particular the confusion between 
analysis and the analyz.ed, that is to say, between formal value and material 
value (between the analysis of valuation and valuation itself: the fallacy of 
method), and the confusion between different moral sciences such as ethics, 
aesthetics, economics, psychology, theology, and of all these with natural 
sciences (the naturalistic fallacy). 
The principal task of today's scientific axiology is the development of the 
first level, that of the pure theory of value, and the determination of formal 
value. In the book, this task is being approached in four ways: first, 
through the axiology of G. E. Moore; second, through the logic of Bertrand 
Russell; third through the method of Galileo Galilei; fourth through the 
polyguity or homonymity of the term "good." A fifth approach, through 
Edmund Husserl's phenomenology, is suggested. 
(1) The paradox of Moore of that "two different propositions are both 
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true of goodness, namely: (a) that it does depend only on the intrinsic nature 
of what possesses it ... (b) that, though this is so, it is yet not itself an 
intrinsic property" is solved in the way of all paradoxes, namely, by 
showing the different logical levels in question: the negative 
proposition-concerning what goodness is not-refers to the thing itself; and 
the positive proposition-concerning what goodness is-refers to the concept 
of the thing. If 'good' is a property which indicates a thing's possession of 
its class properties, then good is not a natural property of the thing itself but 
is a property of the concept of the thing, namely, its intension's being 
fulfilled by the thing. 
(2) According to Russell, a number is the class (extension) of all classes 
(extensions) similar to a given class (extension). There also ought to be a 
concept which is defined as "the intension of all intensions similar to a 
given intension." This is the concept of value. If there is given an 
intension of n predicates (a set of predicates) determining a certain extension 
(class) then the things belonging to the class (the class members) having n 
properties are good such things (good class members), and all those having 
less than n predicates are less than good (fair, bad etc.) such things. The 
value "good" then is the intension similar to the intensions n, and the values 
"less than good" are intensions similar to intensions <n. The set of 
predicates (intension) of all sets of predicates (intensions) which contain all 
their predicates (n) is the value "Good," and the set of predicates (intension) 
of all the intensions not containing all their predicates is the value 
"Less-than-good." The intension (set of predicates) of all these intensions 
similar to a given intension, then, is Value-rather than this or that 
value-just as the class of all extensions similar to a given extension is 
Number-rather than this or that number. 
(3) The third deduction compares Galileo's approach to the problem of 
motion with a possible axiological approach to the problem of value. In 
both cases the problem is one of finding a standard of measurement. 
Galileo found the standard of measurement of motion by disregarding the 
secondary qualities of the phenomenon and concentrating on its primary 
qualities, that is, qualities accessible to measurement; so that what was 
measured was not the sense phenomenon of ordinary life with secondary 
properties but a construct consisting of primary properties. What is to be 
measured in value measurement is the ordinary sense object, not only as 
possessing its secondary properties: but this very possession is what 
measures its value. Hence for value measurement the secondary properties 
must be used as primary properties. This means that the standard of a 
thing's value measurement is the intension of the thing's concept. 
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(4) The fourth deduction leads to the same result, and demonstrates, 
moreover, the pure! y formal and non-naturalistic character of the theory. 
'Good' is, as axiological writers from Aristotle to Paul Edwards have 
suggested, a homonym applicable in many different contexts, with a 
different set of criteria for its employment in each. This is an exact 
description of the logical nature of a variable. 'Good' is a variable and its 
values are actually fulfilled intensions. It is that variable the logical values 
of which are axiological values. (5) The fifth approach, through Husserl's 
phenomenology, would regard the fulfillment of intentionality as intrinsic 
valuation. This would convert phenomenology into axiology. The use of 
the logical concept as axiological measure presupposes the elaboration of 
intensional logic, which has been neglected during the development of 
extensional logic in the last hundred years. Such elaboration leads to the 
notion of intension as a set of predicates and to the structuriz.ation of this set 
according to the logic of sets. Any set of descriptive qualities defines a fact, 
any subset of such a set defines a value. 7 The result of such elaboration is 
the inversion of the relation between fact and value. Fact is that set of 
predicates, p, in tenns of which the totality of subsets of predicates (that is 
to say of values) V,, is ordered, according to the formula of the 
combinatorial calculus, V, = 2P - I. Fact appears thus as the ordering 
norm of value. This means that in valuation one leaves out of account the 
nonnal set of secondary properties (of fact or of the thing in question) and 
freely combines and re-combines the elements of this set. Such 
combinations and recombinations of secondary properties are values. As 
elements of values the secondary properties of fact become the primary 
properties of value. The combinatorial calculus applied allows the exact 
measurement of values. Denumerable intensional sets measure extrinsic 
value, non-denumerable intensional sets measure intrinsic value. In the 
book, only the first kind of measurement is discussed in detail. The 
complete presentation of the calculus is reserved for another book, The 
Measurement of Value. 8 The approach to value presented in the book is 
called "axiological positivism." 
2. Logical Positivism and Axiological Positivism 
It is clear in which respect this approach to value differs from, and in which 
it coincides with, that of logical positivism. The strict logical positivist 
believes that an intelligible theory, let alone a science of value, is 
impossible. The reason is that the subject matter of value does not fit his 
frame of reference, based as it is on extensional logic. Rather than 
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extending his frame of reference and creating a new one which will fit value 
phenomena, he denies their intelligible existence. His logic is a bed of 
Procrustes. What is within it is being stretched, and what is outside it is 
either amputated or contorted. An example of the stretching is that of 
quantifiers into elements of "metaphysics." An example of amputation is the 
negation of the propositional nature of value judgments. Examples of 
contortions are the many auxiliary and ad hoc devices-"persuasive 
definitions," "contextual implication," etc.-by which positivists want to 
save the appearances, that is, talk about value, and yet not give up the old 
framework or construct an entirely new one. 
Against all these, the axiological positivist advocates a genuinely new 
logic which will account for value phenomena with the same precision with 
which extensional logic, in the form of mathematics, accounts for natural 
phenomena. The axiological positivist thus agrees with the logical positivist 
in his critical view of philosophy, but disagrees with his negative 
conclusion. The traditional philosophical disciplines are indeed vague and 
meaningless and ought to be regarded as species of logic. But this does not 
mean that they ought to disappear. On the contrary, it means that they 
ought to be reconstituted on the basis of a new logic. The counterpart in 
physics to the positivistic attitude in ethics would be Albert Einstein's 
decision, since it was proved that the ether did not exist, to lean back and 
pronounce all natural science as "nonsense." Instead, he designed a new 
frame of reference for the old that had rendered things nonsensical. Not so 
the radical logical positivist. Observing that traditional philosophy appears 
nonsensical in the frame of reference he applies, he leans back and 
pronounces all such philosophy nonsensical. He never for a minute doubts 
his frame of reference. Like a man with blue glasses he swears the world 
is blue. Although he supposedly applies the scientific method he never once 
applies the truly scientific procedure of changing the frame of reference 
when it renders the subject matter absurd. Old nonsense, the history of 
science has amply demonstrated, makes sense in new frames of reference. 9 
In the fashion of naive scholastic realism, our positivists condemn the 
subject matter rather than critically examine their instrument of inquiry. 
The axiological positivist differs from the logical positivist in one decisive 
point: his conception of logic. For the strict logical positivist there is only 
one logic, extensional or class logic; and as he sees clearly that the concepts 
of metaphysics, ethics, aesthetics, etc., do not fit into this logic, he 
concludes that these disciplines are no disciplines at all, and "literally 
nonsense." The view of the less strict positivist is somewhat more 
sophisticated. He does see that a new logical instrument is necessary. But 
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what be produces are snatches of logic, ad hoc devices which, being 
logically neither here nor there, are, for the axiological positivist, no more 
than gimmicks bound to disappear, as have similar devices in natural 
philosophy, such as phlogiston or Tycho Brahe's cosmological speculations. 
What the axiological positivist envisages is a full-fledged intensional logic 
in the traditional sense of the term, that is, one based not on modalities of 
copulas but on predicative sets. In distinction to the logical positivist, 
therefore, he recognizes two logics, not merely one, an extensional and an 
intensional, the former based on sets of subjects, the latter based on sets of 
predicates. The elaboration of the former is the frame of reference of 
natural science; the elaboration of the latter is the frame of reference of 
moral science. The latter frame of reference is calledfonnal axiology. 
The positivistic point of departure-that the philosophical disciplines are 
species of the genus "logic"-thus leads the axiological positivist to the 
conception of a moral science. He is an axiological positivist for-mutatis 
mutandis, namely, substituting intensional for extensional logic-he 
considers moral philosophy the same way the logical positivist considers 
natural philosophy. But he cannot afford the dogmatism of the logical 
positivist; he cannot declare that since his is the only true logic and natural 
philosophy appears in it as nonsense, natural philosophy is a psychosomatic 
phenomenon, a kind of grunt, like "Hm" or an ejaculation like "Aha," and 
a natural science a hallucination. 10 Since there are two different kinds of 
logic, both interrelated, applicable to two kinds of reality, that of nature and 
that of morals, he concedes to the logicians of the former their right to deal 
with natural philosophy, reserving for himself the right to deal with moral 
philosophy. The efforts of the logical positivists of amputating half of 
philosophy because it does not fit the bed which they think is the only one 
there is, is not only against all scientific but also against philosophical 
tradition. All philosophy has aspired to specify its general concepts, even 
though this effort up to date has succeeded only in natural philosophy. But 
the moral philosophers were no less industrious and methodologically 
correct simply because they were less successful. On the contrary, this 
tradition is in the field of moral philosophy as old as philosophy itself--and 
older than in the field of natural philosophy. As late as 1695 John Locke 
believed natural science to be impossible, in spite of the works of "the 
incomparable Mr. Newton"; 11 but he never doubted the possibility of a 
scientific ethics as obvious and precise as mathematics. In doing so he 
continued a tradition going back to Plato-that of the elaboration of the good 
as measure in diairesis, the division and organization of the ideas. 12 The 
concepts which these philosophers wanted to determine with Scientific 
18 ROBERTS. HARTMAN 
prec1s10n, and in the precision of which they saw the very core of the 
philosophical method and the only justification of the philosopher, were the 
concepts of moral philosophy, in particular, "goodness." 
This old quest must be taken up anew. For the axiological positivist, 
ethics has declined in the last hundred and fifty years rather than 
progressed. It has become more and more irrational rather than rational; 
and this irrationality has been mirrored in the social and moral events of the 
corresponding age, culminating in what The New Cambridge Modern 
History calls "The Era of Violence. " 13 Philosophers who further and abet 
this irrationality not only surrender the eternal aspirations of philosophy, 
they further and abet the era of violence. For this reason Ferrater Mora 
could rightly say of Ludwig Wittgenstein that he, "an obscure Professor at 
Cambridge symbolizes more exactly our troubled times than a famous 
playwrite in Paris," Jean Paul Sartre, 14 and Bertrand Russell that "the 
desire to understand the world is, the Wittgensteinians think, an outdated 
folly ... The later Wittgenstein ... seems to have grown tired of serious 
thinking and to have invented a doctrine which would make such an activity 
unnecessary." 15 These and other remarks contained in La estructura del 
valor, discussing the present nadir of ethical theory, are not "personal 
attacks" as Professor Neri Castaneda has it, but the truth of the present 
intellectual and moral situation in ethics, as the axiological positivist sees it. 
The philosopher today, in this view, must combine logical rigor with 
historic conscience. The various positivistic schools, in their ethical 
endeavors, show, according to that same view, neither the one nor the 
other. 
They do not see the true lesson natural science has taught us: that one can 
think with precision in generality and with generality in precision. The 
transformation of natural philosophy into natural science has not changed the 
generality of the object of knowledge; the physics of today, as that of 
Galileo and Sir Isaac Newton, deals with the most general problems of 
space, time, matter, knowledge, etc. But it does so with precision, 
scientifically and not philosophically. What has changed since Aristotle is 
the method, not the content, of natural philosophy. Thus, in order to know 
with precision, it is not necessary to limit the object one wants to examine. 
One can think in the largest possible categories and yet can do so with 
precision. The sciences typical of most general and at the same time most 
precise thinking are mathematics and logic; their application to natural 
phenomena enables us to think about nature both with generality and with 
precision. By means of an axio-logic, an intensional logic, one could think 
with equal generality and equal precision in the traditional moral sciences, 
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in ethics, aesthetics, metaphysics, epistemology, and others. To take the 
example of ethics, what would it mean to think with both generality and 
precision in the moral field? What is the kind of precision that could be 
applied to ethics? How would ethics as a philosophy differ from ethics as 
a science? 
3. Ethics and Meta-Ethics 
The answer is not difficult, in terms of the difference between philosophy 
and science given above. Scientific ethics would be not categorial but 
axiomatic, not substantial but functional, not abstractive but constructive, 
not material but formal. It would use not analytic but synthetic concepts, 
not imply at random but deduce systematically, not lose specificity in the 
degree that it gains generality, but gain specificity in the degree that it gains 
generality. And while philosophical ethics, in its totality, is a largely 
unconnected aggregate of general assertions made by individual thinkers, 
scientific ethics would be a cumulative process within one and the same 
frame of reference, the axiological, resulting not in general statements but 
in the development of a method for conducting life-a method which ought 
to be as comprehensive and as deep as life itself. 
This transformation would be brought about by the establishment of the 
axiological framework. It would contain a precise definition of the field of 
ethics: Ethics is the application of intrinsic value to the human person. 16 
Since the formal system contains a precise definition of "intrinsic value" 17 
the application of this definition to the human person originates an exact 
science, namely Ethics, just as the application of, say, the notion of a 
straight line in geometry to a ray of light originated an exact science, 
namely Optics. 
Scientific ethics, then, is a particular application of the axiological 
framework to the human person; and other such applications are other 
scientific moral disciplines, such as aesthetics (the application of intrinsic 
value to things), sociology (the application of extrinsic value to human 
persons), economics (the application of extrinsic value to things), etc. 18 
Scientific ethics is the combination of pure ethical value ("intrinsic value 
applied to the human person") and material ethical value or ethical 
phenomena, that is, those phenomena, e.g., sincerity, observed in human 
persons. The phenomenon observed, analyzed in terms of the definition of 
ethical value, produces the ethical value, namely, sincerity as an intrinsic 
value. "Intrinsic value" is defined with precision in the formal frame of 
reference; and a special formal deduction from it yields the scientific notion 
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"Sincerity." Its application is the observed phenomenon elaborated in all 
the details the system allows. "Sincerity" then is part of the system of 
scientific ethics. Scientific ethics does not deal with this or that ethical 
phenomenon, e.g., sincerity; it contains the definition of the phenomenon, 
"Sincerity"; and it must in turn be applied whenever the phenomenon of 
sincerity is to be examined in a particular case-just as the science of Optics 
does not deal with this or that phenomenon of light but with the definition 
of light; and it must be applied in any particular case to phenomena of light. 
Just as optics is the frame of reference for light phenomena, so scientific 
ethics is the frame of reference for ethical phenomena. And just as 
geometry, and mathematics in general, is the frame of reference for 
optics-and hence a meta-optics-, so formal axiology is the frame of 
reference for scientific ethics, and hence a meta-ethics. 
Where, then, in this picture, fits the old philosophical ethics? In exactly 
the same place that the old Aristotelian optics fits in the present picture of 
science. Starting with Christian Huygens' Traite de la Lumiere and 
Newton's Optics, scientific optics took the place of Aristotelian optics. But 
what does it mean "took the place"? It means that Aristotelian optics was 
examined in the light of the new optics; the parts that fitted were adapted; 
those that did not were discarded. This means, however, that scientific 
optics served as frame of reference for Aristotelian optics, and hence was 
a meta-Aristotelian optics, which means that mathematics was a meta-meta-
Aristotelian optics. 
The same relationship holds between traditional ethics and scientific 
ethics-the latter being a frame of reference for the treatment of the former, 
and hence a meta-Aristotelian ethics-only that Aristotelian ethics is still 
regarded as a part of Ethics today, in contradistinction to Aristotelian optics 
which is extinct. In creating a scientific ethics in the sense defined, one 
therefore is creating a meta-ethics with respect to traditional-and still 
prevailing-ethics. The relation between scientific ethics and traditional 
ethics, then, is that between a meta-system to its object system. This means 
that, with respect to traditional ethics, scientific ethics not only defines the 
ethical terms with precision, but first determines how ethical terms can be 
defined with precision. When traditional ethics speaks of "norms," 
"values," "duties," "sincerity," etc., scientific ethics analyzes these terms, 
determines their meaning, their interrelationships, and establishes a network 
of formal relations which can be used in ethics, as mathematics can be used 
in physics or astronomy. The terms in question then appear as formal 
relations within the system of scientific ethics. This ethics, then, is a 
propaedeutic, a discipline anterior to ethics; it is not ethics but the 
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determination of ethics, and even of the possibilities of ethics. It is not 
ethics but deals with ethics. It has ethics as its subject matter, just as ethics 
has human conduct as its subject matter. Scientific ethics, thus, deals with 
human conduct by means of ethics: it analyzes ethics as the knowledge of 
human conduct and makes this knowledge precise. It brings about the 
precision of ethics by synthetic formulation. In the process, it transforms 
ethics from a philosophical discipline into a scientific method. 
Since scientific ethics deals with ethics rather than is ethics, it is on a 
higher logical level than ethics. There appears then here, again, the 
necessity of distinguishing logical levels in value theory, as it did in the 
solution of the Moorean paradox of goodness; (one of the "two different 
propositions that are both true of goodness" was found to be of a higher 
logical order than the other). The neglect of distinguishing logical levels in 
moral philosophy is, precisely, what we called the fallacy of method, that 
is, the fallacy of confusing form and content of axiological reasoning. As 
a result, ethics has been plagued by fallacies, only one of which has been 
seen by G. E. Moore. 19 
Since the meta-discipline is always more general than the disciplines it 
deals with it has a wider extension than the latter. If, moreover, it is 
synthetic rather than analytic it also has a richer content or intension. Thus 
scientific ethics is not only more extensive but also more precise than 
philosophical ethics. It applies to the totality of all ethical philosophies and 
is an instrument of their analysis and interrelation. 
As there is scientific ethics as a metaethics for traditional ethics, so there 
are-and ought to be-meta-aesthetics, meta-metaphysics, meta-
epistemology, and other scientific meta-disciplines which analyze and 
interrelate the corresponding philosophical disciplines, aesthetics, 
metaphysics, epistemology, etc. And "beyond" these meta-disciplines there 
is the meta-meta-discipline which analyzes and interrelates the 
meta-disciplines themselves, namely formal axiology. This discipline is 
metaphilosophy, that is to say, meta-philosophia-moralis, which is on the 
same logical level as meta-philosophia-naturalis, or mathematics. As 
mathematics is the natural meta-philosophy, which contains the patterns for 
natural sciences, so formal axiology is the moral metaphilosophy, which 
contains the patterns for moral sciences. As the mathematical patterns can 
be applied to the various disciplines of natural philosophy-physics, 
chemistry, astronomy, and so on-so the axiological patterns can be applied 
to the various disciplines of moral philosophy-ethics, metaphysics, 
aesthetics, and so on. And as the mathematical applications by Sir Isaac 
Newton, Antoine Lavoisier, etc., constituted, respectively, physics as a 
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meta-discipline "beyond" Aristotelian physics, chemistry as a 
meta-discipline "beyond" alchemy, astronomy as a meta-discipline "beyond" 
the earlier astronomies and astrologies, so the axiological applications ought 
to constitute meta-ethics beyond traditional ethics, meta-aesthetics beyond 
traditional aesthetics, meta-metaphysics beyond traditional metaphysics and 
so on. These meta-disciplines ought to differ from the traditional disciplines 
in being more exact and more comprehensive-in possessing greater 
generality joined with greater precision; that is, in their scientific character. 
They would be more systematic; "systematic," "scientific," and "meta-" 
discipline being synonymous. 20 Systematic ethics is scientific ethics or 
metaethics. It is a part of formal axiology. 
We have then the following historico-logical scheme of the development 
of science, a scheme which confirms the assertions of philosophers of 
science, such as Pierre Duhem, that historical analysis of science is in many 
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As is seen, the traditional moral philosophies are transformed, through 
the establishment of moral science, into historical disciplines with the same 
methodological position as the traditional natural philosophies, Aristotelian 
physics, alchemy, astrology, and so on. This does not mean, however, that 
they would become obsolete. Although for the practicing scientist of today 
the natural philosophies of the past have little interest, for the philosopher 
trying to understand-rather than apply-these sciences they are 
indispensable. The moral philosophies are even more important to the 
moral scientist-the axiologist-for there will not be in morality the external 
transformation of the world which natural science has effected through 
technology. The moral sciences are going to bring about an internal 
transformation of man; they are going to relate intensions rather than 
extensions, meanings rather than objects. For this transformation the insight 
of moral philosophers of the past into the nature of man is going to be more 
useful than that of the natural philosophers of the past into the nature of 
matter. But there is another, and most significant reason why the new 
moral science will not change moral philosophy so radically as natural 
Axiology as a Science 23 
science bas changed natural philosophy: natural philosophy was in a large 
degree moral philosophy. 
4. Physics and Ethics-Metaphysics and Metaethics 
It is for this reason that the scientists of the Renaissance had to proceed so 
drastically. Galileo, for example, had to invert completely the relation 
between form and matter of Aristotelian physics, that is to say, between the 
method of analyzing nature and the object of this analysis. To express it 
pointedly, Aristotle used nature to explain logic; Galileo used logic to 
explain nature. The fundamental categories of explication of Aristotle were 
the teleological categories of the physical process: potentiality and actuality, 
connected into unity through movement, as cause which converts potentiality 
into actuality. Through these categories Aristotle not only solved physical 
problems but also logical ones. 21 Galileo, on the other hand, used logic 
to solve physical problems. To do this he had first to "degrade," to 
"de-meta-physicize," or "secularize" the metaphysical categories of 
Aristotle. In particular, he had to convert "movement" from a metaphysical 
concept to a physical phenomenon. In consequence, he bad to find new 
explicatory categories for this phenomenon. He found them in mathematical 
relations. Thus, the "degradation" of movement meant at the same time the 
elevation of mathematics and of sense observation-both anathema to the 
medieval mind. 22 Since mathematical relations are specific logical 
relations, it is correct to say that he used logic to explain nature and thus 
inverted the Aristotelian method. 
Thus, Galileo wrote the true metaphysics, in the logical sense explained 
above, to the physics of Aristotle. The latter then appeared largely as a 
collection of methodological, and consequently factual errors. It is, of 
course, methodologically speaking more correct to explain nature by logic 
than logic by nature. For logic is an explanatory system, while nature is a 
"system" to be explained. But this was by no means obvious to the 
philosophers of the Middle Ages. And it is by no means obvious to the 
value philosophers of today. There is a large literature on the value of logic 
but very little on the logic of value. 23 
Thus, although formal axiology discovers similar methodological errors 
in moral philosophy and actually inverts some of the traditional ethical 
arguments in the same way that Galileo inverted some of the Aristotelian 
arguments, 24 this inversion will not have as radical a character as the 
Galilean inversion of Aristotle. The difference between the inverted 
elements in moral philosophy is not as great as it was in natural philosophy. 
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Galileo had to invert the Aristotelian relation between movement and logic. 
Supposing we have a similar situation in axiology and have to invert the 
relation between value and logic: that traditional axiology had used the 
category of value in order to explain features of logic, and that we had to 
invert this relation and use logic in order to explain the phenomena of 
value. 25 This inversion, although logically as radical as the Galilean, is 
not so actually because value is not something as obvious and sensory as 
movement. We do not know as clearly with our senses what value is as we 
know what movement is-and as the Aristotelians knew better than Galileo, 
since their physics was based on common sense while Galileo's was not. 
We do not know, then, what value is, whether it is a category or a 
phenomenon. Hence, what axiological science is going to determine about 
value will not be such a shock against our senses and our image of the 
world as what Galileo determined about motion. The new position of value 
within the frame of reference of axiology will not be felt as a 
"degradation," at least not in the same degree that was felt the new position 
of motion within the frame of reference of Galilean mechanics. To be sure, 
and as also appears in Dr. Neri Castaiieda's review, the denouement of the 
fallacy of method does cause a feeling of degradation of value, which makes 
difficult the acceptance of formal axiology. But the methodological shock 
to our knowledge is very much softer than was the theological shock to the 
emotions of Galileo's contemporaries. Value and logic are very much 
closer than motion and logic. Thus, the substitution of logic for value, 
though offensive to some degree, is not comparable in severity to the shock 
suffered by medieval man. What he had to give up he lived with all his 
soul. What we have to give up are some methodological errors which, 
moreover, concern mostly professional philosophers and are of no interest 
to ordinary people. Philosophical ethics-precisely for being 
philosophical-has never been relevantly used for understanding moral 
reality. 
For this reason, a reconstruction in ethics, and in value theory in general, 
is necessary; and the positivistic denial of this necessity, or the somewhat 
desperate positivistic production of pseudo-logical substitutes, will not do. 
What is necessary is a new logic applicable to value; and this is not a new 
insight but a demand voiced from Plato to Susanne Langer. What was 
needed was only to take it seriously. 26 
5. Science and Philosophy as Methods 
The question, then, is not that but how; not that a new logic is necessary but 
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how to construct it. This is a task which is only outlined in my book; the 
book is not the new formal axiology but only tries to lay its "foundations." 
All it tries to make clear is that the limitation of the notion of 
science-prevalent in the Anglo-Saxon countries rather than the Continent 
of Europe or Latin America-to natural science is illegitimate, and that 
"science," Wissenschaft, may mean both natural and moral science. Once 
this is conceded the argument of the book is obvious. It follows that the 
difference between philosophy and science is not one of subject matter but 
one of method, and that any material may be the subject matter of 
philosophy or the subject matter of science. Thus, natural phenomena 
("facts") and moral phenomena ("values") may both be the objects of either 
philosophy or of science. In the first case, when natural phenomena are the 
objects of philosophy or of science, we have natural philosophy and natural 
science. In the second case, when moral phenomena are the objects of 
philosophy or of science, we have moral philosophy and moral science. 
Today, we have natural science and moral philosophy, but not natural 
philosophy or moral science. While natural philosophy has developed into 
natural science, moral philosophy has not developed into moral science. 
From today's juxtaposition of natural science and moral philosophy follows 
a fivefold confusion, which can be formalized in terms of fallacies, two of 
which were mentioned above. This confusion concerns partly natural 
science, partly moral philosophy. From the fact that "science" today is 
natural science it is concluded (I) that no other kind of science is possible; 
the species "natural science" is taken for the genus "science" (the "moral 
fallacy"). Consequently, (2) the characteristics of natural science are taken 
for the characteristics of science in general. These characteristics arise, 
however, from the specific subject matter of natural science; hence the 
object of science is confused with science itself ("the fallacy of method"). 
The characteristics of "science" are said to be observational verification and 
prediction. Actually, these are characteristics only of natural science, 
arising from the subject matter of this science, the natural phenomena, 
which can be "observed," because they are in space and time, and 
"predicted," because the theory to be verified precedes the verification. A 
science which does not deal with spatio-temporal phenomena neither 
"observes" nor "predicts" in the sense of natural science, and yet is 
science. Examples of such sciences are mathematics, logic, musical theory, 
and axiology. 27 The claim of natural science to be science pure and simple, 
thus, is illegitimate. 
A similar illegitimacy arises on the side of moral philosophy. From the 
fact that there is no moral science it is concluded (3) that there can be no 
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such science, and this conclusion is applied (4) to the objects of moral 
philosophy, values, which, as emotions, etc., are held to be subject to 
psychology, sociology, and the like but not to "ethics" (the "naturalistic 
fallacy"). In particular, it is held to be impossible to account for values as 
such by a science, where by "science" is meant again natural rather than 
moral science. Thus there is added a fifth confusion, (5) that between 
natural science and moral science (the "metaphysical fallacy"). 
All this follows from the mere conception of a science of values. If one 
does not share this conception, of course, nothing follows. And then either 
one should not read my book, or else, if one does, one should attack its 
thesis. Failing either the one or the other, the result must be 
misunderstanding. Professor Neri Castaneda's principal misunderstanding, 
not being "in sympathy" with the conception advanced, is that he does not 
discuss the thesis of the book. According to this thesis, as has been stated 
above, value appears on three different levels which must be kept strictly 
apart: the formal, the material, and the axiological. The first is the level of 
the system of value concepts, the level of "value"; the second is the level 
of the unsystematized chaos of value phenomena, or of value; the third is 
the combination of the two levels, the application of the system to the 
phenomena. 28 The book deals with the first dimension exclusively, 29 that 
is, it tries to lay the foundation of the system of value concepts or "value." 
It does not deal with value phenomena or with the application of the system 
to the phenomena, except in outline, especially in the last section entitled 
"Summary and Outlook." 
Objections should be directed against what the book is about rather than 
against what the book is not about, namely, against the system of "values" 
and not against either the value phenomena or their ordering by the system. 
The most powerful objection against a system is that it is no system; that it 
is inconsistent, illogical, that the axioms are not clear and the deductions do 
not follow from them. No such objection against the logic of the system is 
being brought forward by the reviewer. Neither does he object against the 
analogy between natural science and moral science. His objections concern 
almost exclusively the relevance of the system for the value phenomena. 
He regards the system as "irrelevant," "useless" etc., because he cannot see 
how it can be applied (even though the last section outlines applications to 
some twenty different sciences). He further objects against the very essence 
of a system, namely, its tautological nature (which he calls "redundancy"), 
and, again, concludes from it that the system is inapplicable to value reality. 
The thesis of the book is precisely that the value phenomena ("human 
feelings, attitudes, decisions, and choices") can be systematized on a higher 
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logical level, but that this logic, at first glance, has as little to do with the 
value phenomena as, say, number theory, at first glance, has to do with the 
nature of the universe. Thus, it may well be that the reviewer does not see 
any application of the system. He is not supposed to. He is supposed to 
pass judgment on the system qua system. And objections against its 
applicability are not objections against the system. It is no objection against 
the "formulas for adding and multiplying values etc." deduced from the 
definition of value, that they are "ingenious but fruitless, since the 
fundamental definitions are irrelevant to most actual evaluations. "30 Even 
if they are-and the reviewer cannot possibly know this since he cannot 
have tried to apply them "to most actual evaluations"31-he should have 
seen that these formulae were introduced not for a material but for a purely 
formal purpose: in order to determine, as fully as possible, the hitherto 
unknown relation between description and valuation in the Moorean 
sense-and this is a most relevant subject within the theory of value, that is, 
the book's subject matter. 32 
From the main error of confusing the subject of the book, "value," with 
what is not its subject, value-and interpreting what the book says of the 
former as if it were said of the latter-there follow subsidiary errors, many 
of which evince the reviewer's tendency of changing logical levels in mid-
argument and thus committing the fallacy of method. Of these, only one 
shall be singled out for discussion, since it is an objection against the system 
itself-an objection, however, which loses its power by committing the 
fallacy in question. 33 
6. The Fallacy of Method 
The objection is directed against the core of the system, the definition of 
Goodness. Professor Neri Castaiieda says, in discussing the distinction 
between (P) "x is a C" and (Q) "x is a good C" that of the three 
expressions defining x's Goodness-namely 
(I) x is a C 
(II) C has the comprehension ~ which consists of the properties </>; 
(III) x has all the properties </>, 
(I) is strictly synonymous with the conjunction of (II) and (III) so that 
his .. .logic simply reduces (Q) to (I), i.e., (P), and we are again 
confronting a theory which makes value absolutely redundant. 
Hartman, of course, asserts that (I) does not imply (III) ... Xis a C, in 
other words, does not necessarily mean that x must have all the 
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properties contained in C (or 4>) (p. 229). But, obviously, e.g., a 
knee-high structure with a seat but no back support is not (called) a 
chair; it may be a stool or a bench or just a seat, but once we have 
decided not to call it a chair, it would be absurd to say that it is a bad 
chair since it is not really a chair. 34 
As is seen, Professor Neri Castaneda counters a purely logical argument by 
a certain way of naming a chair. Even if a chair without a back would not 
be called a chair, there are plenty of chairs that lack some chair 
characteristics and, for that matter, are not called something other than chair 
but are called bad chairs, (as Professor Neri Castaneda himself concedes 
later in discussing the distinction of exposition and definition). But it is 
irrelevant for the logical argument how things are actually called. What 
counts is the logical notion of an intension as a set of predicates. To object 
against this notion by the status of chairs is like objecting against the rule 
that 2 + 2 = 4 by saying that a drunk recently saw two people as four, and 
hence 2 = 4. This mixing of logical levels is, precisely, what the book 
calls the fallacy of method, and to which it traces most of the confusions in 
axiological thinking. The book tries to be "an attempt to introduce orderly 
thinking into moral subjects," meaning by disorderly thinking committing 
the various fallacies, especially the fallacy of method, the leaping back and 
forth, without being aware of it, between different logical levels. This 
means, in value theory in particular, mixing up the concept "value" with the 
phenomenon of value, or, in other words, confusing value theory with its 
subject matter, value. As a result, valuers believe they analyze value, value 
analysts believe they value, philosophers of value believe they must be 
involved, committed, etc., and valuers who are committed, involved, etc., 
believe they must philosophize, etc. Thus philosophy and value, value and 
ideology, commitment and rationalization, are all being mixed up. 
The fundamental distinction disregarded is the self-evident one between 
thinking and the object thought. This implies the following distinctions: 
between thinking and doing, between content and form, between subject 
matter and method, between practice and theory, between use and meaning. 
These distinctions, in turn, determine those between order and disorder, 
between clarity and confusion, between coherence and fragmentation 
(incoherence), and between relevance and triviality. In other words, the 
fundamental distinction between thinking and its object is the condition sine 
qua non for the order, clarity, coherence, and relevance of a theory; while 
the fusion of thinking with its object leads, in different degrees, to the 
disorder, confusion, fragmentation, and triviality of a theory. All this, of 
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course, is too obvious for natural science even to be mentioned. But for 
value theory this clarification is of importance. For much of value theory 
is based on the confusions in question. 
As a result, the three levels of value, fonnal value, material value, and 
the combination of both, axiological value, are not distinguished. This 
means, simply, that value has not been made an object of orderly thinking. 
It is not, really, the subject of a theory; and value "theory" is a euphemism. 
For the formal axiologist, value ought to be an object of knowledge like 
any other, no different in this respect from the rose for the botanist or the 
electric current for the physicist. The botanist does not smell like a rose, 
and the physicist does not give off sparks. They analyze smells and sparks. 
In the same way, the axiologist does not value, but analyzes value. When 
the botanist hands a rose to his fiancee or the physicist pulls the bread out 
of the electric toaster, they do not act as either botanist or physicist. They 
act as human beings in everyday situations. These situations happen to 
exemplify certain features of their professional subject matter. But as 
botanist and physicist, respectively, their task is not to hand roses to 
fiancees or pull bread out of toasters. It is to be professionals and experts 
in roses and currents, that is to say, to be familiar with the fundamental 
principles and general laws that underlie all roses and all currents. 
The axiologist is the expert in Value. When he values he does not act as 
an axiologist but as a human being in an everyday situation. This situation 
happens to exemplify certain features of his professional subject matter. But 
as axiologist his task is not to value but to be the professional and expert in 
value, to be familiar with the fundamental principles and general laws that 
underlie all valuing. 
The book then is for experts or professionals in value, not for valuers (as 
a book in botany is for botanists, not for roses). It is to value as a treatise 
on pulmonary physiology is to breathing. The lung specialist is not a yogi 
or a fakir specializing in breathing exercises; he has-as a specialist-no 
commitment to a particular way of life of which breathing exercises are a 
part; he breathes like anybody else. In breathing he is not a specialist in 
breathing. On the contrary, if there is something wrong with his breathing, 
he will probably go to consult a colleague. The value specialist is not a 
saint or a fiend specializing in valuing exercises; he has no commitment-as 
a specialist-to a particular way of life of which value exercises are a part; 
he values like anybody else. In valuing he is not a specialist in valuing. 
And it may well be, when the science of valuation is as fully developed as 
is the science of medicine, that the axiologist, if there is something wrong 
with his valuing, will have to consult a colleague. 
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The book, then, does not give exercises in valuation, but the principles 
of value. It is about "value," not value. 
All this is put pithily in a passage by Theodor Lessing, used as motto for 
a Chapter of [his] book: 
He who confuses the study of the object value with the study of the 
concrete valuable objects or even with the study of the acts of 
valuational attitudes, is in the position of a man who assigns the study 
of arithmetic to the botanists because he learned to count with apples 
and nuts, or who confuses higher mathematics with the psychology of 
counting because there would be no theory of numbers without people 
who know how to count. 35 
Logic as such has nothing to do with chairs, and value logic as such has 
nothing to do with the value of chairs. 
7. The Logical Difference Between Valuation and Description 
Thus, the objection should have been directed against the logical 
considerations given in the book for the non-redundancy of the three 
formulae. Dr. Neri Castaneda says "His ... logic simply reduces (Q) to (I), 
i.e. (P)." But this is not my logic but his. For me, reduction, and 
reducibility, are not at all the simple things in logic that Dr. Neri Castaneda 
makes them out to be. The logical argument of the book-which is passed 
over by the reviewer in favor of the chair example-examines the logical 
difference between (P) and (Q), between "C is a chair" and "C is a good 
chair." It is as follows. 
In "xis a C" every predicate contained in C (or cl>) is one of x. But in 
"xis a good C," the predicate "good" is not a predicate of x, even though 
it may look as if it were, but a predicate of the predicate(s) of x, a predicate 
of C (or 4>)-if not a predicate of a predicate, or predicates, of C (or cl>). 
"Xis a good C" thus is at least a second-order function, that is, a function 
of a first-order function. In other words, a thing that is what it is, is what 
it is, and that is the end of the matter. But a thing that fully is what it is not 
only is what it is but is well what it is: value has been added to its 
factuality. A thing that has all the chair qualities is not only a chair but also 
a good chair. To be fully a chair and to be a good chair is the same thing; 
but to be fully a chair and to be a chair are different things. To be a chair 
is a function of the form "1/;x," to be fully a chair is a function of the form 
"(1/;)1/;x. ,,36 
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"Fully a chair," "a real chair," "a good chair," "ah, a chair!" etc., are 
not the same as merely "a chair." That they seem to be the same is due to 
a fundamental characteristic of language, not always recognized in its 
universality, although Bertrand Russell has touched upon it in his Axiom of 
Reducibility (introduced for purely mathematical reasons): that language 
contains an infinity of words which appear as first-order tunctions, or as 
predicative functions of any order, which are equivalent to functions of a 
higher order. They are higher-order functions "reduced" to predicative 
functions. 
"Good," now, is such a "reduced" function; it hides within it a whole 
hierarchy of logical orders. "Xis good" is a first-order function equivalent 
to a function, or functions, of higher orders. It is this higher-order content 
in the seemingly simple predicative function "good" that has been hidden 
so far, and which is being made explicit by fonnal axiology. 37 
G. E. Moore's paradox of the "two different propositions both true of 
goodness," namely that (1) good is not a natural intrinsic property and (2) 
depends only on the natural intrinsic properties of the thing that has it, may 
be stated logically as follows: (1) "xis good" is not a predicative function, 
but (2) it appears as one. And the book's addition to Moore's statement, 
and the solution of its paradox-that the value of a thing depends on the 
correspondence of its properties with those contained in its concept-may 
be rendered by saying that (3) value is a second-order function. The secret 
of value, then, is not to be a predicative function but to appear as one 
(Moore) or to be (at least) a second-order function reduced to a first-order 
function (formal axiology). In one statement: the secret of value is to be 
a reduced higher-order function. 
"Good" is only one of an infinity of such functions throughout all realms 
of language. A whitewashed house, in the second-order sense, may or may 
not be actually whitewashed in the first-order sense; a nurse on duty, in the 
second-order sense, may actually be asleep; a ship at anchor may actually 
drag its anchor; an article in stock, in the second-order sense, may actually 
be out of stock in the first-order sense, etc., etc. Such 
double-edged-indeed, multiedged-expressions have recently been called 
"continuous states. "38 Actually, they are multi-order logical statements 
capable of reduction to predicative statements. Their mercurial 
character,making them capable of now appearing as predicative functions, 
now as higher-order functions makes them highly disturbing elements of 
language, like comets swishing through their well-ordered circles. Like 
comets, they appear as harbingers of disorder, of linguistic confusion: 
second-order (and higher-order) statements appearing misleadingly in the 
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form of first-order statements, statements about concepts appearing in the 
misleading form of statements about instances. Like comets, they were 
hard to discover, and it seems W. J. Rees-following glimpses and 
preliminary reports of Gilbert Ryle on occurrences in one particular field-is 
the first to have discovered them. Like comets, their regularity and orderly 
nature was not immediately seen. Rees says that "these expressions fall 
under some new and independent category." Like comets, they were 
regarded as signs of the times. Rees subsumes them under the category of 
temporality. Actually, they belong into logic as comets into mathematics. 
Their category is a logical, not a temporal one. In all cases, the ambiguity 
of the expression is due not, as Rees says, to the fact "that they may signify 
either an event or a continuous state initiated by the event" and the like, but 
to the fact that they may appear as either conceptual or instantial 
expressions. Rees thus sees only specific cases but not the general law. 
Actually, "continuous states" are classes of events, of dispositional, 
relational, or other characteristics "normally associated" with them. They 
are of a higher logical order than these events, characteristics, etc. Hence, 
Rees says the same of them that Moore says of the value property in 
relation to the descriptive property-and this in itself is a proof of our 
argument: "If my furniture is in storage no amount of inspection of my 
furniture will reveal that it is in storage; "39 "We cannot meaningfully 
describe any of these [states] in the language which is appropriate to the 
description of events, "40 etc. But he does not see the logical nature of the 
"category." Indeed, Ryle seems to be closer to it, for his "frame of mind" 
is a subjective version of "frame of reference"; and his "mock murder" 
theory actually calls these states "a class of higher order events, that is, 
ordinary events involving in some way the thought of other events, just as 
a stage murder is not a real murder but an ordinary event which involves 
in some way the thought of real murder. "41 This doctrine, says Rees, "is 
now unnecessary." It is, not because the events mentioned by Ryle are 
"continuous states," but because they represent second-order functions 
reduced to predicative functions. They are, in all cases, conceptual 
expressions capable of appearing in instantial form. It may be that all 
instances when regarded in conceptual form, or all predicative functions 
when regarded non-predicatively-e.g., "Her nose is red" (because of the 
cold) as against "She's got a red nose"42 or "Deaf-mute burglar refuses to 
talk" 43-are valuations of some sort; and some of Rees' examples seem to 
bear this out, e.g., "Their doctors are no doctors at all" or "We live our 
lives from the day we are born until the day we die, but in another sense we 
do not really live unless we engage in life's normal activities and enjoy its 
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normal enjoyments. "44 With other examples this is not so clear; yet, our 
axiom shows that once the "continuous state" is regarded as a concept with 
respect to its instantial "events," this state serves as norm for the events or 
the things in the events. These things then are members of the continuous 
state, having its intension, but not fully. Thus, a whitewashed house that 
is not actually white, a nurse on duty that is asleep, a ship at anchor that 
drags its anchor, an article in stock that happens to be out of stock, and a 
person in love that happens not to feel tender, or one "in prison" that 
happens to be at home-without being at home, in the second-order 
sense-all these do not fulfill their respective concept and hence are not, in 
the instant in question, good whitewashed houses, nurses on duty, ships at 
anchor, articles in stock, lovers, prisoners, or people at home. And those 
who only vegetate and do not live "fully" do not fulfill the intension of 
"life" and are not good "livers." 
Even though this analysis seems to be true the book does not insist on it; 
and rather than saying that all reducible higher-order functions-or reduced 
predicative functions-are valuations, it says that all valuations are such 
functions; and hence that they form part of a large and fundamental 
department of language, the one glimpsed by Russell in his axiom of 
reducibility. It does not say, although it seems almost certain, that this 
department is the department of valuation; and that any reduced function, 
that is, any predicative function equivalent to a higher-order function, is a 
valuation. 45 
The transition from I: x is a member of C, to II: C contains properties 
I/;, to III: x has all the properties I/; contained in C, then, is a transition 
from a lower to a higher logical type, and back again, and to a higher 
logical order. 46 The relation between I and II, taken together, and any of 
the propositions in III-xis a, xis {3, xis -y, etc.,-is that of entailment. 
This entailment, as Kant has shown-in Die falsche Spiti;findigheit der vier 
syllogistischen Figuren (which may well be translated as "The Synthetic 
Subtlety of the Four Syllogistic Figures," in both the early Kantian and the 
modem sense of "synthetic" as "artificial")-represents the original and 
natural function of the human mind, expressed by the rule nota notae rei 
ipsius nota-itself a nice formulation of the axiom of reducibility. 
As is seen, if the expressions (I), (II), (III), are "strictly synonymous," 
"absolutely redundant" in the sense of the reviewer, and "simply reduce" 
(Q) to (I), then every syllogism, every deduction, and indeed, the whole of 
logic is so. In some sense, of course, every logical system is tautological; 
but we do not therefore dispense with logic, or with mathematics. Neither 
do we dispense, for this reason, with value logic. Like logic and 
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mathematics, it is a purely formal framework which is justified by its inner 
consistency. As such, it is a new departure in theory. If, moreover, it is 
an instrument for the ordering of the phenomena to which it refers, values, 
then it is, in addition, a new departure in science; and its justification is its 
relevance. But whether it is the latter depends on its being the former. 
Hence the former must be established, by constructive and critical thought, 
before the latter can be determined. 
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SOME SPURIOUS PROOFS 
FOR THE PURE EGO 
Rem B. Edwards 
Robert S. Hartman joined the faculty of the Department of Philosophy at 
The University of Tennessee, Knoxville, as a distinguished Research 
Professor in January, 1968 with plans (which did not always work out) to 
spend half of each year at The University of Tennessee and the other half 
at The National University of Mexico, where he was also Research 
Professor. During the winter quarter and the following spring quarter of 
1968, Hartman taught graduate courses in Value Theory, using his then 
newly published book, The Structure of Value, as the primary text. These 
courses had an immense effect on the lives and thoughts of many people, 
including Rem B. Edwards, who at the time was Hartman's junior colleague 
and an Associate Professor at The University of Tennessee. 
Edwards audited these courses (and several of Hartman's later courses) 
and had many lively debates with Hartman over pertinent issues. Jn the 
spring quarter of 1968, they had an open forum debate, attended by 
Hartman's students and many other faculty and students at The University 
of Tennessee. At this debate, Edwards presented his paper titled "Some 
Spurious Proofs for the Pure Ego," here published for the first time. On 
this occasion, Hartman gave an oral response; but he did not write his 
response until 1971. The following chapter of this book, Hartman's 
"Formal Axiology and Its Critics," includes his response to this critique and 
to many others. 
Jn the following critique, Edwards gave no direct quotes from Hartman's 
works, so relevant quotes will be given below in this introduction. Edwards 
addressed four of Hartman's arguments that appear to show that Hartman's 
doctrine of the timeless intrinsic self is equivalent to Kant's doctrine of the 
Real or Pure Ego that is not in space or time. For Kant, space and time 
are merely forms of appearances, not of realities; and, on some 
interpretations of Kant, underlying the seeming plurality of persons, there 
is only one real person, a single Pure Ego. Kant wrote that "Commerce 
between the soul and phenomenal matter is quite inconceivable, for it could 
only take place in space. But the soul is not an object of 
42 REM B. EDWARDS 
perception ... Bodies as bodies cannot affect the soul and the converse, 
because bodies can have no relations with a thinking being. "1 
Edwards objected to (1) Hartman's argument from unique timeless 
experiences, according to which we experience timelessness and 
spacelessness in our most profound experiences of intrinsic valuation. As 
expressed by Hartman: 
There is a delightful tale of the Persian poet Firdusi where a man 
experiences a whole life while putting his head in a bucket of water 
and right away pulling it out. Extrinsic time here is a few seconds, 
intrinsic time the qualitative infinity of a life. 
You also know the famous relativity of sitting two minutes on a hot 
stove, and on a park bench with your sweethean. The richer intrinsic 
time is, the shoner appears the corresponding extrinsic time; the 
poorer intrinsic time (the time of experience) is, the longer appears the 
corresponding extrinsic time. 2 
The subjects of intrinsic valuation are non-empirical things, or 
rather, empirical things in their non-empirical aspects. They are, as 
such, neither in time nor in space. When a thing is regarded as 
unique, all there is is this thing. Since time and space are defined as 
succession and interrelationship of things, where there is only one 
thing there is no time and no space in this sense. The thing itself is 
the world. 3 
The inner self, we said, is not in space and time. Where then is it? 
Everywhere. In other words, in the inner core of our Self we are 
intrinsically one with every other Self. The cones of our Seljhood all 
meet at the venex. There is one community, one core, of all mankind. 
This reality Jesus called The Kingdom of God that is within us, Kant 
called it the Kingdom of Ends, Royce and others called it by other 
names. In it, intrinsically, we are all one; and when we do a bad 
thing everybody has done it with us and through us." 
Edwards also objected to (2) the argument from meta-awareness, 
according to which the self-awareness of the total temporality of the self 
cannot be in time. As expressed by Hanman: 
I can reflect upon my reflection of myself, and upon my reflection of 
myself, and so on ad infinitum ... The whole succession of my reflection 
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upon myself, thus, is an infinite denumerable series with cardinality 
Na- .. For both thinkers [Josiah Royce and Richard Dedekind/ whatever 
a thinker thought, the thinker himself was not a part of the set of 
thoughts he thought. Thus although all the reflections upon myself, 
and the reflections upon these reflections, and the reflections upon the 
latter, etc., differentiate myself infinitely, they never cover the totality 
of myself, since there always remains the Self which must do the 
thinking. 6 
Next, Edwards critiqued (3) the argument from Bertrand Russell's theory 
of types, which says that whatever involves all of a collection cannot be a 
member of that collection. Applied to time, this means, Hartman believed, 
that the self which refers to the totality of time cannot itself be in time. As 
he put it: 
According to the fundamental axiom of the theory of types, whatever 
involves all of a collection must not be one of the collection,· the 
thinker must not, logically, be part of the set of his possible thought 
objects, in particular, not of the set of his auto-reflections - the set of 
his reflection upon the reflection upon ... the reflection of himself. That 
which thus refers to all of a collection is of a higher logical order than 
the collection. If the collection itself is of order No, the higher order 
is N1• 7 
Finally, Edwards protested against (4) the argument from the infinite 
divisibility of time, according to which any part of a Self's infinite time is 
as rich in properties as the whole of its time. Hartman wrote: 
What is the "/"? It is that which makes one person out of the 
infinite fractions of your life in time and space ... How many moments 
do you have in time? Fifty-two years, we'll say. How many days? 52 
times 365, or 18,980 days. How many hours? 455,520. How many 
minutes? How many seconds? There is an infinity of subdivisions we 
can make. So you have an infinity of life moments, and all of them 
have to be pulled together. 8 
For a particularly clear illustration of the principle of transfinite 
cardinality, that the part equals the whole, see the parable [of Jesus] 
of the Laborers in the Vineyard. 9 
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After telling the parable of the Laborers in the Vineyard, in which 
laborers who work all day ,for several hours, and for only one hour, are all 
promised and paid the same wage (which irritates those who work longer), 
Hartman asked: 
What on earth does it mean? It does look unfair. And from the 
point of view of finite arithmetic, it is unfair. No business in the world 
is conducted this way. But this is infinity business that Jesus is talking 
about - this is the Kingdom of Heaven. No space or time. If there 
is no time, what difference does it make how long a man has worked? 
Everybody is there in eternity. One eternity is as eternal as another 
eternity, and the so-called ten-minute eternity is as eternal as the so-
called twelve hour eternity; there are neither minutes nor hours. There 
is no space either. If there is no space, then there is no separation, 
because what separates you and me is the space between us. If there 
is no separation, then there are no separate pockets. If there are no 
separate pockets, what you have everybody has. What you don't have, 
nobody has. So it makes no difference who gets what. The dollar that 
goes to anyone goes to everyone. At the bottom of our spiritual Selves 
we are one community. All of us are one. 10 
Whiteheadian process philosophers deny that any segment of time is 
divisible into an infinite number of real parts. It is potentially divisible into 
an infinite number of parts only in human thought or imagination, but real 
temporal occasions are finite atomic durations, shorter than which nothing 
can be real. At the level of human consciousness, these atomic durations 
are about a tenth of a second long; at the level of sub-atomic events, 
according to quantum physics, temporal occasions must endure minimally 
for as long as Planck time, 10"43 seconds, in order to exist at all. In lesser 
intervals, nothing can exist; so time is not divisible into an infinite number 
of real units. 
I wish to explain as clearly as I can why I do not accept the doctrine of the 
non-spatio-temporal Self which Professor Hartman bas been urging upon us, 
and in the process of doing so I hope to show that it is not through sheer 
obduracy or lack of perceptiveness that I reject the doctrine. I wish to state 
first a general reason for rejecting the doctrine and then to examine some 
of the arguments which Professor Hartman bas used in class and in bis 
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published writings to support the doctrine. 
As a general reason for rejecting the doctrine, I offer the consideration 
that a non-spatio-temporal Self could have no relevance to ethics or value 
theory if the usual Kantian strictures are placed upon it. According to the 
Kantian position (to which Professor Hartman has not yet explicitly 
committed himself in class}, the categories of cause and effect apply only 
to the realm of phenomena, including the realm of the empirical self, and 
do not apply at all to the realm of noumena or things in themselves, 
including the Real Self. If this causal doctrine is held in conjunction with 
the doctrine of non-spatio-temporality, then the Real Self could have no 
relevance to morality or value theory in the sense that such a Real Self 
could never be acted upon, could never be an effect; and it could never act, 
could never be a cause. No matter what the word "value" may ultimately 
tum out to mean, I do not think that we human beings are able to value 
anything unless that thing can affect us in some way. Also, it is only the 
kind of self which can function as a cause that can have moral duties. A 
cause-less self could never do anything, and if we accept the "cannot 
implies ought not (not obligated)" principle, then it could never have any 
moral duties to do anything. In what then could moral duty consist? 
Finally, if we define moral responsibility as being the originative cause of 
our actions, then a non-causal self could never be responsible for anything. 
Now I wish to examine briefly some of the arguments used by Professor 
Hartman to prove the existence of a non-spatio-temporal-self, which will be 
called henceforth the "Pure Ego." 
1. The Argument from Unique Timeless Experiences 
According to this line of argument, we know that there is a Pure Ego 
because certain unique experiences occur in which we are not aware of 
spatio-temporality. As instances of this type of experience, Professor 
Hartman cited the cases of being in intense pain, like sitting on top of a hot 
stove, and of being reduced to silence, of being at a loss for words, and the 
experience of being in love. There is an ambiguity in the concept of 
"atemporality" which makes it initially plausible that in these experiences 
of timelessness we are transported into the realm of the Pure Ego. 
"Atemporal" may mean on the one hand "not being aware of time," and on 
the other hand it may mean "not being a datable event in time." Professor 
Hartman seems to move from the one to the other as if they were identical, 
but this is not the case. Many times I have had the experience of 
concentrating so completely on the book I was reading that I was unaware 
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of being in my office, but it does not follow that I was not in my office 
simply because I was unaware of being there. Similarly, it does not follow 
that my experience of excruciating pain, or of being at a loss for words, is 
not a datable event in time simply because I am not aware of its being a 
datable event in time. Such magic moments do doubtless occur, but they 
are moments all the same. 
When asked if it makes sense to ask "When do these unique experiences 
occur?" Professor Hartman answered affirmatively. It would appear that 
an affirmative answer to this question concedes that these experiences are 
events in time. I doubt that we ever have an experience of anything which 
cannot, upon later reflection, be recognized to be earlier than some 
experience and later that some other experience in the time series, even 
though the experience in question is one in which we are not aware of or 
attending to temporality. It is with the intent of avoiding this conclusion 
that Professor Hartman offers the next argument, which is not so much as 
argument as it is a postulate. 
2. The Argwnent from Meta-awareness 
It is contended that if our awareness of timelessness is an event in time, 
then this is only the awareness of the empirical self, not the awareness of 
the Pure Ego, which can be so dated. In order to arrive at the Pure Ego we 
must postulate an Awareness of awareness, a meta-awareness; and it is this 
meta-awareness which cannot be dated. Presumably, it is only when we 
arrive at this meta-awareness that it no longer makes sense to ask and 
answer: "When did it happen?" 
About this argument, several remarks are in order. First of all, we must 
be clear that none of the appeals to unique experience discussed in 
Argument (1) provide any evidence for the existence of this meta-awareness 
as long as we are willing to date them as events in time. Has anyone ever 
had an experience of excruciating pain or a magic moment of love for which 
it was absolutely impossible for her or him to give at least a rough answer 
as to when it happened (for example, after I was born, or after I reached the 
age of puberty, and before I came to class today)? I doubt very seriously 
that anyone (including Professor Hartman) could give an honest affirmative 
answer to this question! 
Second, it is precisely at the point where we have to postulate this non-
datable type of awareness that philosophers from David Hume through 
Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne have maintained that our 
theories lose contact with experience altogether. If this is the case (and I 
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believe that it is), then no appeal to unique timeless experiences, and no 
appeal to any empirical evidence whatsoever, could be employed to support 
the Pure Ego theory. The only kind of experience which could support the 
theory would have to be an absolutely undatable experience. 
Third, if the meta-experience about which we are perplexed does not 
happen at a certain time, then what is left of the claims that we have it, or 
that it happens to us? Is not all this talk about timeless meta-experience 
simply about happenings which do not happen? Is not the theory thus 
trapped in a contradiction? 
Fourth, it should not be inferred that the expression "awareness of 
awareness" is shown to be a totally senseless expression by the above 
arguments. In one sense, it is senseless, totally foreign to experience and 
to logic, to say that we have non-datable experiences of datable experiences. 
But it is true to experience to say that we have datable experiences of 
datable experiences. Today my "self of the moment" remembers the pains, 
and loves, and silences of the self of yesterday or yesteryear. Memory is 
experience of experience, awareness of awareness, a type of meta-
experience; but a memory is an event within time, a datable experience of 
a datable experience. There is no need whatsoever to postulate the 
existence of a Pure Ego in order to make sense of such expressions as "I 
am now aware that sometimes I am not aware of myself." The distinction 
between present and past self is all that we need. This simply means that 
"The self of the present moment remembers that the past self was attending 
to or concentrating upon something else (such as a book, or a pretty girl), 
not upon itself." The past self is identified as my past self because it 
belongs to the same causal series of conscious experiences as that to which 
my experience of the present moment belongs, and because it is 
remembered to have many if not most (but not all) of the properties that my 
present self has. Whiteheadians subscribe to a theory of relative self-
identity through time. 
3. The Argument from the Theory of Types 
Just how much metaphysical mileage can we get out of the theory of types? 
Professor Hartman apparently believes that we can get a great deal! It can 
be used to prove that a non-spatio-temporal self is a logical (we are now out 
of the realm of empirical arguments) requirement of the spatio-temporal 
self. 
The theory of types has been offered by certain philosophers as a way of 
avoiding the logical paradoxes or contradictions which arise when a property 
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is predicated of itself, or when a sentence is permitted to refer to itself, for 
example, the paradox of the Cretan who said that "All Cretans are liars." 
The theory of types forbids the type of self-reference which breeds such 
paradoxes. A property cannot be a member of the class of things to which 
it is predicated; a sentence cannot be a member of the class of things to 
which it refers. 
I am not well enough versed in logical theory to argue in detail that there 
is something wrong with the metaphysical application of a logical theory 
such as that expressed in the previous paragraph, though I suspect that such 
an argument could be constructed. I wish to urge only that the following 
difficulties seem to arise if we attempt to get the sort of metaphysical 
mileage out of the theory of types that Professor Hartman attempts to get. 
First, if I must be un-spatial in order to talk about the whole of space, 
and un-temporal in order to talk about the whole of time, would not the 
same pattern of reasoning prove that I must be un-real in order to talk about 
the whole of reality? I am not at all sure that I have much use at all for 
these "whole of X" expressions, but presumably Professor Hartman does. 
I am simply saying that this seems to create a difficulty for him since the 
same pattern of argument which proves the non-spatio-temporality of the 
Pure Ego also proves its unreality! 
Secondly, the line of argument which Professor Hartman has initiated 
seems also to generate an infinite regress of Pure Ego's (if it is admitted 
that the Pure Ego can talk or think about, know about, or have beliefs about 
itself). If a Pure Ego is required before I can talk about my empirical self, 
then what is required before I can talk about my Pure Ego? The obvious 
answer is that a Meta-Pure-Ego is needed! And then A Meta-Meta, and a 
Meta-Meta-Meta, and so on to infinity! 
Finally, even if we admit that the theory of types does have metaphysical 
applications, an alternative account of self-knowledge can be provided 
which does not require a Pure Ego. Professor Charles Hartshorne, for 
example, contends that the self of the present moment, in the strictest 
intelligible sense of "present moment," can never literally know or talk 
about itself, since all introspective experience is actually retrospective 
experience on immediately past states of the present self, and since the self 
which begins the thought "my present self' is already in the past by the 
time that this thought is completed. 11 Self-reference can thus be avoided 
without introducing a "Pure Ego." 
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4. The Argument from the Infinite Divisibility of Time 
The relevance of this one is awfully difficult to see, but Professor Hartman 
apparently wants to contend that the Whiteheadian theory of selfhood is 
mistaken because time is infinitely divisible. Some more elaborate re-
construction of the argument is doubtless required, since the conclusion here 
does not follow from the stated premise in any obvious way. And there is 
always the danger, in re-constructing an argument which was only 
incompletely stated, that it will be misconstructed. But allow me to make 
an attempt. 
The argument seems to be that the Whiteheadian view that the self (in the 
broad sense of the series of cauS&lly continuous experiences which have 
temporarily terminated in the present moment of consciousness) has a 
beginning (somewhere close to birth) and an end (at death) is mistaken, 
since ifthe self endures for a short time, (as Whitehead admits), it therefore 
endures forever (because even a short period of time is infinite, is infinitely 
divisible). To put the matter another way, if the self endures for five 
minutes, it endures for eternity since five minutes has just as many parts as 
eternity, namely an infinite number. Thus, the self is eternal. 
I am no expert in trans-finite mathematics, but I sense that there is 
something wrong with this argument somewhere. I can illustrate the 
difficulty by producing a parallel argument: Ifwe have had five minutes of 
Professor Hartman's course in Value Theory, we have had it all, since there 
are as many parts in five minutes of the course as there are in thirty-five 
hours of it! Shall we adjourn?! 
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FORMAL AXIOLOGY 
AND ITS CRITICS 
Robert S. Hartman 
Before his death in 1973, Robert S. Hartman was working on a reply to his 
many critics and left behind a manuscript titled "Fonnal Axiology and Its 
Critics. " Although unfinished, this manuscript contained many instructions 
for completion, including details on how to integrate specific sections of 
Hartman's unpublished letters into the existing gaps. In a letter to James 
Wilbur, (then Editor of The Journal of Value Inquiry) dated 30 April 1972, 
Hartman wrote: 
I propose a paper which is a kind of "Reply to My Critics" although 
this will probably not be the title. There have been quite a few papers 
on Jonna/ axiology, especially in your Journal, but also in other 
journals, as well as in books, in the U. S., Asia, and Europe, especially 
Russia, etc., all of which demand a reply. 
In a letter to Rem B. Edwards dated 6 June 1972, Hartman wrote that "Jim 
Wilbur ... has accepted my article 'Axiology and its Critics' sight unseen. " 
Unfortunately, Hartman did not live to complete this manuscript and get it 
to this publisher. 
In completing "F onnal Axiology and Its Critics, " the editor tried to follow 
Hartman 's instructions as best he could; but occasionally he had to go 
beyond them. In many unpublished letters and papers, Hartman responded 
to critics and questioners other than those who were designated in this essay 
to receive a response-like John W Davis, Paul Weiss, Charles Hartshorne, 
William Eckhardt, Robert S. Brumbaugh, Marvin Katz, Robert E. Carter, 
and Stephen Byrum. Only four of these-Robert E. Carter who reviewed 
The Structure of Value, Charles Hartshorne, William Eckhardt, and Robert 
S. Brumbaugh-are included below. This essay, Hartman's letters, and his 
posthumously published essay titled "Reply to Eckhardt and Brumbaugh," 
are the primary sources for the contents of "Fonnal Axiology and Its 
Critics." 
Hartman never considered himself above the battle; he delighted in 
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philosophical polemics; and he constantly urged his colleagues and students 
to make improvements on his foundations for Jonna[ value theory. To 
Marvin Katz's objection that axiology will some day be obsolete, made at 
the meeting of The Society for Philosophy of Creativity in St. Louis in 1972, 
Hartman retorted: "What Professor Katz says is certainly true-that 
axiology will be obsolete-] hope the earlier the better-because if this 
system has any dynamic in it, it should be overcome within at least a 
generation, or, at most a generaton." 
In completing Hartman's "Fonnal Axiology and Its Critics," the editor 
followed the strategy, where possible, of presenting Hartman's replies in the 
order in which the critiques were originally published or made public, even 
though this was not Hartman's own order (the plan of which was never 
discerned). 
Formal axiology as I understand it is the science which plays with respect 
to the social and humanistic disciplines the role that mathematics plays with 
regards to the natural sciences. It orders them, quantifies them, makes them 
predictable. It is, in modern terms, the analogue these disciplines follow, 
or in Kantian terms, the a priori which rules the value disciplines, 
universally and necessarily. In this sense it is the essence of these 
disciplines; it is the pure science of value or the science of pure value, of 
the variable "value" rather than value, or the science of the concept "value" 
rather than of any phenomenon of value. It follows a strict logic which I 
call intensional rather than extensional, for it is based on the set-
interpretation of intensions or meanings. It deals with sets of predicates 
rather than sets of properties-which latter are of doubtful nature-but it 
orders the latter, the sets of properties, and, moreover, constructs them as 
primary value properties. In doing so it brings about the sciences of value, 
as mathematics does those of nature. 
[I do not say that] value is the degree in which a thing possesses a set of 
properties corresponding to the set of attributes in the intension of its 
concept. [Instead], value is the degree in which a thing possesses the set of 
properties corresponding to the set of predicates in the intension of its 
concept. The difference between properties and predicates is that the 
predicates are the names of the properties. Thus, we have the property red 
and the name of this property, "red," which is a predicate. lntensions 
consist of predicates. If I should use the word "attributes" I mean it the 
same as "predicates." But I always try to steer clear of words which have 
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an ontological or metaphysical connotation, as does the word "attribute." 
It is possible that in The Structure of Value I do not make the distinction 
between predicates and properties clear enough, but in other writings I think 
I do. 1 
Every set of predicates is defined to be one particular value concept or 
"value." The definition of "value," in other words, is "a set of 
predicates." Any set of predicates is a "value." Any set of properties is 
a value. 
This definition and treatment of the value realm has appeared to me so 
simple, natural, and fruitful-not only in my life but in the lives of all those 
who have been touched by it, a subject a following discussion will deal with 
-that I have dedicated the past three decades to it. I have found a 
satisfactory echo throughout the international philosophic community, of 
which the festschrift: Value and Valuation: Essays in Honor of Robert S. 
Hartman2 is a tangible expression. 
1. Critical Reception of the Theory3 
[My work is being well received] in applied fields such as psychology, 
aesthetics, anthropology, etc. Among philosophers, in spite of its 
framework, which hinders philosophy, the reception was astonishingly good. 
I say in The Structure of Value: 
The transition from moral philosophy to moral science ... has much of 
the excitement today that the corresponding transition had in natural 
philosophy-strenuous opposition of philosophers and laymen to the 
adventurous spirit of new scientists and laymen.4 
On the other hand: 
The difference between moral philosophy and the new moral science 
is very much less radical than was the rupture between natural 
philosophy and natural science. While this has practical advantages-a 
modem axiologist is in no danger of being burned alive-it has certain 
intellectual disadvantages. Since the differences in question (namely 
between/act and value) are so subtle, and merely on the logical and 
perhaps the phenomenological but not on the sensory plane, there is a 
danger that these differences may be underestimated and looked upon 
as irrelevant hairsplitting. But the differences between moral 
philosophy and moral science are logically of the same importance as 
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those between natural philosophy and natural science. This logical 
character is what determines the nature and efficiency of the new moral 
science, as it does that of any science.5 
My [point of] departure then has been often misunderstood; in particular, 
there has not been a single criticism of the system as such, namely, the 
identification of sets of properties as values, or of the system [as a whole]; 
but the criticisms have either been against the application of the system, as 
Robert W. Mueller's, or against the system in terms of applications of it, 
as Hector Neri Castaneda's, or mere name calling, as G. R. Grice's or the 
Soviet reviewers. 
The system as such has not been criticized; on the contrary, even by its 
greatest critics, the system as such has been called truly beautiful. In 
general, the spectrum of reviews reaches from "fantastically ingenious and 
challenging" (Charles Hartshome),6 and "one of the most constructive and 
revolutionary undertakings suggested in modem time" (Henry N. 
Wieman), 7 to "absurd" (G. R. Grice), and a "fetishistic apology for 
capitalism, "8 with the vast majority of reviews positive and complimentary. 
In a way, the emphasis of critics on the applicability of the theory is 
justifiably legitimate in view of what is said in The Structure of Value in the 
last section, "The Value of a Value Theory. "9 Value seems to touch 
people deeply, and hence a value theory involves them greatly either in 
delight or disgust. This accounts, on the one hand, for the raving reviews 
the book has received, but also for the expressions of disgust that have 
come its way. "There are philosophers," says Brand Blanshard, "whose 
philosophy has become a sort of fanaticism, making them to head like a bad 
onion .. ," 10 and who therefore only react [emotionally] against a new value 
theory, especially one that is as incisive as formal axiology. 
It has been experienced with the [Hartman Value Profile-hereafter 
"HVP"] test that people, on just seeing the words, begin to vomit, to shout, 
to crumple it in their hands, to stamp on it with their feet, and by the simple 
view of it to become completely enraged, especially where it is used in 
hospitals. Curiously enough, a similar reaction has occasionally been 
observed with philosophers who read, or read about, formal axiology. In 
one case, in Canada, a doctoral candidate who had a chapter on formal 
axiology was denied the doctorate by one member of his [dissertation 
committee] unless he extirpated "this nonsense" from his dissertation. He 
dismissed the testimony on formal axiology by men such as Paul Weiss, 
Charles Hartshorne, and Henry Wieman by saying that these were not 
philosophers but theologians. 
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In another case, a paper on fonnal axiology, again in Canada, was 
submitted to a professor; and the student wrote me as follows: 
I submitted a paper to one of my professors who appeared profoundly 
disturbed by me, it, your theories, and you ... According to this 
professor, I have a methodological disease which is not relevant to 
philosophy as a mature endeavor, and if I would grow out of and up 
from this disease, my philosophical progress would undoubtedly 
accelerate. 
These are irrational reactions to the theory, which in these cases is seen as 
an intrinsic dis-value; and they are amazingly frequent. This may be due 
to what Bertrand Russell says: 
Many people have a passionate hatred of abstraction, chiefly, I think, 
because of its intellectual difficulty; but as they do not wish to give this 
reason, they invent all sorts of others that sound grand ... The power of 
using abstractions is the essence of intellect and with every increase in 
abstraction the intellectual triumphs of science are enhanced. 11 
Or it may be due to the reason that Albert Einstein mentioned: 
When the basic concepts of a theory are comparatively "close to 
experience" ... its speculative character is not so easily discernible. If, 
however, a theory is such as to require the application of complicated 
logical processes in order to reach conclusions from premises that can 
be confronted with observation, everybody becomes conscious of the 
speculative nature of the theory. In such a case an almost irresistible 
feeling of aversion arises in people ... who are unaware of the precarious 
nature of theoretical thinking in those fields with which they are 
familiar. 12 
Value theory is still "close to experience;" hence, precise logical 
formulation gives rise to suspicion and "an almost irresistible feeling of 
aversion." The programmer who was to program the axiological formulae 
of the value calculus into a computer actually got a nervous breakdown 
because, as she said, of the power of the calculus, and had to interrupt the 
work for six months for this reason. 
Actually, the Canadian professor in the second case was quite right. 
From the point of view of philosophy, science is a methodological disease; 
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but from the point of view of science, philosophy is a disease of 
obfuscation. There is no "maturity" in philosophy because philosophy is 
aporetic, and the questioner never matures; only the answerer does; and if 
he is an answerer, he will become a scientist, as did Galileo Galilei, Sir 
Isaac Newton, Rene Descartes, and G. W. Leibniz. 13 
Another form of objection against formal axiology, especially the value 
calculus, at first sight seems reasonable, but on closer examination becomes 
somewhat irrational or emotional; it concerns the use of trans.finite numbers. 
Although logicians such as Benno Erdmann, and ethicists such as Edwin T. 
Mitchell, have used these numbers, there is a kind of aversion against them, 
partly of intuitionist origins, partly because they are regarded as 
unnecessary. 
It would have been very easy for me to leave out these numbers from the 
theory and simply state the rules of composition and transposition of S 
[systemic value], E [extrinsic value], and I [intrinsic value] following the 
pattern of n, No, and tt1, without ever mentioning these numbers. I could 
have used [only] S, E, and I instead of alephs. Thus, I could have said that 
denumerably infinite values are the limits of exponentiations of finite values, 
that is, that the limit of exponentiations of n-values is E, and that E to the 
E is I, E to the n is E, E plus E is E, E times E is E, etc. But I felt that 
this would have a been a deception since I did base my considerations on 
the theory of transfinite numbers, and since Georg Cantor himself in 
particular felt that there is a value application to transfinite numbers. 14 
lntuitionists who deny the possibility of transfinite numbers and a great 
deal of other mathematical inventions would regard the axiological calculus 
as impossible, even though works. On the other hand, there are 
mathematicians who, more or less legitimately, try to make a bridge from 
mathematics to value and ethics, but do so in a way that is either too 
inarticulate, or on the basis of everyday concepts, to which mathematics is 
inapplicable. 
[I tum now to my] critics, who deserve a full answer. 
2. Reply to Charles Hartshorne, 1965, 1967 
Sources of critique: Charles Hartshorne, Anselm's Discovery: A Re-
examination of the Ontological Argument for God's Existence, (LaSalle, 
Ill.: Open Court Publishing Co., 1965), Part 11, Ch. 18, and a letter from 
Charles Hartshorne to Robert S. Hartman, 21 December 1967. 
Jn 1961, Robert S. Hartman published his "Prolegomena to a Meta-
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Anselmian Axiomatic," in The Review of Metaphysics, J4:4,32 pp. 637-
675. Jn this essay, he applied his developing ideas about axiology to St. 
Anselm's Ontological Argument for God and to Anselm's conception of the 
nature of God. The Process Philosopher/Theologian Charles Hartshorne at 
the University of Texas, the world's most able defender of the Ontological 
Argument, published his Anselm's Discovery in 1965 and included a 
chapter on Hartman, among others. 
Hartshorne remarked that how Hartman would handle the Findlay 
paradox, discussed below, is not clear; and hefonnulated two objections to 
Hartman's position: (1) if God is understood to be that being richest in 
properties, as Hartman espouses, "One can still object that 'richest 
conceivable' thing means, that which would, if it existed, be richest ... " The 
reality of this being can be denied without self-contradiction, just as the 
reality of a triangle can be denied without self-contradiction even though it 
necessarily has three sides if it exists. Perhaps Hartman did not pay 
sufficient attention to the distinction between mere or ordinary existence and 
God's unique mode of necessary existence. As Hartshorne indicated, "Only 
inconceivability-of-nonexistence, as a property, can rule out this escape. " 
Hartshorne also objected (2) that the concept of an "absolute maximum of 
richness" is not a consistent notion. 15 Many things are possible separately, 
but incompossible together, as Leibniz showed. 
Jn J967, Hartshorne wrote to Hartman on 7 November and again on 2J 
December about issues raised in The Structure of Value and asked where 
Hartman stood on a number of questions of interest to process thinkers-like 
(3) whether there is any process or temporality in God, or in human self-
identity. Jn the following letter to Hartshorne, written on 29January J968, 
Hartman seems to ajjinn a process view of both God and human seljhood, 
one that attributes temporality, process, or development to both God and 
human persons. Hartman concluded this letter to Hartshorne with: "/ very 
much enjoyed your letter, and it gave me a great deal to think [about]." 
There isn't really much mathematics in my book except a little transfinite 
calculation, which to a mathematician will be commonplace; but the 
applications of it will be seen by him with great skepticism. Actually, they 
are not his business, as long as there are no mathematical mistakes. 
Otherwise, it is the value theoretician rather than the mathematician who 
must judge the use of these instruments. Also, I do not bother with the 
various problems and disputes of mathematicians on the calculus used; 
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sufficient unto the day is the rigor thereof. But I would be very, very much 
interested to know what Nicolas Goodman16 has to say. The main thing 
of my theory is its coherence and consistency, and that the results that 
follow from the axiom are correct. I see these as a confirmation of the 
axiom, and am happy that Professor Hartshorne agrees with so many of 
them. Also, on those that Hartshorne does not agree with, we are closer 
than it seems. 
As to past, future, and present classes, they are not all identically 
extensional. A class is an extensional set; but these sets have different 
intensions, which in tum produce different extensions. It seems to me that 
individuation is not merely a matter of extension but even more so of 
intension. The more properties you give a class member the more you 
individuate it, until in the end it is not a member of any class, but itself. 
Both past and future classes, and their individuals, are in the mind only, 
which means that they cannot have the same number of properties that 
present class members have. They cannot be either extrinsic or intrinsic 
values, but only systemic values, having the definite number of properties 
which I remember or project. In other words, they are on the same level 
as imaginary individuals, such as Hamlet, which have the finite number of 
properties of the work in which they appear, not beings in time and space, 
but in imaginary time and space. 
The time and space of memory and anticipation are imaginary too. 
Moreover, there does not seem to be more individuation in memory than in 
anticipation. Memory fades; and anticipation may be very explicit, as in 
Jules Verne, and in Bacon's (sic) Utopia. 11 All these have a finite number 
of properties (systemic value). Things in space and time have a 
denumerable and infinite such number (extrinsic value). Yet, an imaginary 
thing may have, depending on the force of the imagination, more than 
systemic value, namely, extrinsic value. Thus, if my imagination reaches 
the intensity of extrinsic value cardinality, then I produce things in space 
and time. Here belongs the whole field of psychosomatics, Fata Morganas, 
sexual 18 phenomena, etc. And if my imagination reaches the intensity of 
intrinsic value, I produce things in aesthetic space and time (F. S. C. 
Schiller's Schein, Susanne Langer's semblance)-! project my intrinsic being 
in a work of art. 
I don't think I accept Spinoza's view that the actual details of the world 
follow necessarily from the eternal nature of God. On the contrary, I do 
believe as you do, that particulars and empirical classes are contingent 
additions to the nature of God. I have developed this axiologically in an 
essay on the relation of "The Good as a Non-natural Quality and the Good 
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as a Transcendental. " 19 I there say that good as a transcendental is a 
second-order property of the maximum intension possible, whereas good as 
a non-natural property is a second-order property of any intension. A thing 
that in the scholastic terminology would be valuable or perfect in the degree 
of its participation in God's perfection would be perfect in the degree of its 
participation in the ultimate richness of properties. The world itself, which 
has the value good (extrinsic value, alepho properties) has the total value 
aleph1 (intrinsic value), since the total value of something is the totality of 
all the subsets of properties something has (2"> = N1). This total value, 
infinitely richer than the value of the world itself in goodness, is supplied 
to the world by the existence of beings. Existence adds infinite richness to 
the world. The world, theoretically, may be existing as a whole with a 
certain number of properties; but it is only the existence of beings in it that 
adds to these given properties infinitely. Thus, while the world has an 
infinity of properties, the existence of beings in it adds to it a higher 
infinity. Every existent thing is a subset of the world's set of properties and 
as such a value of the world. Counting all the value possibilities in it, the 
world has intrinsic, not extrinsic value. 
But this intrinsic value of the world is infinitely poorer than God, who is 
the value of values, rather than eternal or necessary predicates, which 
hardly do justice to His nature. He is the infinity of infinite values, N.,. 
This being so, He is infinitely removed from anything we can conceive; He 
is that than which nothing higher can be conceived even by a being with 
infinitely infinite powers of conceiving-even by Himself. This means that 
He, by the necessity of His nature, is continuously surpassing Himself-a 
necessary, ever self-surpassing, self-concretizing Energy. For since God is 
the infinity of value infinities, He is the most concrete of all concretenesses, 
Concreteness or Reality itself. He is necessary concreteness and, by the 
nature of infinity, necessarily inexhaustible and ever (self)creating 
concreteness: He is concreting, both Himself and, contingently, worlds. 
The necessity of his (self)concreting arises thus both from the nature of His 
conceiving His being, and that of His being itself. His world creating is 
contingent only from our point of view; for God, world creating is a 
necessity of His nature, the means of His self-surpassing; even though the 
nature of the world created is up to a point contingent. 
Now the ontological proof. A systemic concept can reach this nature of 
God only in the systemic dimension, which is infinitely poorer than the 
nature of God. To enter into His truth we need infinitely infinite powers of 
conception, which by definition we cannot have since only God has them. 
The maximum understanding of God for a contingent human being is in the 
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loss of his self, his stretching his self to the breaking point to come as close 
to God as possible-and this is still infinitely remote from Him, though it 
may also be infinitely remote from the world. In this state, there is no need 
of a proof of God's existence, just as there is no need of a proof of my own 
existence. If, however, I want to give an intellectual proof of God's 
existence, then first I have to define existence and show that from God's 
nature there follows his existence. This is possible when existence is 
defined as a kind of intension (or value). Since God is the value of values 
(the intension of intensions) He must include this existence in His nature, 
even though, of course, this existence does not exhaust His nature. It is an 
infinitesimal part of His nature. This does, I think, take care of the 
Findlayan "paradox" [that "the concrete cannot be deduced from the 
abstract, "-yet the Ontological Argument seems to do just this].20 When 
I prove that God exists, I prove only an infinitesimal part of His being-for 
His Reality is infinitely higher than His existence. I prove that part of His 
being that corresponds to my conception. The nature of proof itself, and of 
the a priori, rises with the fullness of what I want to prove-so that in the 
end I myself am the proof, not of God's existence in the sense of proved 
systemically, but of God's infinite reality in the degree of my own power 
of conception. 
I agree with Hartshorne that it is not individual things or persons which 
are the final concrete reality, but states or unit events which are alone fully 
concrete. I also agree that all value is in "actual entities," not in enduring 
changing individuals. My reason is that the intrinsic value aspect of the 
individual thing or person, which is eternal and immortal, is not identical 
with the thing or person in space and time. 
Human beings, as with all intrinsic values, cannot be put into classes at 
all, for in doing so one makes them into extrinsic values. All intrinsic 
values are selves, and each self is unique, i.e., has at least one property no 
other being has. (The property "uniqueness," of course, is not one of the 
properties in question but a second-order property of the set of these 
properties). Thus, members of the class of human beings, of negroes, etc., 
are extrinsic values. As intrinsic value I am neither "a human being," nor 
"a negro," nor any kind of "so-and-so." 
The human individual, by virtue of his capacity of reflecting upon 
himself, is a continuum within himself, whereas God is a continuum only 
when a human being regards him as an intrinsic value. From this difference 
results a difference in the continuum nature of man and God; man's is a 
higher cardinality. 21 
Properties must harmonize for an intensional set to be such a set. If they 
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do not harmonize, the set is a transposition, and the thing a disvalue. 
Harmoniz.ation thus is implied in richness of properties. 
The definition of "human being" of course, excludes the notion of 
murderer. If this notion is included, then the definition is of a human being 
who is a murderer, that is, of a murderer. It can be shown that the 
actuality of murdering is contradictory to the definition or exposition of a 
Self. 
Relation to a concept is the meaning of value only in the sense that a 
formal axiology can be built on it. Any other meaning that could do this 
would be the meaning of value in a different sense, just as there are two 
different meanings for electrons, a corpuscular and a wave meaning. 
I should not say that every analytic concept implies every other, but rather 
that all form chains of implications, which are intertwined. Beside the 
relation of implication (fox-animal) there are those of differentiation 
(animal-fox). While fox implies animal because "animal" is contained in 
the concept "fox," the concept "fox" is also contained, in a different sense, 
in the concept "animal. "22 Differentiation is the intensional counterpart to 
division. 
3. Reply to Rem B. Edwards, 1968 
Source of critique: Rem B. Edwards, "Some Spurious Proofs for the Pure 
Ego," 1968, published as Chapter Three of this volume, pp. 41-50. 
On 2 July 1971, Raymond M. Pruitt, while writing a Master's Thesis in 
Philosophy at The University of Tennessee, wrote to Robert S. Hartman in 
Mexico and invited him to respond to questions raised by Rem B. Edwards 
in his essay on "Some Spurious Proofs for the Pure Ego" concerning the 
nature of, and the spatiotemporality, causality, and finitude of individual 
persons. Many of Hartman's remarks in his writings and in his classes led 
Edwards to believe that Hartman identified the Person or the Self with a 
Kantian Pure Ego that is totally nonspatial, nontemporal, and beyond all 
legitimate applications of concepts of "effect" and "cause. " Raymond Pruitt 
asked Hartman: "When we are valuing a person, what is it that is of 
infinite value-the actual person? the potential person? or the Pure Ego? 
If it is Pure Ego, what happens to the individual person?" Hartman's 
rejoinder to Edwards was given in a letter to Raymond M. Pruitt dated 17 
July 1971. 
In this rejoinder, Hartman said (1) that although he does not use the tenn 
"pure ego," he does speak of the "transcendental self," and this is the real 
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person, (2) that this transcendental person or self is the reality to whom all 
its properties belong, (3) that the transcendental self is non-spatio-temporal; 
and only the empirical self, with which ethics has nothing to do, is spatio-
temporal and involved in causation, and (4) that Edwards confuses the time 
that is within intrinsic experience with extrinsic time that is outside the 
intrinsic. Hartman does not clarify how speaking of intrinsic time can be 
reconciled with (3), or how this Kantian view of the real self can be 
reconciled with the process view of the real self that he affirmed in the 
preceding reply to Charles Hartshorne. 
(I) A thing has the value which is determined by the cardinality of the 
number of predicates in the intension of its concept. The person, in my 
"Four Axiological Proofs of the Infinite Value of Man, "23 is defined by 
various intensions; and it is the person thus defined which is of infinite 
value. 
I don't think that anywhere I use the notion of Pure Ego, either in that 
article or in The Structure of Value. I might use the notion of 
transcendental self, and I would identify this with the person as far as value 
is concerned. Thus, I speak of the person that fulfills the definition given 
in the various proofs. What is of infinite value, then, is the person as 
fulfilling the intension by which it is defined, e.g., in the epistemological 
proof, the definition "man is a rational being." Anything that is a rational 
being is, according to this proof, of infinite value. And it says there, as 
also, e.g., in The Structure of Value, that "every individual person is as 
infinite as the whole space-time universe. "24 
(2) The question whether we make a distinction between the individual 
and the properties of the individual is the old question of Berkeley, and it 
refers to anything, e.g., a chair. Do we make a distinction between the 
chair and the properties of the chair? I think we do. The chair is the 
subject of which the properties are predicated. The individual is the subject 
of which its properties are predicated. The properties are that which is had 
by the subject. Since there is a difference between the properties of the 
thing and the predicate in the intension of the thing's concept, the thing 
possesses value in the degree in which it has the properties that correspond 
to the set of predicates in the intension of its concept. 
A chair may not have the properties of a chair, and a person may not 
have the properties of a person, e.g., a moron, or a criminal who defines 
himself as "I am a non-rational being" or "I am not I." Depending on how 
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many or how few properties the person or the thing has, he may be a good, 
a so-so, a bad, or a no good person or thing. Read my article in the Review 
of Metaphysics, March 1961, entitled "The Logic of Value," where I speak 
of the degrees of intrinsic valuation and the differentiation of intrinsic 
values. 
(3) The transcendental Self in Kant is non-spatio-temporal. Only the 
empirical self is spatio-temporal. But intrinsic ethics has nothing to do with 
the empirical self; nor does it apply the categories of cause and effect. In 
Kant, ethics is based on the notion of freedom.from cause and effect, on the 
autonomous self-determination of the person, and the same is the case in 
formal axiology, as [explained] in The Structure of Value.i.s Here, beside 
Kant, I mention Karen Homey, Abraham Maslow, Erich Fromm, Ludwig 
Binswanger, and Victor Frankl. These are the ones whose teaching brings 
about intrinsically defined ethics. One could also add the ethics of S0ren 
Kierkegaard, Max Scheler, and Emmanuel Levinas, and in general the 
notion of a person in existential psychology and psychiatry. 
In other words, the ethics which appears when we define it as the 
application of intrinsic value to the individual person is existential ethics, the 
relation of the person to himself in self-reflection. There is also [another] 
kind of ethics, logical ethics; but this belongs to extrinsic rather than 
intrinsic value and is more psychology (extrinsic value applied to the 
individual person) than ethics in the intrinsically defined sense, as in the 
paperback [edition] of The Structure of Value.u 
Thus, the intrinsic aspect of psychology overlaps with ethics as intrinsic 
value applied to individual persons. There are very subtle distinctions here, 
as for example in the teleology of Nicolai Hartmann, in what he calls the 
backward determination from the future to the present of the three-fold 
finalistic nexus where intrinsic time determinations take place. But these 
distinctions depend on the distinction between intrinsic time and extrinsic 
time and are not discussed in any of my published writings. I am preparing 
an article, "The Universe of Intrinsic Value," where I discuss this; and it 
is part of a new book, The Universe of Intrinsic Value: An Axiological 
Introduction to Ethics and Aesthetics. 27 
(4) Mr. Edwards mixes up the time within the intrinsic experience with 
the time outside of the intrinsic experience. These are two entirely different 
times, intrinsic and extrinsic, respectively. From the outside, an intrinsic 
experience can be said to endure a certain number of minutes or hours, 
measures which belong to extrinsic time. So we can say that a person has 
had an intrinsic experience for five minutes. But then we speak of the 
temporal length of the experience measured from the outside. Within the 
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experience, the measurements are not minutes and hours but intrinsic 
measures which are differentiations of the infinite. 28 
There is a delightful tale of the Persian poet Firdusi where a man 
experiences a whole life while putting his head in a bucket of water and 
right away pulling it out. Extrinsic time here is a few seconds, intrinsic 
time the qualitative infinity of a life. 
We also know the famous relativity of sitting two minutes on a hot stove, 
and on a park bench with your sweetheart. The richer intrinsic time is, the 
shorter appears the corresponding extrinsic time; the poorer intrinsic time 
(the time of experience) is, the longer appears the corresponding extrinsic 
time. Intrinsic experience can, of course, be both positive and negative. 
When it is negative, i.e., of an intrinsic transposition rather than 
composition, then it is intolerable, e.g., torture or deep grief (IE, Ii); and 
extrinsic time appears endless (but not infinite, as against N). We want the 
negative intrinsic experience to cease, not to exist; and we anticipate with 
all our body and soul this cessation. We are thus aware of the flow of 
extrinsic time, and such awareness makes it flow slowly (as when we 
anticipate arriving at an address we have not been to before. Going, 
therefore, always appears slower than returning, when we know the way 
and don't pay attention to the extrinsic time flow). 
The reason that the awareness of the extrinsic time flow makes time go 
slowly is that in that case our transparency to time is obscured. Our body 
and our senses, including the sense of time, must be transparent, that is, 
must not obstruct us, for our transcendental Self to experience. On the 
other hand, with a positive intrinsic experience, extrinsic time flies. We are 
so involved in the intrinsic experience that we pay no attention to the 
extrinsic time flow. We are completely transparent (Maslow calls these 
peak experiences) and so fully experiencing. In a negative intrinsic 
experience, our empirical self resists this time flow with all its powers. By 
the way, while intrinsic and extrinsic time are thus in inverse proportion to 
their experiencing, or rather being experienced, systemic time goes 
unconcernedly along; the watches keep on ticking and ticking. 
I think the whole clue of the relationship between extrinsic and intrinsic 
value is in the sentence by Husserl: "Fact is one of the possibilities of 
varying the given in imagination. "29 We must get away from the idea that 
the space-time world is reality. It is only one of at least three realities; and 
that of intrinsic value is by far the richest. Every intrinsic experience is a 
world in itself. You might actually define intrinsic valuation as the creation 
of alternate worlds. 
Such a creation is only possible to the being which by its own nature is 
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infinite in the sense of my proofs. The infinity of the person rests in the 
last resort on its self-reflexivity, that is, the definition of the person as that 
being which has its own definition of itself within itself. From this follows 
everything. The predicates, therefore, by which the quality of the person 
is measured are at the same time properties within the person-as is not the 
case with a non-reflective thing. I refer you in this respect to my article 
"Belief as a Value Quality. "30 
An inner intrinsic experience is the identification of the person with his 
own thoughts. A person may have, to his own thoughts, all three value 
relations, systemic, extrinsic, intrinsic. He may just think about his 
thoughts, or he may classify them, or he may identify himself with them: 
The latter is the intrinsic experience of one's own thoughts. The more one 
does this the more one loves oneself and creates oneself as an intrinsic 
universe within oneself. 
4. Reply to Robert E. Carter, 1968, 1969 
Sources of critique: Robert E. Carter, "Review of" Robert S. Hartman, 
The Structure of Value," in Dialogue, 8:4 (1970), pp. 727-730,- and letter 
of 21 October 1968 from Carter to Hartman. 
While completing his graduate degrees, Robert E. Carter began 
corresponding with Robert S. Hartman and struck up a lively friendship with 
him. He visited the Hartmans in Cuernavaca, Mexico, in 1968 on a Canada 
Council Doctoral Fellowship and consulted with Hartman almost daily for 
a period of six months while writing his Ph.D. thesis on value theory. Jn 
later years, he and Hartman worked on a jointly written book,- and he 
corresponded with Hartman extensively up to the time of his death. 
The first section of the following is from a letter from Hartman to Carter 
on 29 October 1968. It answers two very important questions, among 
others raised by Carter in his letter of 21 October 1968: 
fl] Would it be outrageous to hold that the intrinsic value realm is not 
in space but IS IN TIME?,- and {2] How does one judge whether what 
one thinks he ought to be is what he REALLY OUGHT TO BE? How 
do we get beyond the individualistic concerns of Existentialism where 
each man "does his thing"? 
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Jn dealing with Carter's question about the temporality of the realm of 
intrinsic value, Hartman seems to, but perhaps did not, contradict what he 
usually said. He usually categorically denied without qualification that the 
intrinsic is in space or time, as in the citations presented in the preceding 
introduction to Edwards' "Some Spurious Proofs for the Pure Ego, pages 
41-44 of this book. In responding to Carter, Hartman further developed a 
theme presented at least once in The Structure of Valud1 that the intrinsic 
dimension has its own space and time and is not absolutely spaceless and 
timeless after all. Intrinsic spacetime is just different from public extrinsic 
spacetime. Hartman's denials that the intrinsic is in spacetime can be 
reconciled with a process (here Bergsonian) metaphysics if Hartman is only 
talking phenomenology, not metaphysics, as Edwards assumed. Extrinsic 
timelessness characterizes experiences of intrinsic valuation, not the actually 
existing intrinsic values that are the intentional objects of these experiences; 
(Hartman frequently confused intrinsic valuations with intrinsic values,32 
identification with identity.) When we totally love, empathize with, or 
identify ourselves with some /, E, or S, public spacetime is irrelevant, 
unnoticed; and intrinsic spacetime becomes our whole experiential universe. 
Hartman's most thorough and convincing expression of this phenomenology 
of intrinsic valuation may be found in his posthumously published article 
titled "The A.xiometric Structure of Intrinsic Value "/1 but this theme is 
nicely expressed in section (1) of the following reply to Carter. 
The third and fourth sections below are Hartman's response to the 
objections raised in Carter's 1970 review that (3) a single account of 
"good" is sufficient, and that (4) there is a mystery surrounding our 
capturing the concept of something. 
(1) Yes, it would be outrageous to hold that the intrinsic value realm is not 
in space but is in time. Remember that space and time are themselves 
subject to the value dimensions and that we must never mix dimensions. 
Thus, when we speak of intrinsic value we must speak of the time and space 
which belong to this dimension, namely, intrinsic time and space. 34 
Intrinsic value is thus outside both extrinsic space and time and systemic 
space and time, but it is within intrinsic space and time. The time in which 
the mind is, according to Augustine, is the same as Henri Bergson's: it is 
intrinsic duration; it is not the time of the sun and of everyday, nor the time 
of clocks and of physics. Immortality means being beyond extrinsic and 
systemic space and time (the universe); but it means to be in intrinsic space 
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and time, precisely in eternity.35 Very interesting in this connection is J. 
B. Priestley, Man and Time. 36 Also, of course, Arthur Eddington, The 
Nature of the Physical World. 31 There are many works on: Time in 
Homer, Time in Thomas Mann, etc., on the various Time-dimensions. 
Space is not so popular. 
When we define Ethics as "intrinsic value applied to persons," then from 
the notion of intrinsic value it follows that the person is not in space and 
time, hence is not different from any other person, hence that all persons 
are one (the Kingdom of God., etc.). 38 Compassion, conscience, and other 
intrinsic phenomena follow necessarily from the non-spatial, non-temporal, 
or intrinsically spatio-temporal, character of personality. Thus, egoism is 
self contradictory, as already G. E. Moore saw,39 although he doesn't 
prove it as easily and simply as do I by the mere notion of intrinsic value; 
(actually his argument is based on the notion of extrinsic value and is thus 
invalid). 
(2) How does one judge whether what one thinks he ought to be is what 
he really ought to be? If he defines himself intrinsically, then this is what 
he really ought to be, since extrinsic and systemic value ought to be intrinsic 
value. See?! Thus from a cell, I ought to become a physical, and from a 
physical a social being; and from a social being, I ought to become a moral 
being. In doing my own thing, I then do everybody's (Kant: "humanity in 
thyself'). 
Why does Carter say the precise mathematical standard of the intension 
of a concept is missing in ethics? Not at all. It is the non-denumerably 
infinite nature of the self-concept. This I must fulfill.40 In the degree that 
I fulfill it, I fulfill humanity in myself, even the whole universe, a la St. 
Francis. 41 In the degree that I do not fulfill it, I am remote from this 
norm, and the distance can be measured by the axiological calculus; (this is 
precisely what the [HVP] Test does). For this reason, it is so important to 
remember that the whole of formal axiology is axiometry. 
(3) The main criticism which Professor Carter brings against The 
Structure of Value is that I assume "that a single account of the use of 
good-good-of-its-kind-is sufficient for all types of contexts in which it 
occurs. "42 I do not agree with this formulation. I start my presentation 
with good-of-its-kind; but I show that this is only one specific case of a 
much wider logical matrix of Good; and that Good itself is only one kind 
of value. Thus, my theory is not so much concerned with Good as with 
Value; and value is defined as the intensional counterpart to number. Just 
as the class of all classes of extensions similar to a given extension is 
Number, so the set of all sets of intensions similar to a given intension is 
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Value. 
If there is given a set of n predicates determining a certain extension 
(class), then the things belonging to the class (the class members) having n 
properties are good class members; and all those having less than n 
properties are less than good such class members. The value Good, then, 
is the totality of intensions similar to intension n; and the value Less-than-
good is the totality of intensions similar to intensions less than n. An 
intension is a set of predicates and structured according to the logic of sets. 
Any set of descriptive qualities defines a fact; any subset of a set defines a 
value. This is a much wider subject than good-of-its-kind. 
Good-of-its-kind refers to only one kind of value, namely, extrinsic value. 
When the arithmetic of sets is applied to the set of predicates, that is an 
intension; and, in particular, when transfinite sets are considered, then the 
kind of which good-of-its-kind speaks becomes something which no axiology 
has so far considered: on the lower scale of finite predicative sets appears 
systemic value, and on the upper scale of transfinite [predicative] sets, 
intrinsic value. Good-of-its-kind is only the starting point of the theory, 
perhaps the central part of it; but it is by no means all the theory is about. 
This is rather set theory applied to sets of predicates. 43 
Although, thus, I do not accept that the subject of my book is good-of-its-
kind, I still would like to say a word on Mr. J. 0. Urmson's approach 
[discussed by Carter], for it illustrates well the difference between logical 
and linguistic analysis of value. The linguist sticks to words, whereas the 
logician penetrates to the meaning of what is being said. The same is true 
of the axio-linguist and the axio-logician. The former adheres to words; the 
latter penetrates to the meaning of words. Thus, Mr. Urmson, in Chapter 
9 of The Emotive Theory of Ethics, 44 makes the distinction between "good 
of a kind" and "good from a point of view" and notes that while it is 
usually possible to determine that a "good x" is independently a "x," it is 
far from clear how it is to be shown that a "good thing" is independently 
a "thing" in any clear and unambiguous sense. Mr. Urmson's examples are 
(a) "This is a good road from the farmer's point of view" and (b) "This is 
a good thing from the farmer's point of view." 
In a first course of logic, a student is told that in ordinary language the 
terms of propositions are frequently inverted, its parts separated, or words 
used in such a way as to obscure its true logical meaning, to which the 
student is taught to penetrate. The linguistic philosopher works on the pre-
logical level of the student who has not yet learned logic, and this is 
especially true of the value linguist. He still hangs himself up on words 
without penetrating to their axiological meaning. Thus, Urmson's example: 
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"This road is a good thing from the farmer's point of view," means, in 
value logic: "This road is good for the farmer." It belongs to the notion 
"good for," which is examined in detail in The Structure of Value. "A 
good thing" has no meaning in formal axiology because there is no intension 
of "thing" that makes any sense; hence "a good thing" is not an axiological 
but a pseudo-axiological term; it means "something good," as discussed in 
The Structure of Value. It means that something is good. "Something" is 
a variable, and "something good" means simply: "Xis good." When we 
insert for "x" a name that has meaning, the phrase becomes axiologically 
meaningful. Such considerations are closed to the linguistic philosopher, 
since language does not disclose them. "For x to exist or come about would 
be a good thing" means: "It would be good that x exists. "45 The analysis 
of the phrase can be made analogous to that of Moore's open question 
test. 46 In my El Conocimiento del Bien, it is shown that the meaning of 
"It is good that x exists" follows from the fact that the intension of "the 
existence of x" coincides partly with the intension of "x. "47 
(4) The next objection of Professor Carter concerns the "mystery" 
surrounding the capturing of a concept of something.48 Formal axiology 
is based on the principle that valuing goes as far as conceptualization, and 
that valuing is possible in the degree that there is conceptualization. Where 
there is no conceptualization, there no valuation is possible. It is not the 
matter [or business] of axiology to discuss the capturing of concepts (even 
though Carter says I have gone pretty far in showing the structure of 
concepts). It is the matter of axiology to show that valuation depends on 
conceptualization. Thus, when two persons have a different concept of a 
painting or, for that matter, of democracy, etc., then their valuations must 
correspondingly be different. This is a fundamental fact of valuation and 
hence must also be accounted for in value theory. 49 
In sum, I have never yet come across an example of linguistic value 
philosophy which did not yield to axiological analysis. Thus, for me, it is 
neither an open question nor a contentious issue whether axiologic can 
account for value situations. The thing one has to do is to apply value 
logic, to penetrate to the meaning of value words, and not content oneself 
with their surface appearance. 
5. Reply to G. R. Grice, 1969 
Source of critique: G. R. Grice, "Review of Robert S. Hartman, The 
Structure of Value: Foundations of Scientific Axiology, in The British 
Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 19 (1969), pp. 179-180. 
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The first two reviews of Hartman's The Structure of Value by Castaneda 
and Grice were very contentious. Hartman himself wrote the following reply 
to Grice in the third person-as if it had been written by someone else, and 
titled it "Hartman and Simplicio: A Rejoinder to G. R. Grice." Apparently, 
he hoped to persuade someone else to publish it in his own name; but this 
was never done. In the following text, the editor has converted all third 
person references back to first person references. 
Grice protested (1) that Hartman procrastinates in facing the difficulty 
that if a thing has to be an x in order to be a good x, then every xis good 
because every x fulfills its definition; and there cannot be a fair or bad x. 
Grice also claimed (2) that Hartman's definition of "good" is mistaken, (3) 
that he lacks feeling for plausibility, and (4) that his distinction between 
definitional and expositional properties is untenable. 
Concerning these difficulties, Hartman responded: 
In the following, I will discuss G. R. Grice's review of The Structure of 
Value. 
1. Grice objects with "an elementary reflection" against my definition of 
"good," which he claims to show "will not do; and when this definition is 
swept away, the whole of Hartman's thesis is swept away with it." Grice 
claims that on page 51 of my book, I give a definition of "good," the 
difficulties of which I do "not notice ... for a hundred further pages and it is 
not tackled for forty more. ".lO This statement is incorrect in several 
respects. 
(a) On page 51, I do not even discuss or give a definition of "good." I 
discuss a necessary intensional counterpart to the definition of Number in 
extensional logic and find it also in the notion of Value. After examining 
the shortcomings of a merely extensional logic, which culminates in the 
definition of Number, I state: "There also ought to be a concept which is 
defined by 'the class of all intensions similar to a given intension.' This 
concept happens to be the concept 'a value,' as it will be elaborated from 
the determination given by G. E. Moore. "51 Then follows what Mr. Grice 
cites, namely, the concept of "good" as an instance of "value" and as part 
of the program I set for myself, "to be elaborated from the determination 
given by Moore." In pursuing this program, I first discuss the meaning of 
a science of ethics in Moore's sense; second, I develop the axiom of 
valuation from Moore's paradox of intrinsic value;52 third, I show the 
corollaries of the axiom; fourth, I apply the axiom to Moore's own axiology 
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(in what I regard as a brilliant exposition); and immediately thereafter, fifth, 
I proceed to the elaboration of the axiom. The "hundred further pages" are 
thus used in developing the program announced on page 52. It is false that 
I do "not notice the difficulty" until then. 
(b) The difficulty, according to Grice, consists in the following. 
According to my definition, a thing is a good member of its class if it has 
all the class properties, and is a less-than-good member if it does not. This 
definition, says Grice, "has the consequence that a thing is a good x if and 
only if it is an x, with the further consequence that there cannot be a fair or 
bad x. "53 
Mr. Grice here uses precisely the kind of logic which-and this is the 
whole point of my discussion-must not be used in the discussion of 
"good." Grice overlooked my fundamental argument. Using extensional 
logic to account for values, the procedure of positivistic "axiologists," I 
say, 54 results in the nonsense of holding value judgments to be nonsensical 
because they do not fit into this kind of logic. The positivist, rather than 
designing a new logic that would fit the notion of value, Procrustes-like 
amputates the larger part of philosophy and throws it away as senseless. 
[As I indicate,] "The counterpart in physics to the positivistic attitude in 
ethics would be Einstein's decision, since it was proved that the ether did 
not exist, to lean back and pronounce all natural science as 'nonsense.' 
Instead, he designed a new frame of reference ... " 55 
[This is what I do] for the field of value. My discovery is a universal 
instrument for the measurement of value: the measure of the value of a 
thing is the intension of the thing's concept, I say as early as page 19: 
The use of the logical concept as axiological measure presupposes the 
elaboration of intensional logic, which has been neglected during the 
development of extensional logic in the last hundred years. Such 
elaboration leads to the notion of intension as a set of predicates and to 
the structuralization of this set according to the logic of sets.56 
Extensional logic, therefore, can be applied to the phenomena of moral 
philosophy as little as could scholastic logic to those of natural philosophy; 
but precisely this logic is what Mr. Grice applies in criticism of my 
definition. 
(c) Grice has not noticed the basis on which I apply set theory to the 
predicative set of the intension and show that the three cardinalities-finite, 
denumerably infinite, and non-denumerably infinite-give different sets of 
int ens ions. "The first kind of sets are called definitions, the second 
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expositions, the third descriptions (or depictions). Each of these kinds of 
sets defines a specific kind of concept; and the fulfillment of each such 
concept defines a specific kind of value. "57 "Exposition" thus is a 
technical term in my system, following from my fundamental procedure of 
applying set theory to predicative sets. If this notion is held to be 
untenable, as Grice claims, one must attack the procedure from which it 
follows and, in particular, come to grips with the historical sources on 
which I base it, G. W. Leibniz, Hermann Lotze, and Benno Erdmann. 
(d) Instead, Grice attacks the notion of exposition with an example-his 
"elementary reflection" -and applies to it precisely that logic which I 
exclude from the subject of exposition, namely, the logic of definition. The 
three kinds of values originated by the fulfillment of the three kinds of 
intension are characterized as follows. The first kind, systemic value, 
belongs to constructions of the human mind, such as geometric circles, 
electrons, etc. The second kind, extrinsic value, belongs to abstractions 
where properties common to at least two things are "drawn off' one by 
one. Such things may lack one or more properties of the class and still be 
such things, though not good ones. The third kind, intrinsic value, belongs 
to singular things. The value of the first kind is Perfection, that of the 
second kind Goodness, and that of the third kind Uniqueness. To each of 
them belongs a specific logic; extensional logic belongs only to the first 
kind. Grice, unaware of all this, uses the logic of systemic value to 
contradict my definition of extrinsic value. 
(e) The notion of exposition, which defines extrinsic value, and extrinsic 
value alone, is introduced systematically on page 112, not on page 197, [as 
Grice suggests.] Even earlier it is discussed in various contexts, [especially] 
in connection with the Kantian distinction between the synthetic and analytic 
methods, 58 on which I, like Cassirer, base the logical distinction between 
philosophy and science. Grice does not notice any of this. He finds my 
distinction between expositional and definitional properties59 "untenable" 
due to his limited view of logic, rather than because of any difficulty 
inherent in the notion or its axiological consequences. Grice's example in 
this connection shows his error. "If one racing man said to another, 'She's 
a good filly' and the other replied, 'No she's not: no chestnuts', he would 
not have disputed what the first said. "ro But he would have, because for 
him a property of a good filly is having chestnuts on the inner sides of both 
pairs of legs. 
According to Grice, this view of a filly makes one "guilty of 
irrelevance." But it is not up to Grice to judge what a racing man regards 
as a good filly. Nor has this judgment of a good filly anything to do with 
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the logic of goodness. Rather, the example confirms my theory, for this 
theory is about the logic of value judgments, not about the justifications for 
making such judgments. The racing man calls the filly "no good" because 
she lacks some of the properties which, according to him, fillies should 
have. Another racing man, or a philosopher for that matter, may regard 
this as a property not needed by a good filly. But both use the term "good" 
for the possession of those properties that they regard as goodmaking. In 
my terminology, Grice confuses a variable ("good") with one of its logical 
values. This I call The Fallacy of Method.61 Grice's "reflection" is not 
only elementary but formally fallacious. Moreover, it is materially false. 
Horsemen tell me that the lack of chestnuts in a filly is a serious matter. 
(f) Mr. Grice's reflection does not jibe with the phenomena of valuation. 
A truly elementary reflection would show that, for example, a chair which 
lacks a seat is still a chair and is not thrown away but sent to a carpenter for 
repair, or that a review, Grice's, for example, which lacks expositional 
criteria of a review is still definitionally a review since it is about a book 
and in a journal section entitled "Reviews." His is a review, but not a good 
one; and as the shortcomings of the chair must be repaired, so those of a 
review must be corrected. These elementary facts are accounted for in my 
axiology by the distinction between expositional and definitional properties. 
(g) This distinction is as old as logic itself; and so is the notion of the 
intension as a measure of value, going back to Plato and Aristotle. My 
definition of value 
is the formulation in logical terms of a principle common to all classical 
value theory. It has been expressed in ontological, teleological, 
epistemological, and other terms. Ontologically, a thing has been 
called good in the degree of its perfection, teleologically, in the degree 
of fulfilling its purpose, epistemologically, in the degree of possessing 
its essential properties. It has been called good in the degree that its 
actuality corresponds to its ideality, or its ideality is fulfilled by its 
actuality (Paul Weiss), or in the degree that there is "fulfillment of its 
essential nature" (Paul Tillich), or that it has "the special complex of 
characters which justify us in calling it good" (G. E. Moore), etc. 
Surveying the history of axiology we have here a general consensus 
which may be called "axiologia perennis. "62 
(2) Anyone familiar with the subject of my investigation will understand 
that I have tackled successfully a problem which had not been solved in 
previous philosophy. The classical problem of value-in the form of 
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Goodness-has been: How to define Good-in-general, rather than this or 
that specific good. The problem, in other words, has been to find out what 
it is that all good things have in common. This problem, which is that of 
the Socratic dialogues, of the Republic, of Aristotle, of Aquinas, etc., has 
never been solved. It is stated by Nicolai Hartmann in a passage that he 
uses as a motto to his Chapter 3: 
Ethics in all its forms comes down to the question, What is the 
principle of the "good"? ... Positive morals cannot be appealed to, for 
each answers the question materially in a different manner. One sees 
happiness, another satisfaction, a third justice, a fourth love, as the 
Good ... Philosophy has early recognized the complete onesidedness of 
positive morality and consequently searched for the Principle of the 
Good as something more general, superordinated to these fragmentary 
insights. It was looked for as the genus to the manifold of the species. 
The Platonic "Idea of the Good" was the most radical such attempt. 
But what is the content of such an "Idea of the Good"? It has been 
looked for in vain. Neither Plato nor any later philosopher has been 
able to determine it. 63 
The naturalistic fallacy consists precisely in the faulty substitution of 
definitions of specific goods, such as satisfaction, pleasure, etc., for the 
definition of good in general. I show that the reason for this fallacy does 
not lie in the subject matter of axiology; rather, it lies in its philosophical 
instead of scientific method. The same kind of fallacy appears in every case 
in which a philosophy is converted into a science. From the point of view 
of the new science, the arguments of the old philosophy-like Grice's 
"elementary reflection"-appear fallacious. 64 [As I indicate,] "The history 
of science shows that whenever the philosophical definition of a subject 
matter is replaced by a scientific one, the philosophical one appears as a 
methodological fallacy such as the naturalistic fallacy. "6S 
The unfolding of Moore's naturalistic fallacy into five methodological 
fallacies is one of the most fascinating sections of my book. The basis of 
it is the transformation of philosophical into scientific axiology, in the sense 
defined in 1 :e above. In the process of solving the problem of Good, I was 
driven to a scientific, that is a formally synthetic, rather than a materially 
analytic, procedure (in the Newtonian-Kantian sense). I had to develop 
Moore in the very direction Keynes foresaw. 
Indeed, as Keynes said, in Principia Ethica, Moore "carried the use of 
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ordinary speech as far as it would ever be possible to carry it, in 
conveying clear meaning. For still greater precision one would have 
to proceed by mathematical symbols." This kind of procedure I have 
been driven to employ in this book. 66 
I was driven to a formal axiological view of value in the same way that the 
creators of natural science were driven to a formal mathematical view of 
nature. 
Anyone who is familiar with this problematic will, as Ludwig 
Wittgenstein said to C. H. Waddington, be grateful to anyone who tries to 
tackle it. 67 I not only tackled but, as far as I can see, successfully solved 
it. Of course, my book, being a scientific one, must appear as implausible 
to a philosophical mind who has not followed my argument carefully, as the 
arguments of Copernicus and Galileo appeared to the scholastics. Grice is 
my Simplicio. It is a confirmation rather than a criticism of my position 
when Grice finds "bizarre machinations," "weird conceptions," and "lack 
of any feeling for plausibility" in my book. 
Those, however, who have struggled with the problematic and have 
racked their brains trying to follow the convolutions of contemporary 
axiology will welcome my book as a true liberation. They will find it 
exceedingly clear, my formulations ingenious, my conceptions to the point, 
and my feeling for plausibility of that fundamental simplicity which Bertrand 
Russell calls "'logical common sense'-i. e., that it should seem in the end, 
just what one ought to have expected all along. "68 
Professor Charles Hartshorne has written that my book is "fantastically 
ingenious and challenging. "69 At the same time, its formal simplicity, yet 
explicitness, applied to the fundamental subject of value, makes it, in the 
words of Professor Henry N. Wieman, "one of the most constructive and 
revolutionary undertakings suggested in modem times. "70 
6. Reply to Nicholas R~cher, 1969 
Source of critique: Nicholas Rescher, Introduction to Value Theory, 
(Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1969), Ch. V. 
In his chapter on "Axiology: The General Theory of Values," Nicholas 
Rescher at the University of Pittsburgh charged (1) that Hartman's axiology 
deals only with value of a kind or class, but not with value in general, (2) 
that he incorporates an essentialist metaphysics (things have essences) into 
his value theory, (3) (a) that bad things as well as good things have 
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properties, and (b) that complex things need not be better than simple 
things, (4) that Hartman treats all properties as being on a par, (5) and that 
he neglects degrees of property possession. 
Hartman gave the following reply to Rescher in a letter to him dated 7 
November 1970. 
Concerning the section [Professor Rescher was] kind enough to grant me in 
his book, Introduction to Value Theory, I have one major objection against 
his presentation, and from this other objections follow. The main objection 
is that he presents one small part of my theory as if it were the whole. 
Actually what he presents as my theory is only a third of it. He then 
criticizes what he presents; only, what he presents is not my value theory! 
[Rescher explains] only that part which I call extrinsic value, but not 
systemic or intrinsic value, nor value in general. After his words, 
"Hartman says, •A thing is good if it fulfills the definition of its concept,' 
and that the more complex and property-laden this concept becomes, the 
better the things that instantiate it, "71 Rescher might have added: 
However, "goodness" characterizes only one of the three value 
dimensions in Hartman's view, the extrinsic. Things can be called 
"good" and "bad" only if they can vary in the possession of their 
properties and yet retain their capacity for being the kind of things they 
are. This is the case only for things in space and time, which remain 
such things even though they can vary their properties. Things that are 
thought constructions change their being when predicates are added or 
subtracted. Hence, to thought construction, the predicates "good" or 
"bad" cannot be applied. There are no good or bad geometrical circles 
or square roots of -1. The values of such things Hartman calls 
systemic values. They are characterized by the finite and definite 
number of predicates in their concepts. "Good and "bad" are only 
applicable for things in classes. Thought constructions are represented 
by their schemata and do not appear in classes. There is a third 
dimension of value, the intrinsic, where "good" and "bad" are not 
applicable either, when a thing, namely, is regarded in a class by itself 
and unique. In this case the set of its properties, and that of the 
predicates in its intension, forms a continuum, and is non-denumerably 
infinite. Hartman thus defines intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic value 
as functions of the cardinality of the number of predicates in a thing's 
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concept. Each of the value types, thus, is quantitatively defined, and 
the three can be put in an hierarchical order: extrinsic value is richer 
in qualities than systemic value, intrinsic value richer in qualities than 
extrinsic value. Since "richer in qualities" is the definition of "better," 
extrinsic value is a better value than systemic value, and intrinsic value 
a better value than extrinsic value. Moreover, since what is worse 
ought to be better, systemic value ought to be extrinsic value, and 
extrinsic value [ought to be] intrinsic value. All valuation, in other 
words, ought to be directed toward intrinsic value. Every intension, 
according to Hartman, is a value measure or axiometric. The names 
of things thus are used as their norms. Hartman shows that value is of 
the same structure intensional.y as number is extensionally. This leads 
to his definition of Value in General as the set of all sets of intensions 
similar to a given intension. Value is that variable the logical values 
of which are axiological values, i.e. axiometric intensions. 
This, more or less, would be a short and fair description of my value 
theory. It is summarized in The Structure of Valuen and in my article on 
"Formal Axiology and the Measurement of Value" in The Journal of Value 
lnquiry. 13 
In view of this description, Rescher's major criticisms disappear; and the 
minor do so as well. Let me now take them up one by one, starting with 
the major criticism. 
(1) "The theory does not get at value-in-general, but only at value sui 
generis-the value of something as an instance of a specific kind with well-
determined characteristic properties. "74 
[I reply that] value sui generis is only extrinsic value. Neither systemic 
nor intrinsic value are the value of something as an instance of a specific 
kind. Rather, we have three kinds of value quantitatively defined and 
hierarchically ordered. 
(a) There are two sections in The Structure of Value on the relation of 
Value in General and specific values, Ch. III, Sections 1 and 3. Section 1 
is called "Generic and Specific Value," and Section 3 is "Axiological 
Specificity." The difference between generic and specific value is explained 
in detail, and it is shown what is meant by each. Under the generic there 
are two logical levels, the particular and the singular. General value is 
called "Value," specific value "value." Both are combined in valuation. 
The first is elaborated in the logic of value or formal axiology (axiologistic 
or axiologic), the second in applied formal axiology or pure theoretical 
axiology, the third in applied value sciences. 75 Value sui generis does not 
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belong in this logical series; it is not the opposite of value in general. 
Value sui generis may either be general or specific value. Value in general 
is what all value phenomena have in common; 76 and if all value 
phenomena have in common that they are instances of a specific kind with 
well-determined characteristic properties, then this kind of value is value in 
general. As mentioned, this is not my definition of value in general, but the 
definition of extrinsic value only. 
The definition of a value in general is rather the set of intensions similar 
to a given intension.11 That is, the value "good" is had by all things the 
set of properties of which corresponds to the set of predicates in their 
intension. The set of sets of predicates (intensions) which contain all their 
predicates is the value good, and the set of sets of predicates (intensions) 
which do not contain all their predicates is the value less than good. Value 
is that variable the logical values of which are axiological values. 78 The 
latter are defined, also, as any subset of a set properties. 79 The set of all 
these sets of intensions similar to given intensions then is Value in General. 
(b) Since the three kinds of value, intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic, are 
hierarchically ordered, it is not true that whereas "We can use the property 
inventory to evaluate, say, a pearl qua pearl, but we cannot use it to 
evaluate pearls versus diamonds. "80 We can, once we have determined the 
tertium comparationis, say, "jewelry," and the property inventory of the 
latter. We can then show which of the two, pearls or diamonds, have more 
and which less of the jewelry properties. We cannot, however, compare 
things in different classes unless we can show that the class concept of the 
one is richer in properties than that of the other. Thus, we can show that 
all intrinsic values are better, that is richer in properties than, extrinsic 
values; and all extrinsic values are better than systemic values. This leads 
to the reversal of the classical hierarchy of values, [where] thought is the 
highest value, and to the existential hierarchy [intrinsic values-persons, are 
highest; extrinsic values-things, roles, actions, are next; and systemic 
values-ideas, constructs, come last]. 81 
(2) "It bases the process of evaluation upon an outmoded-and in fact 
untenable-essentialistic perspective that treats pearls and apples as 
characterized by a constellation of essential properties that denominate them 
as the sorts of things they are. "82 
The word "essence," in Rescher's sense, does not appear in my book. 
My approach is logical, not ontological, or even epistemological. All I say 
is that things are defined and explained by the intensions of their concepts; 
and that the intensions are sets of predicates to which the properties of the 
things may or may not conform. I show the difference between the logical 
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and other perspectives. 83 Of course, if apples and pearls did not have 
different properties, they would not be apples and pearls, for it is the 
corresponding sets of predicates that define "pearl" and "apple" 
respectively. Rescher projects into my book an epistemological or 
metaphysical perspective which I explicitly distinguish from my own logical 
one. 
(3) "It overlooks the fact that complex types of things (with many 
properties) need not be inherently better than simple ones, and that 'bad' 
things too have their characteristic definitions that incorporate a multiplicity 
of properties (sinners as well as saints, poisons as well as medicines). "84 
This objection is a conjunction of two themes. 
(a) To take the second [point] first, it seems Rescher missed the section 
in my book that deals with Transposition. 85 The difference between a 
good thing with the number n of properties, and a bad thing with the same 
number of properties is the transposition of the latter's properties; that is, 
some or all of them are bad for the others, in accordance with the definition 
of "bad for," which is: "x is bad for y means that x is contrary to some 
part of the intension of y. "86 My example is, precisely, that of arsenic 
used as either poison or medicine. A transpositional intension is "a 
collection of predicates without a uniting tie. "87 A thing with a 
transpositional concept is a thing with an inner contradiction, and a plurality 
of things in transposition contradict one another. 
A good Buick and a good Ford transpose each other when they collide; 
and the wreck may be called a transposition in the literal sense of the 
word ... The wreck, however, is a good wreck, fulfilling the definition 
of "wreck," which in turn means a combination of two bad cars ... 88 
This section [of my book] shows all kinds of transpositions and 
compositions of values, some of them enumerated on page 297. A look at 
the index under "bad," "bad for," and "badness" would show the many 
ways in which I discuss this subject. 
(b) Rescher's first theme states that "Complex types of things (with many 
properties) need not be inherently better than simple ones. "89 
This is a problem due to vagueness of language. If Rescher means things 
of the same class, then what he says is false since of two things in the same 
class, say, chairs, one with many chair-properties is better than one with 
less chair-properties and will, for example, cost more. If, however, he 
means things of different classes, then the word "simple" becomes relative, 
for what is simple in one class, e.g., a simple airplane, is different from 
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what is simple in another class, say, a simple person or a simple chair; 
obviously a simple person is more complex, richer in properties, and hence 
better than a complex airplane, and a simple airplane more complex, better 
and more expensive than a complex chair. Thus, without defining what 
"simple" means in his statement, the sentence is too vague to make sense. 
Also, it is not explained [by Rescher] what the difference is between 
"inherently better" and "better." 
Now let me go to the minor criticisms. 
(4) "It treats all the properties of the thing being evaluated as fully on a 
part with one another. "90 
This leaves out of consideration a whole section of my book which deals 
with the weighing of properties, "The Logical Pattern of the Value 
Terms. " 91 [This section] gives a pretty detailed study of what sets of 
properties mean in each thing, and how they relate to one another: 
The higher the differentiation of the thing, the less each property is 
worth for the thing: but the more properties the thing itself has, that 
is, the more differentiated it is, the more the thing itself is worth for 
something that has it. For this reason, the horse's foot is worth more 
for the horse than its tail, and its mouth is worth more for it than its 
foot and so on; any more differentiated part is worth more for the 
whole than is a less differentiated part ... Thus the mouth has more 
properties than the foot and the foot more than the tail ... Hence the 
value of these respective sets of properties for the horse is proportionate 
to the number of properties contained in each. 92 
(5) "It neglects the fact that possession of a property can be a matter of 
degree (e.g., the rotundity of the pearl), while others are on-off matters, 
(e.g., the chemical composition of the pearl ... )" 
This subject has been treated in the same section of my book. Rescher 
continues that the chemical composition of the pearl "represents an 
absolutely crucial consideration because an item deficient in respect of this 
particular property is not a poor pearl, but no pearl at all. "93 
This again is treated fully in my book, in the distinctions between 
systemic and expositional properties in the section: "The Dimensional 
Pattern of the Value Terms. "94 
The distinction between definitional and expositional properties of an 
empirical class must only be made when the loss of an intensional 
property means loss not of the goodness but of the particular existence 
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of the thing. For, if x does not have the definitional properties of C, 
then x is not a C. Whereas, when x has none of the expositional 
properties but does have the definitional properties then x is a C but a 
no good one. 95 
Please excuse the length of this [response], which is prompted by the 
importance I give to Rescher's writings, and to my appearance in them. 
7. Reply to Robert W. Mueller, 1969 
Source of critique: Robert W. Mueller, "The Axiology of Robert S. 
Hartman: A Critical Study," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 3:1 (Spring 
1969), pp. 19-29. 
Robert S. Hartman's reply to Robert Mueller, who was then at Marquette 
University in Milwaukee, comes partly from the manuscript "Fonnal 
Axiology and its Critics" and partly from a letter to Mueller written ori 28 
October 1969. 
Mueller objected (1) that Hartman can not tell us where to find the 
expositional properties that measure goodness, (2) that this leaves us without 
an objective measure of the goodness of man-and everything else, including 
sincerity, honesty, and authenticity, (3) that dictionaries, social consensus 
or common consent, and experts are inadequate sources of expositonal 
standards for measuring value, (4) that Hartman reduces valuing to knowing 
and would turn geniuses into saints, (5) that his position reduces ethical 
disagreements to disagreements in belief, (6) that he projects a utopia in 
which all people agree about nonns, (7) that he presupposes the attainability 
of crystal clear knowledge in both physical and ethical science, (8) that 
Hartman's hierarchy of value, which includes the infinite value of man, is 
unjustified, (9) that Hartman's theory is inapplicable to practice, especially 
the [HVPJ value test. 
Hartman concluded his 1969 letter to Mueller with: "1 have very much 
enjoyed your article. lt is one of the very best so far written on the subject. 
1 thought that my comments on it will interest you. " 
Of the thorough critiques of the book, I have answered one, namely, that 
of Neri Castaneda, in Philosophy of Science. I would like here to 
answer. .. others which appeared in The Journal of Value lnquiry. Professor 
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Robert W. Mueller states that "This paper will attempt to evaluate 
Hartman's system with its test. "96 [I will reply to Mueller's many 
objections.] 
(I) Where do we find the expositional properties in practice? [Mueller 
says:] 
In practice, Hartman uses: 1) dictionaries; 2) common consent or 
agreement; 3) experts. Precisely in the value disciplines (aesthetics, 
ethics, etc., these sources prove inadequate, which means that unless 
some other source is available in his system, Hartman's theory proves 
inadequate. en 
Against this I say, first, that where there are no expositional properties 
beside the definitional properties, then no valuation is possible. For 
example, in political science, when an American and a Russian discuss 
democracy, and one says to the other, "Your democracy is bad," each has 
a different definition and exposition of "democracy" to which the definition 
and exposition of the other does not measure up. This does not mean that 
my theory is inadequate; it means that the understanding of democracy is 
inadequate. Value theory says precisely that I cannot value if I do not have 
a clear and distinct knowledge of the object to be valued, that is, of its 
concept. If I am asked to value the goodness or badness of "triugolnaia 
grusha," I will be at a loss if I don't know what triugolnaia grusha is; and 
this is precisely what the theory says that I will be. 
(2) Mueller asks: How shall we judge a good man? Where are his 
definitional and expositional properties? He says that here dictionaries do 
not help us. 98 
Indeed, in cases where definitional and ex positional in tensions are unclear, 
some other source must be available in the system. With respect to man, 
the system defines "man" as "That being which has its own definition of 
itself within itself, the self-reflective being." This is not a very original 
definition; and anyone who knows ethics ought to know it and ought to be 
able to judge who is a morally good person and who is not. Someone not 
versed in ethics, of course, would not be able to do so, but would take 
extraneous properties of man as standards, as the norm for man. 
Mueller says that manuals of ethics and moral theology are not 
representative of consensus and hence cannot constitute the objective 
criterion which I seek, specifically in regard to what makes a man good. 99 
But nowhere do I speak of seeking an objective criterion for the goodness 
of a particular object. I give a method whereby a criterion can be found, 
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a method which defines "criterion" as such, namely as "predicate of an 
intension," but not a method for finding a particular criterion. That is a 
matter of the application of the theory, not of the theory itself, as explained 
in my discussion of "The Fallacy of Method. "100 
There are all kinds of goodnesses of man: "A man is a good man" is 
entirely different depending on whether man is regarded as a systemic, 
extrinsic, or intrinsic value. [When regarded as] an extrinsic value, as in 
Mueller's example "a good man," then good is meant axiologically but not 
morally; and the same would be the case, only more so, in a systemic 
notion of man, for example, as homosapiens. But if "man" is meant 
intrinsically, that is, morally, then we have to define man (1) as a person, 
(2) and a person as that being which has its own definition of itself within 
itself, (3) this definition being "I am I," and (4) the fulfillment of this 
definition as a person's actually being himself, i.e., honest, sincere, 
genuine, etc., .. . as discussed in The Structure of Value. 101 
Mueller continues: "By what justification does one arrive at statements 
such as: 'To be sincere, honest, or authentic in whatever one does is 
infinitely more important than what one does' (p. 115)?" 102 
The predicates "sincere," "honest," "authentic," etc., are not unexplained 
in the Hartman system. Rather, they mean that a person is himself, fulfills 
the definition "I am I. " 103 Since goodness is conceptual fulfillment, moral 
value will appear as the fulfillment by a person of his own concept of 
himself. This is the singular concept "I" whose intension, axiomatically 
structured according to the logic of singularity, will appear as the 
axiological measure of a person's moral worth. A person will be more 
moral the more he fulfills his concept of his Self. Hence, moral terms such 
as "honest," "sincere," "genuine" will receive an exact axiological 
meaning, as will their opposites "dishonest," "insincere," "not genuine." 
The structure of a person will become the axiometric structure of his or her 
self-concept applied to her or his situational actuality. Thus, it is not true 
that I borrow these terms from other systems or presuppose them in the 
reader by way of common consent. 
It is thus not correct when Mueller says that these predicates-"sincere," 
"honest," and "authentic"-are unexplained in my system and quite 
obviously borrowed from other systems or presupposed in the reader by 
way of common consent. They mean the four steps just outlined [in 
explaining "man" as understood intrinsically]. Also, with respect to 
manuals of ethics and moral theology, etc., I say the kind of ethics that 
results from formal axiology is that of Kant. I could have added 
Kierkegaard and Scheler. But, as I say, "the majority of traditional ethics 
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do not belong here but in the fields of value psychology, sociology, and 
metaphysics. " 104 
(3) [Mueller says that] dictionaries do not provide the relevant sets of 
expositional predicates; common opinion does not; neither do experts; and 
there is no source for them in Hartman's system. 
But it is not part of my system to find sets of properties, that is, 
applications-just as it is not part of the system of hydrodynamics to find 
waterfalls. It is, however, part of the system of axiology to construct 
prototypes of, to give the norms for, whatever objects are found-namely 
that they have to have properties if they are to be valued-just as it is a 
matter of norms for hydrodynamics to be applied if and when waterfalls are 
present. 105 
A formal rule of axiology says that "Each thing ought to be good." The 
corresponding formal norm explains what is the particular thing in question, 
how to find its exposition or description, how to fulfill its exposition or 
description, etc., and thus how in actuality such a thing ought to be good. 
What is asked about here is the formal procedure, not the actual procedure; 
for this we have the facultative material norm 106 which refers to the 
application of the rule in general, for example, the application to a person 
by himself. The formal norm says that a person, like anything else, ought 
to be good; that is to say, he ought to fulfill his concept. In the formal 
norm, "person" is an element of an applied axiological science, to wit, 
ethics. 
Axiology does not establish that a certain person must be good, but directs 
itself to all those who apply axiology, saying that if they are going to apply 
axiology, then they must apply it correctly. But it does not say that anyone 
has to apply axiology. If a user wants to apply axiology to himself, or to 
a thing, regards himself as a person, or a particular thing as such a thing, 
then the facultative material norm says that he has to use the axiological 
rules and formal norms concerned with persons or with things. This means 
that he has to be morally good, or that the thing ought to be good in the 
way it is; in tum, this means that he has to fulfill his concept of himself, or 
that the thing has to fulfill its name, to be a good such thing, etc. Thus, to 
find lists of expositional properties, or a norm for a thing, is a matter of 
application; whereas axiology only says in general what a norm is; it gives 
norms for norms; it does not give norms for things. 
[Mueller says that] we find two kinds of words in the dictionary-value-
laden words, and non-value-laden words, examples of the former being 
"murder," "rape," and "sin. " 107 It is precisely the purpose of formal 
axiology to attune the valuer to the difference between value-laden words 
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and non-value-laden words, and to show in which sense value-laden words 
are value-laden, that is, to what value discipline they belong. 
In general, the precision of our valuation corresponds to that of our 
vocabulary. We cannot, in general, value more precisely than we think. 
This is a principle formal axiology must establish and substantiate. But it 
is irrelevant to the theory of formal axiology what our vocabulary is, for 
this is a matter of the interpretation of the theory, and not of the theory 
itself-just as it is irrelevant to mathematics how people add, and what 
mistakes they make; these are matters of the application of mathematics, not 
of mathematics itself. 
A value-laden word, of course, is an axiological rather than a descriptive 
word, as I mention in The Structure of Value with respect to such words "in 
which the logical predicate implies an axiological predicate." 108 I do not 
seek the objective criterion for valuation in manuals of ethics and moral 
theology, as Mueller says; 109 rather, as I say, this criterion is the axiom 
of value itself, which is objective; whereas its application is subjective. 110 
The manuals of ethics and moral theology as well as the dictionary are all 
applications of formal axiology, as is made clear, or so I thought, when I 
distinguish the three levels: I) of the system, 2) of the applied science 
produced by the application of the system, and 3) of the actual situation for 
which the applied science accounts. 111 Only the first of these levels is the 
"objective criterion" or rather the norm; for the words "objective criterion" 
nowhere appear in my book. A criterion is always something of application 
and thus cannot possibly, in my system, be "objective." 
I thus completely agree that common opinion in these matters is not 
common to more than a small group at a given time in a given culture; and 
such a given time and given culture is to be measured by its application of, 
or deviation from, the norm-which is the system. Of course, there are no 
experts in value unless there are experts in axiology. And I populate that 
slot, as Mueller says, by trying to produce a system which in tum can 
produce experts in axiology, experts of value. 
As for aesthetics, an axiological theory of aesthetics has yet to be written, 
just as with a detailed ethics. I am doing so in a book which I am writing 
at present, The Universe of lntrinsic Value, 112 where I start with 
aesthetics, then ethics, religion, and political science. The Structure of Value 
gives the foundations of formal axiology, not the total system; it gives a 
method and directives about how value sciences can be written. Thus, 
aesthetics is the application of intrinsic value to things. An axiological 
aesthetics would first have to define in detail the structure of intrinsic value, 
and then apply this structure to things, which thus would be recognized as 
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works of art. 
(4) Next, [according to Mueller,] the "reduction of valuing to knowledge 
would make a test for the ability to value into a test for intelligence, would 
make geniuses into saints, etc. "113 
Indeed geniuses in axiology may well be saints, "saint" being defined as 
an axiological genius both in knowledge and action. To be a saint is a 
profession, like any other; it is the identification of self with every other 
self. 114 
The more intelligent a person is the better he or she will know how to 
value, for the more and wider concepts he or she considers; the most 
intelligent sees all sub specie aeternitatis. The narrower one is, seeing 
more and more of Jess and less, as does the specialized scientist-Ortega's 
specialist barbarian-the Jess will one be able to value. The saint is the 
genius of intrinsic valuation, of ethics, applied to people. 
Only saints can fully live [the] infinite range of the self. A saint is a 
person who puts his whole power, all the resources of himself, into his own 
goodness, a man who has discovered his oneness with all creation, all men, 
all animals, even all things. He lives within the depth of everybody and 
everything. He is a man of infinite compassion. The deepest intrinsic 
goodness is to Jive so deeply and transparently within ourselves that we live 
deeply and compassionately within every human being, indeed every living 
being-indeed, every being. As St. Francis said to Brother Leo when he 
tried to extinguish the fire on St. Francis' coat: "Brother Leo, be careful 
with Brother Fire." Or as Albert Schweitzer, who felt pain at having to kill 
the bacteria when he did an operation. Compassion is one touchstone of 
moral value. 115 
(5) Mueller calls Charles L. Stevenson's distinction between disagreement 
in beliefs and disagreement in attitude "classic" and says that: "For 
Hartman, any axiological judgment would differ from man to man only 
because one man did not know the expositional properties of the thing in 
question. Hence, seemingly, all disagreements in attitude would resolve to 
disagreements in belief. 116 Here he thinks that Charles L. Stevenson has 
remained closer to reality. Thus, "When disagreement is merely in belief, 
the resolution of the difference is made by checking out the facts, by 
improving our knowledge, (e.g., whether it is raining). " 117 One man says 
it is, the other it is not; and then they just look out the window. But "When 
the disagreement is in attitude, that is, when there is agreement about the 
fact but difference attitudes regarding those facts, (e.g., "I like rain" vs. "I 
dislike rain,") then checking the facts will not help. " 118 
As to disagreement in belief and disagreement in attitude, we have the 
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same problem of objective as against subjective value, as above. This 
particular matter is discussed [when I explain] "It is good that" applied to 
fact and to value. 119 Approval is attribution of goodness to the attribution 
of goodness. "I like rain" means "It is good that it rains;" and "I dislike 
rain" means "It is not good that it rains." It is not the case that axiological 
judgement would differ from man to man only because one man did not 
know the expositional properties of the thing in question, but rather because 
one man does, and another does not, approve of these properties as 
exhibited by a phenomenon. 
What does it mean to say "It is good that it rains"? "It is good that x-R-
y" means that the relation R is part of the intension of one or the other of 
its terms. Thus, "It is good that John reads Ivanhoe" means that reading 
Ivanhoe is good for John, or that such reading agrees with the nature or 
intension of John. "It is good that John loves Betty" means that love is 
good for either John or Betty, or both. ixi In all cases of "It is good that," 
e.g., "It is good that x is c," goodness is attributed to the referent of a 
proposition, a situation, or a state of affairs; whereas, in the case of good, 
e.g., "X is a good c," goodness is attributed to the referent of the concept, 
an object, e.g., a chair. These are attributions of goodness to facts. 
Attribution of goodness to values is approval, that is, I am finding the rain 
good, and I find it good that it is good. 
Now, in which sense is the rain good? There are in The Structure of 
Value eight forms of such approval, that is, a logical pattern for approval 
and disapproval on the basis of value composition. Thus, "The rain is 
good, and it is good that the rain is good; the rain is good, and it is good 
that the rain is and as the rain ought to be; the rain is good, and it is as it 
ought to be that the rain is good as the rain ought to be," etc. By "The rain 
is good" I can mean either that it is a very good rain, or that the rain is 
good for something, for the crop, for the freshness of the air, etc.; and in 
this case I would have to refer to the definition of "good for." 
"X is good for y" means that x and y are in different classes but have 
overlapping in tensions such that the intension of x is part of that of y. In 
this case, I would approve, find it good, that the rain is good for the crops, 
meaning that the intension of the rain and that of the earth complement each 
other. I could also mean that the rain is good for me since it gives me fresh 
air, so that the intension of my body, namely its breathing apparatus, and 
of the rain, complement each other, etc. 
Formal axiology thus gives an exact and articulate pattern to what 
Stevenson calls attitude and by no means merely resolves agreements or 
disagreements in attitude to disagreements in belief. 
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(6) Mueller says that I project "An ethic-utopia in which all men agree 
about the expositional properties of a concept. " 121 
Nothing is further from my mind, and nowhere do I say that I do this. 
On the contrary, I speak explicitly of disagreements which are differences 
in knowledge rather than in attitude or approval. In a section called 
"Axiological Agreement and Disagreement, " 122 I explicitly recognize 
agreement and disagreement in belief, namely, in either the ex positional 
properties of the thing in question or other features of the value judgment. 
Disagreements may be either perceptual or conceptual: one can see a thing 
wrongly; one can believe that it has another name from what it has; one can 
misunderstand the definition of the concept; one can wrongly apply the 
concept to the thing; one can misunderstand the dependence of the value 
predicates on the natural predicates of the thing, and so on. Each of these 
cases has again sub-cases, all of which can be systematically studied. Thus, 
in every case of disagreement, axiology can be applied and the disagreement 
defined by it. 123 
I also speak of disagreements based on confusions of logical orders, 
which, since good is a second order property, are most certainly value 
disagreements. One such confusion gave rise to an international incident 
during WW II on 24 November 1944. British Field Marshall Alanbrooke 
recorded in his diaries, published after the war, [that there was] a "very 
unsatisfactory state of affairs in France, with no one running the land 
battle." [This involved a confusion between Eisenhower as Supreme 
Commander of the allied forces and as Commander of the Land Forces; 
Alanbrooke thought that Eisenhower was just playing golf, and that no one 
was running the land war.) 124 
(7) Mueller objects that to argue as I do "from the analogy of ethical 
science with physico-mathematical science presupposes the attainability of 
crystal-clear knowledge in both, without having shown the attainability of 
such knowledge in Ethics." 125 
Mueller mentions "an ethician" [Aristotle] who said that "It is the mark 
of an educated man to look for precision in each class of things only to the 
degree which the nature of the subject permits." That same ethician said 
that "Nothing could be more dangerous than to mingle geometry and 
physics and to apply purely geometrical methods and reasoning to the study 
of physical reality." In other words, nothing is more dangerous than to 
apply mathematics to physics. Now, if we accept the judgment of this 
"ethician" we have to make up our minds as to his other statements; for he 
has been extremely mistaken in his judgements. 
[My position is that] the transition of the concept of value from an 
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analytic to a synthetic concept-in the sense of Newton, Kant, and 
Cassirer-would bring about the applicability of value science and hence the 
construction of a value reality; and this has been realiz.ed in the [HVP] test. 
Mueller charges that "The question of why there is fairly common consent 
about actions (e.g., murder) is not raised by Hartman. Any answer would 
be irrelevant to the theory because mere majority opinion is on the level of 
common sense and therefore non-scientific. " 126 
In reply, we must free ethical thinking from common sense. Everything 
that formal axiology constructs must be in agreement with reality. Thus, 
the [HVP] test has 90 percent plus correlation with reality. A murderer, in 
formal axiology, may be axiologically good when he murders well, but he 
is morally bad. 127 Morally, a murderer is a bad person because his self-
definition is a transpositional concept: "I am not I," that is to say, "I want 
to destroy myself," which, since intrinsic value is not in space and time, 
means "I want to destroy everybody." His self concept is self destructive 
as well as other destructive, autodestructive as well as heterodestructive. 
It is a sincept. 
A transposition comes about by the lack of a concept's combining its 
elements. The transpositional intension is no true intension; it is a 
collection of predicates without a uniting tie. It signifies or indicates lack 
of meaning. 128 The murderer's self concept can be non-sensical, 
contradictory, or false-and can be so in all three value 
dimensions-systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic. 129 Thus, formal axiology 
gives a total structural pattern for murderers, or for person who are not 
themselves. For details on the lack of self of a murderer, see Robert M. 
Linder, Rebel Without a Cause. 130 
A doctrine of a non-self person would be a doctrine of evil in man, 
including murderers; and it would be a construction of such persons. 
Whether people will accept this or not has nothing to do with the 
corresponding science, just as it made no difference for the scientific truth 
whether people did or did not accept the Copernican thesis that the earth is 
not in the center of the universe, or Galileo's "Eppur si muove," or 
Einstein's thesis of the bending of light in the proximity of mass. 
(8) [Mueller sketches] the theory of the three value dimensions and shows 
how they are applied in the first part of the [HVP] test-intrinsic values to 
persons, extrinsic value to things, and systemic value to systems, while in 
the second part [of the test] these dimensions are applied to the person 
himself-intrinsic value to his own self or "I," extrinsic to his work, and 
systemic to his work. 131 
He now asks two questions: "Where does Hartman get the principles 
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behind the divisions listed above?" and "In his application of them, is 
consistency and pattern observable?" 132 To the first question he responds 
that it does not follow from the system that persons are intrinsic values, and 
thus more valuable than things-or that things, extrinsic values, are more 
valuable than systems, even though these statements may be true. He states 
that to move from the ability of man to have thoughts about the total 
number of things, cardinality No. to his ability to reflect on these thoughts, 
and to reflect on these reflections, etc., cardinality M1, to the statement that 
these thoughts are actually infinite-therefore, man is infinite-is shifting 
"from the possibility of an infinite number of thoughts to their actuality as 
infinite, and from infinity of one aspect to the simple statement that man is 
infinite." Using such logic, he says, "we could prove anything-lines, 
mudpies, whatever-to be infinite, and hence equal to man, which would 
ruin the hierarchy of values. " 133 
Mueller here refers to only one of my four axiological proofs of the 
infinite value of man. 134 These four axiological proofs are based on four 
different definitions of man. The one here in question is: "Man is a 
rational being," where "rational being" is defined as "being able to think 
thoughts." Thus, we do not have one aspect of man but his essential aspect 
in accordance with this definition. The question whether man actually 
thinks an infinity of thoughts will be discussed in my objection to Mr. 
Edwards [to come later]. [What I say in The Structure of Value is that] 
"While the process of abstraction is potentially infinite, the totality of 
common properties abstractable is actually infinite. "135 
I do not make the simple statement that man is infinite; rather, I deduce 
that man is infinite from the fact that the definition of "man" contains and 
unifies an infinity of predicates. If a line, or mudpies, or anything whatever 
would have an M1 infinity of different predicates, then, like any intrinsic 
value, they would be equal in value to man. This is indeed possible for 
certain lines used in drawings; then they are a matter of aesthetics. 136 But 
this is not the case for example for a geometrical line, which is systemic, 
and where the cardinality M1 is not in the intension, but the extension. 
Where there are no different properties, but only one repeated, we have an 
extensional, not an intensional continuum. 
(9) Mueller now turns to [another] question, saying that strictly as a 
device, the theory is truly beautiful; but it is unrelated and unrelatable to 
anything other than itself when it comes to value judgments. It cannot get 
off the ground, or perhaps it can not come down to earth. 
To answer [this] question, he turns to the value calculus and the [HVP] 
test, saying that "All of his examples presumably could be used in the 
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test-many of them actually are so used. " 137 In this section Mueller takes 
apart my examples for the value formulae. In particular, [he contends] that 
in the sequence of the hierarchy of these formulae, "'Killing in war'-even 
as a concept-is better, or less-to-be-disvalued than taking a metaphor 
literally," but that is what Hartman does. 138 This indeed sounds 
paradoxical. 
The main argument of Mueller's critique is directed against what he calls 
the inapplicability of the theory, and in particular the [HVP] test. [At this 
point, I must give] some information on the test. First of all, in writing on 
the test, one ought, of course, to use the test and not something else. Yet, 
Mueller compares two value examples, neither of which is found in the test, 
such as "Killing in war" and "Metaphor taken literally," and applies this 
argument to the test. 
The examples used in the test for the formulae 15 and IE respectively, are 
"A crackpot" and "Slavery." As is explained in the Manual139 to the test, 
one cannot compare hodge-podge value samples from different realms, even 
though they have the same formula. Rather, values for the formulae must 
be seen under special keys-Subjects, Knowledge, Truth, Language, 
Process, etc. The items of a scale must be mutually compatible and have 
to be selected accordingly. Therefore, it does not seem to me fair to speak 
about the test by using items not contained in the test. I am frankly curious 
to know why Mueller did this and what his reason is for doing it. 
Secondly, even though the illustrations of the formulae have to be used 
within their respective keys, the formulae themselves do hold, though often 
in a way we cannot at present quite understand, as I say in The Structure of 
Value. 140 For what is easily understood in a system, for example, that 2 
x 2 = 4,32 is not necessarily understandable in the application of the 
system, for example, that two plums added to two horse shoes is four. 
"Arithmetically, what is true is the addition of two numbers, and it is of no 
importance what these numbers are interpreted to be." Similarly what is 
axiologically true is that, for example (EE)E IS OF EQUAL VALUE as IE, 
no matter what these extrinsic and intrinsic values may be interpreted to be. 
Yet, there is probably, as I continue, 141 a deep reason in this calculus, 
showing its extreme sensitivity of valuation, which is beyond our present 
capacity to value. 
Thus, with Jesus, the thought of a deed already was the deed-and a life 
without spirit was no life. I refer in this connection, 142 to various 
passages in the Gospel, also, in particular, to I Corinthian 11: 27 where 
taking the communion meal in a spirit of eating is equated with killing 
Jesus. All this is based on the fact that the reality to which a philosophy 
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refers is very different from the reality to which a fonnal system refers, as 
discussed in the section of The Structure of Value on "Philosophical Reality 
and Scientific Reality. " 143 Since our value sensitivity at present is crude, 
referring to a reality corresponding to a philosophy, we of course cannot 
fully understand the subtlety of a reality that arises from the application of 
a system. 
Thus, there seems to be a double incorrectness in Mueller's argument: 
( 1) he discusses a test by examples which are not in the test, and (2) he 
neglects to consider the new sensitivity which arises when people become 
attuned to a system. Thus, valuations which today are against common 
value sense may tomorrow be according to it (as, for example, happened in 
the realm of fact with the Copernican system). 
Thus, Mueller's objection against the applicability of the theory is, I 
believe, on theoretical grounds untenable. Moreover, there is plenty of 
evidence now of the effectiveness of the [HVP] test. It has been used in 
some 150,000 cases in several countries, (United States, Mexico, 
Switzerland, Sweden, Japan, Israel), all with the same striking adherence 
to the person's actual value make-up. Obviously, Mueller did not take the 
test himself, perhaps because he did not have the material that goes with it, 
especially the instruction for scoring, and, of course, the Manual of 
Interpretation. Otherwise, he would have given himself an account of how 
well the test fits the value pattern of the person. 144 
The [HVP] test has not only been validated empirically in both clinical 
and nonclinical (industrial, educational, government, etc.) practice, but also 
in a profound study of factor analysis, a dissertation by Billie Cannon 
Elliott, Factor and Cluster Analysis of the Hartman Inventory: A Study of 
Item Homogeneity and Factorial Invariance for Nonnative and lpsative 
Scales, at The University of Tennessee. 145 Factorial analysis is the 
ultimate test of a test. The axiological test passed this test with flying 
colors. 
The [HVP] test is objective in that it is based on an objective theory and 
measures the deviation of an individual's value pattern from the axiological 
pattern, whereas a psychological test is not based on an objective theory but 
on empirical standardizations by the empirical norms of a group. 
"In summary," Mueller says, 
I have tried to show that the test is inapplicable in real life for the 
purpose Hartman proposes. When applied, it gives the relation between 
what Hartman thinks is the order in general and what a living person 
thinks is the order for him. As such the test is either subjectively 
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inapplicable or merely subjectively applicable. 146 
"This judgment," he adds, "applies to the use of the test as an objective 
normative instrument; its use as psychological testing device, to show 
division from the norm is another question. "147 
I do not understand this difference; and the validations of the [HVP] test 
have shown the close, actually the incredible, relationship between the 
axiological order deduced from the definition of value as a set of predicates, 
and the actual order in the thinking of living persons. 
The norm on which the test is based is the axiological order, namely, of 
the formulae Mueller mentions. 148 Eighteen interpretations of these 
formulae have been mutually attuned in one and the same key in order to 
organize the test. When the test is given to a person, then the deviation 
from the norm can be measured in terms of the value calculus, just as in a 
geographical test, when a person puts Rio de Janeiro north of New York, 
the deviation can be measured in terms of longitude and latitude, or as in 
a mathematical test, when a person says 2 and 2 is 5, the deviation from the 
norm can be measured. 
Thus, what does it mean that a test is objectively inapplicable? A test is 
always taken by people; and the only thing that can be measured is the 
deviation from the norm, if there is a norm. The distinct difference 
between the axiological test and a psychological test is that the norm is 
objective (not "what Hartman thinks is the order in general," but what he 
deduces on the basis of an axiom); whereas in a psychological test it is 
subjective, based on majority expression. Moreover, as I said, the test has 
been tested widely, both practically and theoretically. It simply works. 
Mueller says that" A new system could develop a test which is not limited 
to 18 examples. Hartman's test is so limited because it deals with types of 
valuations and types of values. " 149 
The [HVP] test is limited to 18 items because it takes in only binary value 
combinations (compositions). If it included tertiary value compositions, it 
would have 108 items; and if quaternary, it would have 588 items; but this 
was found to be unnecessary. It has nothing to do with the difference 
between method and system; rather, as we have seen, the system has a 
potentially infinite number of value formulae. 
Mueller concludes that, "Hartman's system is neat, clean and 
mathematically and logically unassailable, as long as it remains in its tower. 
But the consequences of its descent into the real world are disastrous. "1so 
He says that my contribution could be "a method rather than a system." 151 
But I say explicitly that I regard my system as a method. 152 A science 
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is the combination of the intension and extension of a fundamental synthetic 
concept, an axiom, which constitutes a method, and necessarily leads to 
action; while a philosophy is the combined intension and extension of a 
fundamental analytic concept, a category or principle, which lacks method 
and remains speculation. 
From the above, it seems that Mueller's judgment that fonnal axiology is 
unsuccessful in practice is neither substantiated by facts nor by his 
argument. 
8. Reply to Gordon Welty, 1970 
Source of critique: Gordon Welty, "Transfinite Cardinality and Hartman's 
Axiology," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 4:4 (Winter 1970), pp. 293-301. 
Gordon Welty, then at Princeton University, protested (1) that for 
Hartman intrinsic and extrinsic values differ only in degree, (2) that 
establishing cardinalities for the three kinds of values is highly problematic 
in practice, which makes Hartman's theory irrelevant to the real world, (3) 
that a special theoretical stance is required to differentiate unique objects, 
to locate objects in the three value dimensions, and to select predicate sets, 
(4) that applying the value dimensions is purely subjective, (5) that 
Hartman's axiology cannot be established by empirical scientific inquiry, 
and (6) that Hartman can apply his axiology only by ad hoc theorizing. 
Hartman's response to Welty, below, comes entirely from the uncompleted 
manuscript on "Formal Axiology and Its Critics. " 
We now tum to Gordon Welty. Professor Welty devotes his attention to a 
few specific points in my discussion. 
(I) The first of these is the cogency of my ordering of the dimensions of 
value. He says that [I regard] the differences between intrinsic and extrinsic 
value as "differences in kind rather than degree,. .. and the intrinsically 
valued objects are more valuable. " 153 
This seems to me a contradiction; for, as I say, things which belong to 
different classes can not be compared, and thus one cannot be called more 
valuable than the other. The three dimensions of value are all three 
dimensions of value, and as such they are of the same kind but of different 
degrees. I say in The Structure of Value that "The relationship between 
systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic value corresponds to a process of 
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continuous enrichment with definite leaps from one value dimension to the 
next. " 154 
The relativity of fact and value stretches throughout the whole value realm 
such that any given set of properties is a fact; any subset of a given set of 
properties is a value of the given set; the given set is the norm of its 
subsets; the totality of subsets of a given set of properties is the total value 
of the given set; the total value is the value type succeeding the given set; 
and any value type is value to its preceding and fact to its succeeding type. 
In other words, the value dimensions belong to a value continuum; and in 
this respect the value dimensions are different in degree. On the other 
hand, for the valuing person the leap certainly means a difference in the 
kind of the valuation. 
So it is both true and not true that the difference between the value 
dimensions are in kind rather than degree. 
(2) Welty's next objection is [posed in] the questions: How do I 
determine cardinalities of properties of actual things? In other words, how 
do I determine the application of the theory in specific cases? 155 This 
objection I have dealt with in the case of Mueller. However, Welty adds 
a few interesting wrinkles to the argument. He does not speak of particular 
objects but of objects in general. The question, he says, is "the number of 
predicates relevant to a set of material objects. These predicates will permit 
the establishment of classes of objects. The predicates are thus a 
precondition to valuation." 156 
This is quite correct; but now Welty's argument gets confused. He begins 
with scientific objects, such as inert or noble gases, where the validity of a 
predication is assessed by a prediction; and he shows that "predication is 
controlled (in the methodological sense) by theory, and vice versa. " 157 (It 
seems to me that inert and noble gases are evaluated rather than valued.) 
The confusion lies in Welty's transition from a scientific object, that is an 
object of scientific discourse, to "every material object." An object of 
scientific discourse is by definition a systemic object. Scientific discourse 
has neither abstract, nor singular, but synthetic concepts. Not predication 
in general, but only predication in scientific discourse or of scientific 
objects, is controlled (in the methodological sense) by theory. "Prediction," 
I say in The Structure of Value, "is nothing but the statement that the object 
conforms to the frame of reference." 158 Science in general is a method 
and has nothing to do with any specific content. If there is a formal frame 
of reference applicable to a set of objects, then there is a science, no matter 
whether the subject matter of the science is spatio-temporal-and hence 
empirical, observable, and predictable-or not. 
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Thus, mathematics, music, and axiology are sciences; and they do include 
experimentation, observation, and prediction even though they are not 
empirical. In music, one can "predict" which note Wilhelm Backhaus is 
going to play next when he is playing a certain concerto; and in 
mathematics one can "predict" what will be the result of a certain operation. 
The same occurs in axiology. Given a certain situation, and applying the 
axiological frame of reference, one can "predict" the axiological result. 
Prediction thus is simply extrapolation of systemic deductions. Thus, the 
inert gases, electrons, and anything that is subject to a formal frame of 
reference is a systemic thing. [Welty asks:] "What does this suggest for 
Hartman's distinction between abstract and singular concepts?" 159 
Nothing, because abstract and singular concepts do not refer to systemic 
things. 
So let us turn then to the distinctions between abstract and singular 
concepts. An abstract concept is one which is abstracted from a given sense 
reality. It thus refers to a space/time object; and this has not, like the 
systemic concept which is construct by a formal theory, a definite and 
finite, but an indefinite and denumerably infinite, number of properties in 
common with other such things. The class, the extension in question, is 
[that of] things in space and time which are sensorially and conceptually 
grasped. These are not, as Welty seems to think, objects of scientific 
discourse, for the extensions of scientific discourse are not things in 
experiential time and space, but constructions in their own constructed time 
and space, as is shown in The Structure of Value. 100 
(3) We now turn to the singular concept. Says Welty: "Every material 
object is unique. Hence no object can be differentiated on this basis in the 
absence of a theoretical stance. 'That object is Blah' is a singular concept, 
whatever Blah is and whatever the object is. "161 
Welty overlooks the difference I make between singularity and 
uniqueness. A singular concept refers extensionally to a singular thing but 
intensionally to uniqueness; that is to say, uniqueness is the intension of 
singularity, and singularity is the extension of uniqueness. A thing is unique 
only if it has a non-denumerable number of properties. If it does not then 
it is singular, but not unique. Thus if an object has only the property 
"Blah," it is singular but not unique. 162 The singular fact has the full 
concreteness of all its properties. Thus, an object that is Blah is not seen 
in the concreteness of all its properties, but only in the Blah aspect of these 
properties. [As I indicate,] "The singular fact has the properties of fact in 
general, namely being, plus the properties of a particular class, plus an 
infinity of properties which the individual has uniquely. "163 
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"That object is Blah" may mean that Blah is the proper name of that 
object; and in this case, if Blah is unique rather than merely singular, it 
must have a non-denumerable number of predicates. A thing may be 
singular (have one property not in common with anything else), but does not 
then have uniqueness; when it is singular, it need not have uniqueness. 
It is also false, as Welty contends, that the object will always fulfill its 
concept, because there are gradations in intrinsic valuation, as is made clear 
in "The Logic of Value. "164 An object which always fulfills a concept is 
a systemic object, not an intrinsic object, as is made clear in The Structure 
of Value, 165 and as follows necessarily from the definiteness and finiteness 
of the systemic intension. Hence, no "stance" is required for deciding the 
location of a thing in the value dimensions. [We only need] to know what 
kind of a concept determines the thing. 
It is also false that there is no basis for selecting predicates. The set of 
predicates for any object whatsoever will not be of the same cardinality. If 
we do give them the same cardinality, then we give them the same value 
dimension. Thus, if we form a continuum with a man and with an ice 
cream sundae, we value both intrinsically; but we do not have to do so. We 
can value a man extrinsically, for example, as a good man in my office, and 
an ice cream sundae systemically, when we are the manager of an ice cream 
factory. In other words, we can value anything in all three value 
dimensions; and this is a matter of personal choice, if we value. If, 
however, we speak about valuation, if we are axiologists rather than 
valuers, then the distinction between dimensions of value is derived from the 
axiological superstructure. Hence, in saying that "Rather than the 
distinction between dimensions of value being derived from the axiological 
superstructure, we find that the constituency of the predicate set is a matter 
of personal choice, " 166 Welty confuses again the levels of theory and 
practice. 
I discuss this matter fully in the "Introduction" to The Structure of Value 
and in the section on "The Axiological Fallacies. "167 The fallacy he 
commits is the Fallacy of Method, the confusion between the frame of 
reference and the subject matter of a science, the confusion of the form and 
the content of a science. As I say, "This confusion, which arises from the 
overwhelming emphasis on the subject matter rather than the form of 
science ... is the main obstacle to the creation of a science of ethics. "168 
Welty's sentence makes about as much sense as to say "Rather than the 
distinction between dimensions of physics, space and time being derivative 
from the physical superstructure, we find that the velocity of a car is a 
matter of personal choice." 
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(4) Welty then quotes my citation from Ortega y Gasset according to 
which one and the same reality may split up into many diverse realities; and 
all the realities are equivalent, each being authentic for its corresponding 
point of view. He says that I do not realize that "the equivalence of 
viewpoints is incompatible with the existence of theory. "169 However, he 
omits the following sentence of Ortega's: "All we can do is to classify the 
points of view;" and this is exactly what formal axiology does. The points 
of view are precisely the value dimensions, which are part of the system of 
formal axiology. Hence, "The axiological variations of the situation are 
expressible in a symbolism which faithfully represents the 'measure' given 
by Ortega y Gassett. The value symbolism is isomorphous with the value 
reality. " 170 Again, Welty commits the Fallacy of Method. 
Each person selects the value dimension within which he wants to value 
a certain situation, just as a person selects the velocity of his car; but the 
formula for velocity is in the science of mechanics. Hence, Welty's 
reference to the science of mechanics, where only one point of view dictates 
the relevant dimensions, is not relevant to axiology. It refers only to the 
science but not to its objects, not to the application of it. The value 
dimensions are parts of the science and are a priori determined by the 
axiom of the science of value; but the applications, of course, are not. 
Hence it is false of Welty to reject my "claim to have 'structured' ethics 
by introducing the concepts of the dimensions of value" for the reason that 
the application of this science is a matter of subjective caprice. 171 It is not 
merely caprice, as Ortega says; there is a very good axiological reason for 
any kind of valuation. Also, in the situation that Ortega describes of the 
great man dying, his wife, the doctor, the painter, the witnessing reporter, 
have different emotional distances from the event. However, this distance, 
in practice, is as different from the distance determined in The Structure of 
Value, the science, as is the actual distance I drive in my car from the 
notion of distance in the formulae of mechanics. Thus, it is false of Welty 
to say that the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic value purportedly 
derived from the superstructure is in fact arbitrary. in This conclusion 
derives from Welty's commission of the Fallacy of Method. 
By systemic class we must understand two kinds of classes, the synthetic 
and the schematic. 173 The former is the class of constructs such as 
numbers and electrons, the latter the class of schemata such as Equidae, 
Canidae, and Syringae. Both kinds of classes, when fulfilled, give rise to 
systemic value; whereas the concepts "horse," "dog," and "lilac" are 
empirical concepts and give rise to extrinsic value. Kant called the two 
kinds of schemata the constructive or synthetic, and the abstractive or 
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analytic, technical and architectonic respectively. 174 The difference can 
be seen, for example, by substituting syringe vulgaris for "lilac" in the 
famous lines about going down to Kew. In the same way, I am my 
brother's keeper, but not my male sibling's. The extrinsic and the 
corresponding systemic terms are not synonymous for their intensional 
structures are not similar. 
Welty finds it unsatisfactory that the basis for ethical distinction lies 
within the language level of ethics. rn I find this very satisfactory because 
the language levels of ethics express the value logic inherent in the 
identification of name with norm; and this probably guarantees the final 
triumph of ethics when these laws of value logic have been made clear to 
people so that they see that their present value judgments are logical 
confusions. Otherwise, there would be no hope for humanity. Axiology 
makes clear that valuation is innate in the human frame. 
In sum, as is said over and over again in The Structure of Value, the 
value system itself is objective and a priori; its application is subjective. A 
baby may be regarded as less valuable than Reimanian manifolds; that is a 
matter of individual value patterns. But the value formulae can never be 
different from what they are. "I to the I" means the intrinsic valuation of 
an intrinsic value; "I to the S" means the systemic valuation of an intrinsic 
value. As Mueller rightly says, the first is my baby seen as my baby, the 
second as a tax reduction. 176 
If we want to speak of "stances," then formal axiology is the result of a 
theoretical stance which forces us into the valuations in the tables of The 
Structure of Value which normal people follow. The curve of the actual 
valuations of people is always a bell curve where those who value very 
exactly and those who value very badly form the extremes, while the vast 
majority values precisely as the value theory says. Hence, empirical 
verification shows that the Tables are not "What Hartman thinks is the order 
in general" 177 but that this is indeed the order by which people value. 
(5) On the other hand, I do not have much hope to convince my critics 
by mere facts. After all, Galileo's colleagues, after looking through the 
telescope at the moons of Jupiter, signed a document saying they had seen 
nothing. The difference is only that they did not pride themselves in being 
empiricists. After all, if the analogy between the creation of natural and 
value science is valid or correct, as I hold it is, there must be an analogy 
with Galileo's colleagues looking through the telescope at the moons of 
Jupiter and signing a document that they had seen nothing. 
Welty gives what he calls "a schematized criterion of relevance for 
predicates. " 1711 The formula he gives is an example of what I call a 
100 ROBERT S. HARTMAN 
schematization of analytic concepts179 and what Garcia Bacca calls a 
stenographic as against a scientific formalization. It is simply the statement, 
in forms of letters, of undefined concepts.'*' [We must] take seriously the 
distinction between analytic and synthetic, material and functional concepts 
in the sense of Kant and Cassirer, 181 and the difference between 
[empirical] concepts abstracted from sense reality, or analytic concepts, and 
concepts constructed through penetration to the essence of a phenomenon 
and through axiomatic identification. David Garcia Bacca identifies this 
essence with a logical [construct). 182 Unless this is understood, one 
cannot understand either the method of science or the method I use in 
axiology. Empirical procedure is false in natural science and fundamentally 
false in value science where there is nothing empirical to observe. 
In conclusion, 183 [Welty's] whole section on empirical scientific inquiry, 
[according to which] we first ascertain if a difference between two sets of 
observations is real or chance, etc., 184 is irrelevant to value science. It is 
true that in order to apply value science, I must both have in my mind a set 
of predicates of certain objects, and must observe whether these objects 
have these predicates. But this is not so much observation as measurement; 
and the value predicate can never be observed-only the unit in a thing 
which corresponds to the unit that determines the value predicate. 
Even less can the science of values itself be produced by induction from 
observations, except by empirical investigations on the occurrence of the 
value word "good" and other [such words]. This is actually how I came to 
the value axiom. 185 But to observe how often and under what 
circumstances a word is used is very different from observing material 
objects. The verification of the theory, on the other hand, deals with co-
variation techniques according to the formula mentioned [in discussing] the 
[HVP] test. The whole procedure outlined by Welty for co-variation 
techniques vs. randomization techniques186 has an application for the 
validation of the [HVP] test; but it comes, in practice, to very different 
results from those that he believes to be true. 
Again, at the end of his section [on empirical scientific inquiry], Welty 
commits the Fallacy of Method by mixing up the objective standards of the 
theory of formal axiology187 and errors in judgment. He says "If the 
ethical theorist admits that there is at least one object which has not been 
judged, he admits the possibility of an error of judgment. "188 
As I said before, I not only admit the possibility, but the necessity, of 
error of judgment, since the application of a theory is subjective; whereas 
the theory itself is objective. By a method I mean the existence of a formal 
frame of reference which can be applied to reality. The latter, the 
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application, is subjective; and in this respect the method is always 
subjective. But the other part of it, namely the formal frame of reference, 
is objective. 
(6) In the third part [on ad hoc theorizing in ethics], Welty draws the 
consequence from the fallacy he commits. He says my attempt "stumbles 
on the leg of a theoretical stance from which one can select relevant sets of 
predicates," and that therefore I am "reduced in application to ad hoc 
arguments that suggest e.g., that 'a baby' is sequenced higher than 'a 
mathematical genius. "' 189 
My sequencing [of items] in the [HVP] test has nothing to do with Value 
and the like but comes directly from the sequence of numbers of sets of 
predicates, that is, precisely, values. 
Actually, the application of axiological theory, like [that of] any theory, 
is an art, as Kant makes very clear, and as is clear to anyone who has ever 
taught a technical science. Moreover, there is a "technical stance" for the 
selection of relevant sets of predicates. This is given in The Structure of 
Value, 190 where the process of abstraction is shown from its intensional 
rather than its extensional side. 
I do not regard it as a theoretical stance to show that certain selections of 
predicate sets have to be done personally and socially; nor do I identify 
myself with Ortega's [view] that they are done on caprice only. They are 
done because of the value pattern of the persons in question-their minds 
and feelings. The procedure I outline would go far to explain the puzzle of 
abstraction. In the words of Cassirer: "There is nothing to assure us that 
the common properties, which we select from any arbitrary collection of 
objects, include the truly typical features, which characterize and determine 
the total structures of the members of the collection. "191 
The problem of selecting relevant properties is much more complex and 
much deeper than Welty assumes. It does have a profound empirical 
aspect, but it is not the one of Welty's little formula. It goes back to the 
very beginnings of the mind, as Susanne Langer has shown in her Mind: 
An Essay on Human Feeling, 192 and as has been shown by psycho-
analysts. The question is: at what stage of development does an infant 
begin to associate qualities such as solidity with objects that he sees? 
Experiments with infants reveal that this occurs much earlier than expected, 
namely, around the fourth month. The difference is [between] infants less 
than 16 weeks, and infants older than 16 weeks. The object concept is 
discovered after the 16th week of life, that is, after about four months [of 
age]. The first structure of properties recognized by a baby is the upper 
part of the mother's face. The mother becomes the first extension to this 
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set of properties. Children who are deprived of maternal recognition in the 
first year of life are impaired in later life both in their power of abstract 
thinking and generalization, and their capacity for valuation. In recent 
psychoanalytical literature, the baby's breakthrough to "playful openness, 
to diverse possibilities," begins in the fourth month of life and is regarded 
as the basis of consciousness and Self. 193 
The value capacity thus is founded in the very roots of the experience of 
the self. Hence, it is almost frivolous to discuss the subject in the way 
Welty does. It may well be held that this question of selection of relevant 
predicates of a concept is an important subject of practical axiology, but it 
is so only because the system of formal axiology is based on the axiom that 
value is a subset of properties. Empirical formulae such as Welty's never 
define what value is. Thus, his formula even uses the word "value" in a 
double sense, a logical and an axiological one, without ever defining the 
meaning of axiological value, or saying why utility is a value. All this is 
what I call value alchemy because it approaches the problem of value as the 
alchemists approached the problem of nature. 194 
It is no exaggeration to say that a philosopher who does not know the 
methodological difference between alchemy and chemistry195 and the 
difference between using formulae on the basis of analytic, as against on the 
basis of synthetic concepts, 196 is unable to see the difference between a 
science of value and a philosophy of value. He will necessarily criticize the 
science through the framework of philosophy, exactly as alchemist used to 
criticize a chemical procedure or a procedure of science, as Fludd did 
Kepler. Indeed, such critiques can actually be constructed by analogy with 
an alchemist criticizing a chemist. 197 
The relation between the axiological theory and finding a procedure for 
selection of relevant predicates is the same as the relation between, say, the 
theory of relativity and finding whether light really bends around a mass. 
It is a practical supplementation of the theory. The axiological theory only 
says that valuation is a function of the knowledge subjects. If one wants to 
expand the axiological theory and find a way of knowing objects by their 
predicates, then this is a laudable enterprise; and it would make more 
certain and secure the practice of valuation. Unfortunately, Welty's 
prescriptions are too superficial and cursory; also, they only apply to 
fragmentary scientific subjects. For example, the universe of intrinsic value 
is precisely nonstochastic, as Viktor Frankl has shown. 198 
I do not see how what Welty says about empirical scientific inquiry 
applies to the axiological problem of an objective standard. The objective 
standard in axiology is derived synthetically a priori by the process of 
Reply to Gordon Welty, 1970 103 
axiomatic identification described in The Structure of Value199 and by no 
means by the technique he describes. There can be no empirical scientific 
inquires into values. So the error of a judgment is meant by Welty in the 
production of the theory, not in its application. 
Welty compares Rescher's and my arguments, writing that: "On the one 
hand, Hartman proceeds ad hoc when confronted by practical cases, on the 
other hand Rescher proceeds ad hoc in his attempts to rectify the 
superstructure of Utilitarianism. "200 
There is a world of difference between these two kinds of ad hoes. Welty 
says in his conclusion: 
There appear to be two polar demands placed on an ethical theory. 
One is the requirement of validity or objectivity of judgements. The 
other is the requirement of the autonomy or accountability of the ethical 
agent. These demands have been unreconciled since the time of Kant, 
if not earlier. 201 
But this is definitely not true, because Kant made very clear that his theory 
of rationality or freedom accounts for the autonomy of the agent. In formal 
axiology the same is the case through obligatory material norms. 202 
(7) Welty says that "Hartman tries to guarantee truth by basing his theory 
on intensional predicates of the object. But that posture makes the theory 
irrelevant to the real world. "203 
But again this is mistaken, as the [HVP] test proves. Rescher tried to 
guarantee autonomy by appeal to the methodological principle of Sir David 
Ross: "What we think" about moral questions is the "standard of 
reference" for a moral theory. 204 Such a theory, says Welty, has no 
validity: "The way to resolve this problem is not to indulge in ad hoc 
theorizing." How he can call mine ad hoc theorizing is a riddle to me 
because he only speaks of the application of my theory. The theory itself 
is based on a definite axiom, like any scientific theory. [Welty concludes:] 
What is needed is a theoretical stance. To this end it is perhaps 
necessary to relax the requirement of truth and objectivity to that of 
reasonableness of method, as Thomas D. Perry has cogently 
argued. 205 This would be similar to the realization that one can't 
resolve truth and determinism in a hopelessly stochastic world. '.1116 
As I said before, the world of ethics is the very opposite of a stochastic 
world; "stochastic," "conjectural," "random," "statistical"-this is where 
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the error is. To know ethics scientifically two things are [essential]: a) a 
correct view of science as a synthetic a priori structure, and b) the view of 
the ethical world as rational and non-stochastic; only the extrinsic is 
stochastic. ~7 The view of Welty leads to, or comes from, the stupid view 
of a monad who writes about value theory without any idea of what value 
is, as if I would write about [the inserted words are unreadable]. 
In intrinsic valuation we go precisely beyond the conjectural random 
features of the universe. Each intrinsic value is a world in itself and so is 
the autonomous world of every individual.2llll It is absolutely hopeless to 
find an ethics in the extrinsic dimension, that is, in the hopelessly stochastic 
universe. First of all, this is not the dimension of ethics, namely, the 
autonomous human will. Secondly, the universe is not at all hopelessly 
stochastic, but the mathematical laws of physics rule it. It is a rational 
structure, even though with stochastic pockets. The premiss of axiological 
science is precisely the same as that of natural science, namely, the rational 
order of the universe. Thirdly, the universe is stochastic insofar as we do 
not order it by reason. Science imposes its pattern, as Heisenberg bas said, 
like a kaleidoscope, on the disorder of the universe; and so does life on the 
disorder of everyday events, as says Erwin ScbrOdinger. 
What Welty says is true of analytic abstractions from the world, which 
indeed have a minimum of order;2D9 but it is not true of the construction 
of worlds. It is true of analytic abstractions from the world but not of the 
synthetic construction of worlds, e.g., the value world. This construction 
only knows variables, [like x and y for individuals, q, and V for intensions 
or predicates, and 4> for class concepts.]210 To give these variables values 
is a matter of application. Hence, the definition of "formal axiology" as 
"that science the logical values of which are axiological values. "211 
General value is that variable the logical values of which are axiological 
values. 
All together, these critiques [by Mueller and Welty] confirm the motto of 
the "Introduction" of The Structure of Value: 
I 
Some students begin by forming an opinion (like 'bunk') ... and it is not 
until afterwards that they begin to read the texts. They run a great risk 
of not understanding them at all or of understanding them wrongly. 
What happens is that a kind of tacit contest goes on between the text 
and the preconceived opinions of the reader; the mind refuses to grasp 
what is contrary to its idea, and the issue of the contests commonly is, 
not that the mind surrenders to the evidence of the text, but that th<i text 
yields, bends, and accommodates itself to the preconceived opinion. -
Reply to Gordon Welty, 1970 105 
Fustel de Coulangei212 
The unfortunate author then has the task of bending back the distorted 
picture of his text in the mind of the critic, or at least of the readers of the 
critic. 
The fundamental preconceived opinion is that of [my] critics, [who] have 
not succeeded in separating the a priori and the empirical aspects of ethics. 
Unless this is done there is no hope for an ethics, for an understanding of 
ethics, such as that of formal axiology; and what Kant says is true: "That 
which mingles these pure principles with the empirical does not deserve the 
name of philosophy, ... much less does it deserve the name of moral 
philosophy ... "213 It does not deserve the name of philosophy because 
what distinguishes philosophy from common rational knowledge is that it 
treats in a separate science what the latter only comprehends confusedly; 
much less does it deserve that of moral philosophy. 
Thus, a critic, rather than giving detailed criticisms of single features of 
a work, ought first to state his frame of reference and then discuss the 
features in question as consequences of that frame of reference. Actually, 
in order to attack or criticize the work, he should show why his frame of 
reference is more adequate to the subject matter than that of the author 
criticized. In this respect it would, of course, be a fatal objection to say 
that the system does not work, as both Mueller and Welty do; but, as we 
have seen, it does work. 
In reading the text, they only see what fits or does not fit their 
preconceptions. They do not enter into the spirit of the book, and they 
overlook things that are important to the argument to such an extent that 
they seem to be sloppy in their reading. Yet, it must be emphasized that 
these critics are in a minority and that the majority of the readers are both 
understanding and creative, as the list of works that make use of formal 
axiology shows. 
Another procedure concerning the relevance of properties is given in the 
section of The Structure of Value concerning the weighing of properties, 
"The Logical Pattern of Value Terms, "214 where the logical order of an 
intension is shown in terms of combinatorial analysis; and an exact 
procedure is given for the weighing of properties, leading to the law that 
each property of a thing is worth as much as each other property, no matter 
on what level of abstraction or differentiation, but depending on the degree 
of maximum specification. All these terms are discussed in detail. The 
higher the differentiation of a thing, the less each property is worth for the 
thing; but the more properties a thing itself bas, that is, the more 
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differentiated a thing is, the more the thing itself is worth for something that 
has it. 215 These are a priori determinations of intensional structure, rather 
than the empirical one in Welty's formulae. 
A theory of relevance of properties in the sense of fonnal axiology must 
itself be a fonnal a priori theory based on an axiom and not a matter of 
empirical determination; that is to say, the pattern of relevance must be 
given in terms of a structure of variables, the values of which are of course 
a matter of subjection application of the theory; but ad hoc formulae without 
a theory do not solve the problem.216 At the beginning, fonnal axiology 
structures and classifies forms of norm, or fonnal norms, variables of 
norms. As a science it is a method, not merely a theory; fonnal axiology 
is not words but a method-it is action. "Into the fire with words ... " 
Bertrand Russell wrote: 
Both [Alfred North] Whitehead and I were disappointed that Principia 
Mathematica was only viewed from a philosophical standpoint. People 
were interested in what was said about the contradictions and in the 
question whether ordinary mathematics had been validly deduced from 
purely logical premisses, but they were not interested in the 
mathematical techniques developed in the course of the work. I used 
to know of only 6 people who had read the later parts of the book; 
three of these were Poles, subsequently (I believe) liquidated by Hitler. 
The other three were Texans, subsequently successfully assimilated. 217 
Russell [criticized] Gilbert Ryle for "dismissing important scientific 
knowledge in favor of verbal trivialities; "218 [and he expressed] the 
aporetic of philosophy: "Science is what you know, philosophy is what you 
don't know." He thought that nine tenths of what is regarded as philosophy 
is humbug; the only part that is at all definite is logic; and since it is logic, 
it is not philosophy. 219 
9. Reply to Pete Gunter, 1973 
Source of critique: P. Y. A. Gunter, "Hartman: Three Criticisms," The 
Journal of Value Inquiry, 7:2, (Summer 1973), pp. 136-140. 
This critical essay and the next one by George K. Plochman were 
presented on 4 May 1972 to The Society for Philosophy of Creativity, 
meeting in St. Louis in conjunction with the Western Division of the 
American Philosophical Association. Both Gunter and Plochman were 
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responding primarily to Hartman's article, "The Value Structure of 
Creativity," in The Journal of Value Inquiry, 6:4 (Spring 1972), pp. 243-
279. 
Hartman 's tape-recorded responses to these two papers, transcripts of 
which will follow, were also given at that meeting. 
Jn his article, Professor Gunter, from North Te:rns State University, 
objected (1) that Hartman assumes the absolute validity of set theory, (2) 
that he assumes that qualities form discrete units that can be counted, and 
(3) that Hartman cannot reconcile his dynamic view of man and God with 
applying non-denumerable infinity, which implies timelessness, to them. 
[Professor Gunter's criticism] was very, very subtle and I think a little too 
subtle, because, it is like this: if a man says "I am going north" then you 
will say, "You can't say that because when you go to the north pole you 
will go south." That's also very subtle, isn't it? In other words there are 
certain simple things which, when you go to their final consequence, 
become extremely complex. 
(1) Now, set theory. Set theory has, as the critic of the critic said, its 
inconsistencies; but I can afford not to be concerned about them; I can say: 
"Sufficient unto the day is the rigor thereof." In other words, today set 
theory indeed has these problems which are not solved, even in exact set 
theory; and the problem is, they are not solved because they seem to be 
unsolvable. 
We cannot deny the use of mathematics in any field because at the basis 
of it is an abyss. We have to use mathematics. We know the abyss is there 
below it; but neither the physicist nor the girl in the shop cares about that. 
So, the "Cantorian paradise," as David Hilbert called it-we may perhaps 
be expelled from it; but for all the calculations of the everyday world, for 
all the calculations of physical science, for all the calculations of science 
including value science, I think this is, at their lower levels, irrelevant. 
And since axiology is on such a low level, I don't have to bother yet. But 
it may be that there will come the day when the correspondence between 
number and value will be so subtle that then the paradoxes will appear; they 
will appear as paradoxes in value theory; and that I think will be extremely 
interesting. (2) [Gunter's] second question was about the relationships 
between quantity and quality. That, of course, is a tremendously interesting 
and profound question. Can set theory be applied to a collection of 
properties? Now Mr. Gunter said that a set is "any collection of objects 
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whatsoever, "220 and in saying "object" he already uses extension instead 
of intension. He is doing this because he says objects are discrete; they can 
be counted. 
Now, objects are not as discreet as one would wish them to be. Not only 
are the objects of the perceptual world rather vague, but the objects of 
science are so vague that we don't even know whether they exist. Yet we 
calculate with them very happily-for example, electrons. Nobody knows 
whether they are even objects; nobody knows where they are. As a matter 
of fact we know we can't say where they are. Werner Heisenberg's 
uncertainty relationship [says that] we never know where an electron is 
because when you look you push it away; so when it's there, you are not 
there; and when you are there, it is not there. So we can never say where 
it is. It is a very vague object. One can make a very good point for the 
undiscreteness of objects even in the empirical world. 
However, I do not base the theory of value on properties. I just don't 
base it on properties, because of this question. I base the theory on 
predicates, on the intensional predicates, the predicates in an intention. And 
this set of predicates is the measure of the value of the thing. In other 
words, if I want to measure a chair I don't speak of the properties of the 
chair; I speak of the predicates of the concept "chair;" and these predicates 
are very discrete. We look them up in the dictionary. 
Then I apply these predicates, and this construction I call "properties." 
So the properties are constructed; they are not empirically perceived in 
axiology. However, by applying the transfinite cardinalities I then come to 
predicates which by necessity are completely undiscrete, like the points in 
a line. They are conceptually discrete but not perceptually. There are also 
predicates which are completely vague; they belong to intrinsic value; and 
they are metaphors. So metaphor is defined precisely as a non-denumerably 
transfinite concept, and it is vague in this sense. However, you can 
mathematically deal with that vagueness in non-denumerable sets. 
(3) With that I come to [Gunter's] third [objection], namely, simultaneity 
and succession, another extremely interesting problem; how can something 
that is given be dynamic? That is about the right correlation, is it? 
Now, if you have a non-denumerably transfinite set which is given, then 
by topological transformation, it becomes the most dynamic thing in the 
world. In a new article called "The Axiometric Structure of Intrinsic 
Value" 221 I apply topological transformation to these given sets, and then 
they become extremely dynamic. A topological transformation is the 
following thing-it's a lovely thing. It is the invariant of any given form, 
no matter how it will look, as long as its points remain in the same order. 
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For example, if you have a doughnut, which topologically is called a torus, 
then you can perform any kind of squeezing, and punching, and pulling, 
etc., of that torus; and the result may be, for example, a teacup. Now the 
teacup looks very different from a torus; yet, it has exactly the same 
sequence of points; and where the hole in the doughnut was, there is the 
handle of the teacup. So this is a topological transformation, an invariance 
of neighborhoods of points even though the form looks entirely different. 
(When you apply that to intensions, to metaphors, you get a theory of 
metaphors which is a transformation and a great dynamic of these forms.) 
But I can give you another example of something given which is an 
intrinsic value and is extremely dynamic: a good work of art. There it is, 
that Rembrandt Nightwatch. Now, for the people who have a feeling for it, 
that's a whole world, a dynamic world; and there are many books on the 
dynamics of lines, aesthetics, and so on. So an aesthetic dynamic is of 
something given simultaneously, and yet there is this tremendous dynamic 
in it. 
10. Reply to George Kimball Plochmann, 1973 
Source of critique: George Kimball Plochmann, "Robert S. Hartman on the 
Structure of Creativity: A Critique," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 7:2 
(Summer 1973), pp. 129-135. 
George Kimball Plochmann, then at Southern Illinois University, edited 
Hartman's The Structure of Value for publication by Southern Illinois 
University Press. His reservations about Hartman's position centered 
around what he saw as (1) the unyielding structure of formal axiology, and 
(2) its low likelihood of being true. The response below was tape-recorded 
as Hartman gave it at the meeting of The Society for Philosophy of 
Creativity in St. Louis in 1972. 
Now I go to Professor Plochmann. The most important thing is that he told 
me he only wished that my paper did not possess such a "shimmering 
schematic perfection. "222 Well, I like that; to say of a theory that it has 
a shimmering schematic perfection, I think I take that as a compliment! 
(1) Professor Plochmann says of my theory that "Its structure is 
unyielding; "223 but, seriously, the structure is not at all inflexible. As a 
matter of fact, it is so tremendously flexible that if you put the three value 
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dimensions together and you let one value value another-in other words 
you take a systemic value and you let it be valued systemically, or 
extrinsically, or intrinsically, and you do the same with the extrinsic value, 
you let it be valued extrinsically, systemically, or intrinsically, the same 
with the intrinsic value, you let it be valued systemically, extrinsically, or 
intrinsically, then when you have only five combinations of value, you get 
28,000 different value combinations. 
Some mathematicians at M. I. T. have put all this in a computer and have 
come up with a book entitled: Axiological Tables, and there are the first 
28,000 value formulae. Now, all of these formulae, mind you, are 
variables; and each of them has an infinity of applications. It is almost 
impossible, even with these few, the first 28,000 formulae, to find enough 
actual examples to fill up the book. You have to go to Hamlet, to La 
Traviata, and so on, to find enough examples for these formulae; and this 
is only the value formulae of six different combinations, six different 
values. So it is really extremely flexible. 
(2) Finally, Professor Plochmann says, a true value philosophy, a true 
system, must at least have "a likelihood of being true. "224 So let me 
finish with this report, and you think out what it may mean, because I don't 
know it myself yet. In my book, The Structure of Value, there are tables 
of hierarchies of value according to the first two value combinations. These 
make 18 values in a hierarchy, ranging from the highest value form, 11, to 
the lowest, I1 the destruction by an intrinsic value of an intrinsic value; that 
is 18 value forms. 225 
I had a seminar with the psychoanalysts in Mexico of Erich Fromm's 
school. Fromm has a school down there, and I had the value seminar for 
them. When we came to these pages they said to me, "But this is a test." 
I said "How do you mean that?"2 And they said, "You scramble up these 
18 value forms and their examples, give it to a person, and have the person 
put his own order of these 18; and then you measure the distance between 
his order and the order in the book; and you have a test of the value 
capacity of the person." 
We did it, and it worked immediately-to such a point, mind you, that 
this test is now used in about 7 countries. It is, for example, used in the 
social security system of Mexico; it is used here in St. Louis226 at the 
Deaconess and Lutheran Hospitals because it is more prognostic and more 
diagnostic than, for example, the Minnesota Test (a famous psychological 
test) when you make the correlations between any crowd. If we in this 
room would take the [HVP] test, then every one of us, because we are 
pretty normal, would have a correlation with the table in the book of more 
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than 95 percent. In other words, we actually do value the way it says in 
these tables. 
Now that, to my view, is a tremendous likelihood of being true; and I 
think that is a validation of the theory. But I am not sure, and I don't know 
yet. Well, it measures something; but if a person puts these 18 items 
according to his own value pattern, if he is normal, then he will be 95 
percent doing the very same thing that the calculus says he should do. The 
differences in the valuation of the items, for example, "my kingdom for a 
horse" 227 is precisely what brings out the individual value pattern of a 
person when taking the [HVP] test; it speaks for, not against, the test. 
There are many more problems than solutions. Don't think that I am not 
very aware of that, but actually I love this [critical dialogue); and the more 
problems I have, the better I like the theory. 
11. Reply to Rem B. Edwards, 1973 
Source of critique: Rem B. Edwards, "The Value of Man in the Hartman 
Value System," The Journal of Value Inquiry, 7:2 (Summer 1973), pp. 141-
147. 
In this article, Edwards, a colleague of Hartman's at The University of 
Tennessee, appraised the central arguments of Hartman's "Four Axiological 
Proofs of the Infinite Value of Man," Kant-Studien, 55:4 (1964), pp. 428-
438. Hartman wrote before we became as sensitive as we are today to the 
sexism inherent in certain ways of speaking; but in writing of "man" he 
meant no sexism; and he clearly expected that the word would be interpreted 
generically. 
Edwards objected to Hartman's claims that an entity's degree of value 
depends on the number ofproperies it possesses, and that we human beings 
as rational beings are infinitely valuable because we can think a non-
denumerable infinity of thoughts (thereby having a non-denumerable infinity 
of properties). 
The objections are (1) that no one can do it; our powers of thinking are 
limited, as are our capacities for thinking about our thinking; that (2) 
Hartman confuses potential with actual infinity, and the ideal essence of 
man with concrete individuals-a difficulty that is perpetuated in the 
following response, and (3) that thinking a non-denumerable infinity of 
thoughts is not a real potentality (much less an actuality) for any human 
being, though presumably God can do it. Edwards also maintained (4) that 
since different individuals can think different numbers of thoughts, 
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Hartman's argument shows that we are of unequal value, and that we are 
of less value than computers, which we cannot rival in sheer number of 
thoughts. (If some people can think an infinite number of thoughts and some 
can not, that also proves inequality.) 
From the the theory of types, which says that properties cannot be 
members of whole sets of things to which they are predicated, Hartman 
argued that the Self that thinks an infinity of thoughts cannot be a member 
of the set of which it thinks but must belong to a higher order of infinity, 
and that the Self that thinks of the whole of spacetime cannot be 
spatiotemporal. 
Edwards responded (5) that this leads to the absurdity that the Self that 
thinks the thought of the whole of reality or the whole of existence must be 
unreal, must not exist! Edwards also indicated (6) that the argument from 
the theory of types leads to an infinite regress of selves, and (7) that if we 
can think only a finite number of thoughts, the self which thinks them needs 
to belong only to a different finite set (perhaps one temporally ordered), not 
an infinite set, to avoid the sort of self-reference prohibited by the theory of 
types. 
In the following letter to Edwards dated 25 January 1972, Hartman 
replied to the typewritten manuscript of this article, prior to its actual 
publication. 228 
I am writing an article for the Journal of Value Inquiry, "Axiometry in 
Theory and Practice," where I show how my system is being applied. The 
most striking and widespread as well as effective application is the 
axiological [HVP] test. Its effectiveness seems to prove the system. For 
example, the actual practice of people taking the test, that is, the average of 
their sequences, corresponds between 90 and 99 percent to the theory, that 
is, to the sequence in the tables on pp. 272-273 of The Structure of Value. 
The correlation between theory and practice, in other words, is over 90 
percent. 
Thus, maybe, one should not be overwhelmed in one's desire to apply the 
system by the "philosophical difficulties" which, I think, are not as serious 
as Edwards believes. Let me try to show this in the following commentary 
on his paper. 
(1) The first objection I have to his difficulties is that I believe he 
misunderstands the relation between essence and existence, or the relation 
between the scientific account and the observation of phenomena. It is not 
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for nothing that formal axiology is called a science. We have to apply the 
structure of science to it. 
Thus, the very objection he raises against my proofs of the infinite value 
of man, namely that no individual man actually can think that infinitely, was 
made against Galileo when it was held that his ideal picture of entities did 
not correspond to the entities themselves. Thus, there is no actual empirical 
line which has the properties of a geometrical line, e.g., that of having no 
dimension [thickness]. Yet, the purely mathematical properties of a line are 
those which rule the concrete samples of lines. I refer in this connection, 
to W. H. Werkmeister, A Philosophy of Science. 129 In other words, it is 
the primary properties which give us the laws of the secondary properties 
of empirical objects. The latter can never in purity exemplify the former. 
This was discussed by Galileo in his Dialogues Concerning the Two Chief 
World Systems, 230 where Simplicio admits-just as Edwards does-that the 
mathematical subtleties of the new science might be in themselves cogent 
and logically correct, but maintains that they are applicable to nothing in the 
actual world. It may be perfectly true in theory, he says, that a sphere 
touches a plane in only one point; but in the case of physically real planes 
and spheres it is manifestly not so. To this challenge Galileo replies that the 
discrepancy between theory and the empirical world is the fault of neither 
geometry nor physics but is due entirely to the inability of the investigator 
to calculate correctly; for the investigator, Galileo contends, begins by 
defining a generalized "ideal case" of the particular process of nature under 
observation; then he introduces such qualifying propositions as to make the 
universal notion applicable to the unique situation; and only to the extent to 
which he succeeds in doing this will there be harmony between his theory 
and the real world. It remains true, therefore, that in theory sphere and 
plane touch each other in only one point; but in the empirical world we 
must allow for a certain "roughness" of surface and must take into 
consideration the "pressure" of a physical sphere upon a physically real 
plane. 
Formal axiology is a science; and it therefore deals, like any science, with 
the ideal case, the schema or thought construction, to speak with Kant. The 
infinity of properties is the primary property of man which rules the 
secondary properties of actual "empirical" men. Of course, if no man, as 
Edwards says, ever felt or was capable of feeling this infinity, the definition 
would be purely theoretical. But his view of man is too limited. It is quite 
true that most people do not feel, nor can think, the infinity which their 
nature presupposes; but there are some who do. Read Henri Bergson's Two 
Sources of Morality and Religion,rn where he speaks of the mystic, or 
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The Structure of Value, 232 for cases of such infinite, "oceanic" feelings. 
Even though perhaps Edwards or I have never felt this way, we cannot 
therefore deny, as William James rightly said, that they exist. Edwards 
himself has discussed this matter in Ch. 5 of his book on Religion. 233 The 
mystics are the prototypes of man, and the axiological definition refers to 
these prototypes (as a line traced by an almost invisible material would be 
the prototype of a line). Other men just approach the definition more or 
less, as the sphere more or less approaches the one point on touching the 
·plane. 
(2) Thus, it is false that there are no men who correspond to the 
axiological definition. But it is also false that the axiological definition of 
Man would be invalidated if there were no such samples of Man. The 
proofs arise from the axiological definition of Man and the premises of the 
axiological system. Werkmeister makes it clear that even if there should be 
no confirmation by observation, deductions within a system would still be 
as forceful and cogent as ever, even though they would possess only 
"theoretical" value. Archimedes' principle of the spiral, for example, has 
lost nothing of its significance for mathematical theory just because physical 
objects do not move in accordance with it; nor is the validity of the 
Pythagorean theorem impaired because we cannot construct a 
mathematically perfect triangle. The whole of Newton's theory of the 
universe is based on the fiction that the gravity of a body is condensed at a 
point in its center. In mathematics, Newton says, we are to investigate the 
quantities of forces with their proportions consequent upon any condition 
supposed; in other words, we are to consider the "ideal case," and we are 
to treat it as if it were a case of pure mathematics. 234 In the same way, 
Heinrich Hertz explicitly states that the deductions of the first part of his 
The Principles of Mechanics235 "remain entirely foreign to experience" 
and that "they are based upon the laws of an inner intuition and upon the 
forms of logic. " 236 Thus, if we define man as he is defined in the various 
proofs and if we apply to these definitions the axiological system, then it 
follows deductively and necessarily that man is the infinite being in 
question. If then in observation we should not find such a man it would be 
just too bad for observation (and man), for observation would then be faulty 
(and so would be man), in terms of the system. But, thank God, we do find 
such men, namely in the various writings of mysticism. 
On the other hand, a system is a universal tool; and one does not have to 
define man that way I do. One may define man as the Russians do, as "a 
product of society." In this case, man is an extrinsic value rather than an 
intrinsic value, or perhaps even a systemic value. But then there is still the 
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theoretical possibility of an intrinsic being, and this would then have to be 
defined differently from man. Maybe the Russians would call Lenin an 
intrinsically valuable being, a superman, whereas the masses are only 
extrinsically or even systemically valuable. Thus, a system can be applied 
any way, and this variability of the system is due, of course, to the fact that 
it consists of variables. 
So far, all the objections against my system have been against supposedly 
wrong results in application. In so far as these arguments were against the 
test, they were simply wrong (e.g., Mueller). In so far as they are against 
the definition of man, I can only say I don't agree. As is said in The 
Structure of Value, application of a system is a subjective matter. When I 
see a man or a woman, then he or she is infinite for me. I see man as does 
Kierkegaard, or Berdyaev, or Jesus. 
(3) I feel Edwards is doing himself a great injustice in saying that he is 
able to think only five or six types or orders of his own thinking. Thinking 
is much more than conscious thinking, it is one's totality; it is dreaming, 
imagining, memory, anticipation, etc., etc. (see Husserl). And if we would 
take LSD we would be astonished at the infinities that are within ourselves. 
It is thus simply not true that "no individual human person can do what 
Professor Hartman suggests that we all can do in constructing a thought 
world. "237 
(4) It is also false, for reasons in the methodology of science, that there 
is an "absolutely devastating equivocation between the notion of the concrete 
individual human person and the ideal essence of the abstraction 
'man'. "238 Edwards underestimates both actual men, past men, and 
especially future man. All these are meant by the definition of man, not 
just the few men of his acquaintance. Thus, man as he will be in a hundred 
thousand years, for example in Franz Werfel's Star of the Unborn,239 a 
book which I very much recommend, will have the imagination, vocabulary, 
intellectual energy, and endless time to devote to the enterprise of being 
human, that the definition implies-not to speak of man on other and older 
stars [planets] than Earth. In a word, we must see man in all his essential 
nature and not in the merely terrestrial or pedestrian way of January 1972. 
I do not at all understand, therefore, what Edwards means by saying that 
"the application of the Hartman system to actual existing men shows that 
they are of finite value. "240 This kind of man is the one he has in mind, 
but to which my definition of man does not apply, but the Russian or a 
similar one does. 
(5) Neither can I see how it follows from the application of my system 
that men are of unequal value. 241 Their limitations by language, etc., are 
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mere accidents, and have as little to do with the definition, as has an 
unequally designed circle on a blackboard with the definition of "circle." 
Computers by no means can outdo man, and it would take all the computers 
in the world for a thousand years to even approach one human brain. After 
all, computers are made by human brains. There is a quite a lot of 
literature on this. 
Of course, Edwards can, in his own application of formal axiology, call 
the being I call "man," "God;" but he is then left with the different 
infinities within infinity examined in my article on Creativity242-with 
Gods and meta-Gods, etc. Edwards actually comes to the same notion of 
God I have come to myself, namely that there are infinite orders of infinity. 
Where does the logic of the proof using the infinity of orders take us if we 
follow it out all the way? [It leads] to the understanding of existence as a 
fixation, and of True Reality as far beyond existence. In this sense it is 
non-existence. God then is the limit of infinities, in the technical sense of 
"limit" (just as a point, for Whitehead, is the limit of concentric circles). 
And man, self-reflective as he is, is made in God's image, i.e., tending to 
a similar limit within himself. ("Similar," of course, not in the 
mathematical sense, since man's limit is an infinity infinitely less infinite 
than God's. 243 
Edwards' objection against the logical proof, then, does not hold water 
either. For the definition is not "false from the outset" because it applies 
to no actual individual man, for the reasons mentioned above that science 
deals with ideal cases and not with concrete ones. But also for that other 
reason, that actually some men can do what Edwards says they cannot do. 
We therefore do not have here a false premise on my part but rather a too 
limited notion of man on his part. 
(6) As to Edwards' objection against my use of the theory of types, 244 
there is no reason why one should not "get mileage" from metaphysical 
applications of a logical theory. Metaphysical reasoning is logical. Willard 
Quine and others outdo me by far in using even existential quantifiers 
metaphysically. 
Just as the orders of infinity lead to the transcendence of God, they lead 
to the incomprehensibility of the Self. Edwards is quite right; the self or 
the thinker can never have any knowledge or thoughts about the totality of 
himself ([which does not mean] not "about himself at all"). There is an 
infinite regress within the self, as Kant already stated; and Nicolai Hartmann 
has shown in his Ethics245 that precisely because we never can know 
ourselves fully, we need another who can do so-so we can know ourselves 
fully only by loving an other who loves us. This is Nicolai Hartmann's 
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phenomenological foundation for the necessity of loving another person. 
Thus, wherever one turns in the application of Formal Axiology, one 
finds himself in company, good or bad, as the case may be. The main 
function of a system is probably to stimulate thought. Anyway, as I did 
stimulate Edwards', so he did mine. 
12. Reply to William Eckhardt and Robert S. Brumbaugh, 1973 
Sources of Critique: William Eckhardt, "The Place of Values in Human 
Relations," The Journal of Human Relations, 2I:2 (Second Quarter I973), 
pp. 2I6-2I9, and Robert S. Brumbaugh, "Formal Value Theory: Transfinite 
Ordinal Numbers and Relatively Trivial Practical Choices," The Journal of 
Human Relations, 2I:2 (Second Quarter I973), pp. 211-2I5. 
The second I973 issue of The Journal of Human Relations actually 
appeared after Robert S. Hartman 's death and contained short articles by 
William Eckhardt and Robert S. Brumbaugh responding to his project of 
developing a science of values. It also contained Hartman's rejoinder, 
republished below. Hartman responded to both critics in one short article 
originally titled "Reply to Eckhardt and Brumbaugh," The Journal of 
Human Relations, 2I:2 (Second Quarter I973), pp. 220-225. Immediately 
following Hartman's article, the Editor commented: "Robert S. Hartman 
died in I973, a great loss to those inspired by his value research. This 
issue of the Journal of Human Relations is dedicated to his memory and to 
his continuing inspiration. "246 
William Eckhardt, then a research psychologist at the Canadian Peace 
Institute in Oakville, Ontario, emphasized (1) the importance to the survival 
of humanity of developing a science of value and suggested (2) that 
Hartman's correspondence theory of value (the correspondence of entities 
with concepts) is the correspondence theory of truth (the correspondence of 
concepts with entities) "turned on its head. "247 Eckhardt also (3) equated 
value with love, and suggested (4) that a science of values would require 
criteria for judging the authenticity of values and value concepts. 248 He 
also (5) noted the convergence of his own empirical approach to value 
theory and Hartman's formal or mathematical approach. 249 
Robert S. Brumbaugh, then a Professor of Philosophy at Yale University, 
commented (1) that applications of Hartman's value transpositions are very 
limited and cannot be extended to cover trivial value choices like what to 
have for lunch or whether to buy a Swiss Army knife. 250 Brumbaugh also 
suggested (2) that if formal axiologists recognize a quantifiable relation of 
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"greater than, " they might fear the sort of counterintuitive results derived 
from the utilitarian hedonistic calculus. No finite number of pleasures (like 
those of the cannibals eating Joe) should ever be allowed to total up to the 
value of a unique individual person, but this often happens when a purely 
finitistic calculus of value is employed. 251 His most constructive 
suggestion was (3) that the mathematics of transfinite ordinals needs to be 
added to Hartman's calculus of transfinite cardinal numbers. This would 
permit making distinctions within each of the three levels of intrinsic, 
extrinsic, and systemic values, while preserving their ultimate 
incommensurability. 252 The inability to calculate distinctions within 
transfinite orders when only transfinite cardinal numbers are used makes a 
purely cardinal calculus, like that proposed by Hartman and developed in 
depth by Frank G. Forrest, a very "blunt tool," as Forrest himself 
admits. 253 In Part Two of this book, Mark A Moore will present an 
alternative finitistic quantum logic calculus which allows innumerable value 
distinctions to be made and calculated that cannot be determined using only 
a transfinite cardinal calculus. Finally, Brumbaugh noted (4) the need for 
knowing how to value axiology itself. 254 
I agree with almost everything Eckhardt says about the place of value in 
human relations, especially the necessity of a science of values for our time, 
and the convergence of empirical and mathematical types of value theory. 
I emphasize the latter, for creating a science of value presupposes a formal 
frame of reference. Exactly as there is mathematics in natural science, 
there must be a frame of reference in value science; and it must be different 
from that of natural science. It must be mathematics applied not to things, 
a qualitative rather than a quantitative, and an intensional rather than 
extensional, use of mathematics. Its basis is the definition of a value as a 
set of properties for predicates], which leads to the application of set theory 
to values. Once one has this framework, which I call formal axiology, one 
can apply it to empirical value phenomena and explain them in terms of the 
axiological system and its elements, the intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic 
value dimensions. 
In speaking of love, then, we speak of intrinsic value applied to human 
beings; and we find that this produces the axiological science of ethics. 255 
But intrinsic value can also be applied to things, and we then get the science 
of aesthetics; or it may be applied to concepts and we have metaphysics, or 
to words and we have poetry. In sum, in a formal value frame of 
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reference, empirical-existential words such as "love" become variables 
which apply to many more value phenomena than did the [original] words. 
The latter were abstracted from sense reality and therefore are ambiguous 
and limited in their meaning. Thus, "love" is a very ambiguous and a very 
limited word. We would probably not call "love" the dedication of a 
sculptor to the marble block from which he elicits a form, yet it is the same 
value phenomenon applied to a thing rather than a person; and we speak of 
a love of truth which is a systemic use of the word "love" and would belong 
to the science of metaphysics. The formal approach thus is more 
generalized and infinitely applicable and gives a new insight which the 
everyday words of common language cannot give, simply because common 
language does not have the insights that are needed for a science of value. 
If it did, we would not need but already have such a science. 
What then is the authenticity of a value? A value U is more authentic 
than a value V if it is a higher value than V. Since in formal axiology 
value is defined as any set of properties, and set theory is applied to these 
sets, systemic, extrinsic, and intrinsic values are mathematically defined: 
intrinsic value is a higher (greater) value than extrinsic value, and extrinsic 
value a higher (greater) value than systemic value. Hence, intrinsic value 
is a more authentic value than extrinsic value, and extrinsic value a more 
authentic value than systemic value. A value composition is more authentic 
than a value transposition. 
I would not, however, use the word "authentic" of value, for values are 
constructions of the human mind; and we can as little speak of the 
authenticity of a value as, say, the authenticity of the number 3. 
"Authenticity," in formal axiology, is applicable only to humans and 
signifies that a human being fulfills his own definition of himself, which is 
"I am I," and thus actually is who he is. This is the definition of an 
authentic, genuine, real human being who is true to himself. I therefore 
would reserve the word "authenticity" for ethics. 
In general, the norm for each value is the concept by which the valued 
thing is known. This may be called a turned-around correspondence theory: 
in the degree that the thing corresponds to its concept it is more or less 
good. But there is a difference between a thing's corresponding to a 
concept and a situation corresponding to a proposition. "What is truth-value 
to a proposition is good-value to a concept. "256 
Eckhardt finds the definition of goodness of formal axiology somewhat 
limited because its utility depends on the amount of agreement we can get 
on conceived definitions. This is one of the most important theorems of 
formal axiology. Valuation in common is possible only where there exist 
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common concepts. When an American and a Russian value democracy, 
then both rightly say that the other's is a very bad democracy; they have 
opposite definitions of "democracy." In general, the more abstract a 
concept the more difficult, indeed impossible, is the common valuation of 
it; and the more concrete a concept the more it may be subject to common 
valuation. The reason is that in learning to speak we learn to combine 
certain sensorial things we observe with certain concepts our mothers tell 
us. This is beautifully illustrated in William Gibson's The Miracle 
Worker; 257 the world of fact as well as the world of value revealed itself 
to her [Helen Keller]. 
We all agree on chairs and tables, but in cases where there is conceptual 
disagreement concerning the definitions themselves, no common valuation 
is possible. This is a most important theorem of value theory and fact of 
value actuality, and no wishful thinking can erase it. 
Whereas in Eckhardt's paper we get aspects of the relation between value 
reality and value theory, in Brumbaugh's paper we find a contribution to 
formal value theory itself. I agree with the importance of using transfinite 
ordinal numbers and have used them in exactly the way Brumbaugh 
proposes, 258 but without elaborating this use the way Brumbaugh does, 
and which I fully accept. However, we must be aware of the difference 
between "better than" and "greater than." When we apply mathematical 
models to properties of things rather than to things themselves, we must be 
aware of the qualitative nature of our procedure. We are then forced into 
the relative values of concrete and abstract things, of genus and species, of 
sliced avocados and sliced fruit, etc. And this subject has to be treated 
fully; 259 and it is here precisely that it is useful to introduce the ordinal 
transfinite numbers. 
Insofar, then, I agree with Brumbaugh. But be has misunderstood, or at 
least not correctly presented, formal value theory in two respects. One is 
by only mentioning negative exponentation, or disvaluation by transposition, 
without giving the corresponding operation of positive exponentation, or 
valuation by composition. Obviously, in the latter case we do not have 
orders of value infinitely different but misplaced in relation to one another, 
but we have these value orders placed correctly in their relations to one 
another and comparable in spite of being of different orders. My value 
calculus deals with both with compositions and transpositions, and one is as 
important as the other. 
The second misunderstanding seems to be a too simple view of value. In 
value theory, as far as I am concerned, there are no "trifles." An everyday 
thing like a salad at noon, a knife of the Swiss Army type, a cold corked 
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retsina wine, etc., can be subject to systemic, extrinsic, or intnns1c 
valuation, depending on how one looks at them, as Brumbaugh shows in an 
example of moral issues at stake in choosing a lettuce salad (when there is 
a union lettuce-workers boycott). A thing, such as the ones mentioned, is 
usually an extrinsic value, and an extrinsic value is anything but a trifle. 
The thing in question may be a trifle, but its value is not. For a thing with 
n properties has, in the value calculus 2° values. Thus, we do not have an 
extrinsic value [like] "great ethical tension;" but we do have an almost 
infinite variety of complexity in extrinsic valuation. To take only two 
examples, French tasters of Burgundy wine have a check list of 158 
properties, which gives a glass of Burgundy 2158 or 3.6 x 10"6 possible 
values.w:i An expert in Volkswagens who knows the Volkswagen inside 
and out with all its 20,000 parts, each having a minimum of 5 properties, 
would be able, theoretically, to give a particular Volkswagen 21·cm,cm values. 
Thus, the valuation of trifles is extremely complex, indeed astronomical. 
Even a thing with only 10 properties has 210 or 1024 possible values. 
Thus, in a job evaluation which has ten properties, there are 1024 ways in 
which a worker can fulfill it. These 1024 ways can be exactly structured. 
There is one way of good performance; there are 385 ways of fair 
performance, 252 ways of average performance, and 385 ways of bad 
performance. It is not sufficient, then, to say that a worker is doing a fair 
job; it must also be determined which of the fair sets of properties his 
performance fulfills-9, 8, 7, or 6-and which set within these sets. There 
are 120 different possibilities of fulfilling 7 out of ten job requirements. 
Which of the 120 is he fulfilling?26 1 
From the point of view of a formal value theory, value becomes infinitely 
complex. This is the reason that value theory has to introduce transfinite 
numbers of properties. Brumbaugh has shown this clearly in his essay 
"Changes of Value Order and Choices in Time" 262 where he makes 
another important contribution to value theory based on the relation "greater 
than" of the three dimensions. We must be able, he says to keep 
comparability of different value orders without reducibility between orders; 
and the transfinite symbolism makes this possible. 
To speak of trifles then is to look at value from a sensorial and limited 
every-day perspective, from the point of view of a secondary value property 
but not a primary value property which alone is the concern of the science 
of value. 
Finally, to mention one of the problems Brumbaugh sees in value theory, 
I need to know how to value axiology itself. This, of course, presupposes 
an axiological meta-theory, that is, a formal theory applicable to various 
122 ROBERTS. HARTMAN 
value theories. This matter bas been discussed in The Structure of Value, 
in the section "The Value of a Value Theory. "263 
Both in the cases of Eckhardt and of Brumbaugh, the ways in which we 
differ are pointed out only for the sake of precision; whereas the ways in 
which we agree are fundamental. As Eckhardt rightly says, a science of 
value beside the science of facts is the need of our age. 
13. Conclw;ion: Theory and Practice 
[Kant discussed and repudiated the platitude that "This may be true in 
theory, but it does not apply in practice." The proper remedies for this, he 
contended, are: better judgment in linking theory with practice, and better 
theory that successfully harmonires theory and practice. ]264 The critics 
I have discussed, and they are the main ones, all come down to this 
platitude discussed by Kant. It thus seems to be a common objection against 
formalistic or scientific ethics that it cannot work, no matter how beautiful 
it be in theory. It seems to me that my system is the first that actually does 
work, and the working of which can be statistically verified. 
Any reader can verify it by giving the [HVP] test to some 20 people, 
averaging the results, and using the formula for the correlation of 
sequences. He will find, depending on the class of the people tested, a 
correlation between 85 and 98 percent with the theory. The test appeared 
in my book The Structure of Value without my knowing that it was a test. 
A seminar of psychoanalysts drew my attention to the fact that the tables on 
pp. 272-273 would constitute a test. Thus, we have here a purely 
philosophical product which can be compared perhaps in its kind to such 
purely philosophical products as Pascal's and Leibniz' calculating machines, 
or if we take axiometry as a whole, to Descartes' analytic geometry, or to 
Leibniz's differential and integral calculus. At least, I see no other 
comparison in the history of philosophy. 
This means indeed that philosophy has been left behind, that there bas 
arrived an axiometric method; but it does not mean for me personally that 
I should "throw away the ladder," even though it is quite true that in the 
light of value science, value philosophy appears antiquated and indeed 
senseless. Thus, I might say with Wittgenstein that "My propositions are 
elucidatory in this way: he who understands me finally recognires them as 
senseless, when he has climbed out through them, on them, over them. He 
must so to speak throw away the ladder, after he has climbed up on it. "265 
Value philosophy is still extremely important to lead up to the lacunae that 
are found in axiometry. Thus, in the discussion of intrinsic value, the 
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fundamental insights of aesthetics are the most important values for the 
axiometric determination of intrinsic value. While we have a science with 
respect to extrinsic value and also can understand its symbolism, we do not 
yet have a science with respect to intrinsic value; we only have the 
symbolism without clearly understanding it. This is my next task, and for 
this I still need philosophy as the ladder. But even as it now stands, 
axiometry is a new instrument of thought, and one which I believe the world 
desperately needs. We don't need more methods of technology, but we 
desperately need a new way of thinking. 
As Max Lerner said in an article on 24 January 1972, in his column 
"Opinion," "The encounter movement needs an overview which will give 
them a core and an intellectual habitation and name. Encounter deals with 
techniques and isn't enough." "Human potentials" mostly expresses a hope. 
"Esalen" has become a fighting word. "Growth centers" smacks of real 
estate and public relations. The woods of New York, Los Angeles, and San 
Francisco are full of newly imported gurus, but the thriving guru business 
doesn't amount to "a Philosophy." The work of Abraham Maslow [is 
suggested] as a basis for the new movement of intrinsic valuation, and 
Maslow made constant use of formal axiology. I am a founding sponsor 
with him and others, of the Association of Humanistic Psychology and had 
many meetings with him on the subject, [especially] during his year in 
Cuemavaca when we were together almost daily. 
The revolution of our time must be an inner revolution, a reformation, 
something which has become clear even to the rock and roll generation and 
to serious so called "rock pop" composers such as Tim Rice, composer of 
Jesus Christ Superstar. Said Tim Rice in an interview by the magazine 
Seventeen, Jesus' 
whole attitude toward revolution is very relevant. Although he was a 
revolutionary in the mind, he could see that acts of violence and 
physical overthrow were quite unimportant in the long run. He would 
not be in favor of putting a bomb under a building or blowing up a 
bridge. What had to be accomplished-which probably depressed him 
very much-was a complete overhaul of everybody's thinking. He 
could see that most people who called themselves revolutionaries just 
couldn't understand this. 
It is indeed the intellectual creations that change the world. The whole 
nuclear age came about because a library clerk in a basement put down 
some formulae in an esoteric physical journal. Axiometry is a new 
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intellectual instrument; yet, people who think deeply about the refonnation 
of our time but know nothing of axiology come as close to it in their 
formulations as is possible in words. 266 
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TEN UNANSWERED QUESTIONS 
Rem B. Edwards 
Robert S. Hartman died in Mexico in 1973 at the height of his philosophical 
and axiological prowess, having laid the foundations for a formal science 
of axiology, but not having developed iis superstructure. His concluding 
paragraph in The Structure of Value was prophetic: 
The application of axiology to actual situations through the applied 
axiological sciences is a task for new generations of pure and applied 
axiologists, pure and applied social and moral scientists, and.finally, 
the mechanics and craftsmen of social and moral situations. As the 
achievements of the natural scientists analyzing natural situations in 
terms of mathematics, have led to the building of factories turning out 
new and undreamed of things, so the achievements of the moral 
scientists of the future, analyzing moral situations in terms of formal 
axiology, will lead to the building of a new society with new people, 
living on higher levels of awareness and possessing undreamed of 
insights into the subtleties and depths of moral reality. 1 
Since 1973, Hartman's projects have been carried forward on many 
fronts, especially by the members of the Robert S. Hartman Institute for 
Formal and Applied Axiology, who meet annually to discuss difficulties and 
share advances and results. Much work, centered on the Hartman Value 
Profile [HVP}, has been done on the psychology of values; and much has 
been done with the philosophy of values. The present work focuses 
primarily on the philosophy of values-as it reaches towards a science of 
values. 
At the annual meeting of the R. S. Hartman Institute in October 1991, 
Rem B. Edwards presented the following paper titled "Ten Unanswered 
Questions. " It posed questions arising out of the attempts of both Robert S. 
Hartman and Frank G. Forrest to develop an applied calculus of moral 
value; and it was intended primarily as a stimulus to and future research 
agenda for members of the Hartman Institute. In Chapter Six of this book, 
Frank G. Forrest, who accepted the challenge, will present answers to these 
ten questions. 
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To summarize, the ten questions are: 1. Can the ethical duty to enrich 
ourselves and the selves of others be expressed formally? 2. Does 
axiological ethics give us the duty to reproduce maximally, since the birth 
of every child in.finitely enriches the world; if so, is contraception morally 
equivalent to murder; and does axiology forbid mass murder, since killing 
a million people is no worse than killing only one? 3. Can axiological 
ethics distinguish between duty and supererogation-going beyond the call 
of duty? 4. Can axiological ethics make a place for euthanasia, either 
. active or passive, or both? 5. Would axiological ethics generate concrete 
moral rules? 6. If so, would the rules be simple and unqualified; or might 
they be complex and incorporate qualifications and exceptions? 7. Would 
formal axiology help us to distinguish between adequate and inadequate 
moral rules? 8. Could it make a place for human rights and adjudicate 
conflicting rights? 9. Could it make a place/or moral sanctions,for Mill's 
legal, popular, and inner supports for moral conduct? JO. Finally, what is 
the proper place of "marginal human beings" (fetuses, the profoundly 
retarded, the irreversibly comatose) and animals, according to formal 
axiology? 
I have many unanswered questions about what axiology has to say about 
moral action and obligation. I do not know how to answer these questions, 
and I challenge you to think about them and share your insights with me. 
I offer these questions to the members of the Robert S. Hartman Institute 
as a research agenda for the future. I am convinced that the following ten 
questions must be answered if formal axiology is to develop a plausible 
theory of moral action and obligation. 
1. Measuring Personal Enrichment 
Can the ethical requirement that we enrich our selves and the selves of 
others by such things as love, creativity, enjoyment, moral activity, and so 
on, be expressed mathematically or formally in the transfinite logic of set 
theory? More particularly, if an individual self in its totality has the formal 
value of N1, how are finite enrichments of self to be represented and 
calculated mathematically? Surely not every enrichment of self moves its 
value toN2 I have always doubted that N1 is an appropriate number for 
beings like ourselves with finite lives; all personal enrichments of individual 
lives seem to me to be finite enrichments of finite beings-but that is 
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another story. 2 
2. The Duty to Reproduce, Contraception, and M~ Murder 
If intrinsically valuable individual persons are infinitely valuable, and we 
have a moral obligation to maximize the good, does the Hartman system 
place upon us an obligation to reproduce, to have as many children as is 
humanly possible, since with each new child we can infinitely enrich the 
universe? Do we have moral obligations to purely potential (unconceived 
or unborn) persons, to conceive and to have them, since thereby we could 
infinitely enrich the world; or do we have moral obligations only to actual 
persons? Is contraception morally equivalent to murder on Hartmanean 
grounds? I do not know the answers! 
The foregoing problem itself may be very "unscientific," however. 
Formally, persons have the characteristic number N1• Formally and 
scientifically, the addition of N1 to N1 always yields only N1, nothing more; 
so it would seem that we do not enrich the universe at all by having 
children. 
The really troublesome thing about this logic, however, is that the 
subtraction of N1 from N1 always leaves N1, so it would appear that there is 
nothing wrong with mass murder (like the bombing of the Federal Building 
in Oklahoma City on April 19, 1995) as long as at least one person remains 
in existence. Is this what axiology implies? I hope not! In a reference that 
I could not find in my haste, 3 I believe that Hartman himself noted that his 
transfinite logic implies that killing one person is just as bad as killing 
many-let us say a million. The dark side of this logic is that it implies that 
killing a million people is no worse than killing one person. This strikes me 
as being exceedingly counter-intuitive, to say the least, and utterly horrible 
and repulsive, to say the most! Am I right about this? 
3. Duty and Supererogation 
Could Hartmanean ethics make a place for the distinction between moral 
obligations and supererogations, between duty and "going beyond the call 
of duty?" Can it distinguish between beneficial acts that are morally 
required, and beneficial acts that should be encouraged even though they are 
not morally required? If not, does it require us to be saints and heros at all 
times? Just how many personal sacrifices does it require of us in helping 
others not only to survive but also to flourish as developing persons? I do 
not know the answers! 
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In The View From Nowhere, Thomas Nagel says that "supererogatory 
virtue is adherence to the claims of impersonal morality prior to their 
modification to accommodate the normal limitations of human nature. "4 
Would the morality generated by formal axiology be an impersonal 
maximizing ideal which requires extreme personal sacrifice at all times for 
the sake of greater goodness? Or would it require of us only minimal 
decency while encouraging but not requiring supreme moral excellence of 
us mere mortals who are inescapably frail, ignorant, and all too often poorly 
motivated to do the right thing? If so, what formulas would express the 
distinction between the required and the recommended? 
4. Euthanasia 
Would a Hartmanean ethics be able to make a place for euthanasia, either 
passive (withdrawing or withholding means of life support) or active 
(directly exterminating) where terminally ill persons suffer unbearable and 
unrelievable pains, or where terminally ill persons are irreversibly 
comatose? What formulas would tell us either that we should live to the 
bitter end no matter how horrible life might be, or else that we may end it 
all when the burdens become too great to bear? I do not know the answer 
axiologically, but philosophically I know what it should be! And I am 
prepared to abandon axiology if it gives the wrong answer! 
5. Generating Moral Rules 
Would the Hartman ethic generate a set of concrete moral rules to give 
practical moral guidance to ordinary persons? If so, what would be the 
point of their general adoption? I have in mind such "common sense" 
maxims as: 
A. Keep your promises, 
B. Tell the truth, 
C. Do not kill persons, 
D. Do not steal, 
E. Do not commit adultery, 
and so on. 
I know how to think about moral rules philosophically (as in 
Utilitarianism or Deontology); but how does one think about the origin and 
justification of moral rules formally, axiologically-and in that sense 
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scientifically? Can axiology say anything more than that moral rules are 
themselves systemic values, but that they can be valuated systemically, 
extrinsically, and intrinsically? What is their significance for extrinsic and 
intrinsic values? Could the answer be as simple as that moral rules, as 
systemic values, should always be represented by "n" in axiological 
formulas, and their positive significance for extrinsic and intrinsic values is 
simply E0 or I°? I have no clear view of the answers. 
6. Complex Moral Rules with Qualifications and Exceptions 
Would the action-guiding moral rules generated by a scientific axiology be 
simple (and simple minded), as above? Or would they be complex with 
built in exceptions and qualifications, as in the examples below? And if 
complex, how would they and the qualifications or exceptions they include 
be expressed formally? How might the following complex rules be 
expressed axiologically? 
A. Keep your promises, except when you have promised to do wrong, 
or unless breaking a promise is necessary to save a human life, or 
unless ... 
B. Tell the truth, except when a "little white lie" like "I'm feeling fine," 
or "You're looking good," or "I'm glad to see you," will do no harm, 
or except when necessary to save a human life, (What do you say to the 
S.S. officer who asks if you are hiding any Jews in your attic?), or 
except when you are teaching your children about Santa Claus, or 
unless ... 
C. Do not kill persons, except where absolutely necessary in self defense, 
in defense of loved ones, in a "just war," or unless capital crimes have 
been committed, or unless active euthanasia is appropriate, or unless ... 
As for C., could the destruction of an infinite value for any reason ever 
be justified within a Hartmanean framework? How could this be expressed 
formally, mathematically? I do not know the answer! 
7. A~essing the Adequacy of Moral Rules 
How could the formal logic of set theory assist us in telling the difference 
between morally adequate rules, and morally inadequate ones, or whether 
simple or complex rules are best justified? Would there be something 
distinctive about the set of moral rules that a Hartmanean framework would 
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generate? Would Hartmanean rules look very different from the common 
sense moral rules identified above? If so, how so? Again, I do not know 
the answers! 
8. Human Rights, Conflicting Rights 
Could formal axiology generate a plausible account of human rights and 
show us how to resolve conflicting rights? If so, how so? What concept of 
"rights" would be operative? I have in mind such things as the rights to 
life, to liberty, to security, to the pursuit of happiness, or, within the 
medical context, rights to some degree of basic medical care, to 
confidentiality, to be told the truth about one's condition, to informed 
voluntary consent, and to refusal of treatment. Could formal axiology tell 
us, for example, how to resolve the conflict between a woman's right to 
have an abortion and a pro-lifer's right to freedom of speech on the 
premises of an abortion clinic-or between a Republican's inalienable right 
to property and a poor person's right to basic but costly medical care? 
Could formal axiology tell us if and when rights are forfeited by extreme 
anti-intrinsic behavior-for example, the right to liberty for grand larceny, 
or the right to life for murder? Could formal axiology tell us whether rights 
could be voluntarily waived and if so which ones and under what 
circumstances, for example, the right to life in the euthanasia situations just 
mentioned? 
Again, I know how to think philosophically about rights, but how does 
one think about themfonnally, axiologically, scientifically? Frank Forrest 
has convinced me that without fonnulas, there is no Jonna/ axiology. 
Without formulas, we may be thinking philosophically about values; but we 
are not thinking scientifically or axiologically. What formulas would 
express human rights, and what formulas would permit us to resolve 
problems about conflicts of rights? I do not know. 
9. Moral Sanctions 
Would formal axiology generate a theory of moral sanctions to support 
obedience to moral rules and respect for moral rights? I have in mind 
Mill's legal sanction-the police power of the state, his popular 
sanction-the power of adverse public opinion, and his inner moral sanction 
of conscience-unpleasant feelings of guilt at the very thought of 
wrongdoing. Again, whatfonnulas would tell us if and when one or more 
than one of these sanctions is appropriate in particular circumstances. 
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10. Marginal Human Beings and Animals 
What is the moral status of "marginal human beings"-the profoundly 
retarded and deranged, the irreversibly comatose, the pre-conscious 
developing fetus, within formal axiology? None of Hartman's "Proofs of 
the Infinite Value of Man" apply to them. Do they, or do they not, have 
intrinsic worth? What moral standing do they have, if any? What moral 
duties do we have to them, if any? And what about the moral status of 
animals? Animal righters would certainly challenge us to think very hard 
about these questions, but it is very unclear to me how they should be 
answered within the framework of axiology. I am puzzled about why "A 
baby" appears in the Hartman Value Profile, [HVP], Part I as the example 
of intrinsic value in light of the fact that intrinsic value is fulfillment of self-
concepts-and newborn babies with no language at all have few if any 
concepts at all-especially of self. I have suggested in my essay on 
"Universals, Individuals and Intrinsic Good" in Fonns of Value and 
Valuation that what we need is a broader notion, according to which 
intrinsically valuable entities are those conscious individuals who have a 
capacity for intrinsic valuation-which would make a place for the intrinsic 
worth of animals and babies, but not for pre-conscious fetuses or the 
irreversibly comatose. 5 Though infants and most animals cannot measure 
things by linguistically expressed concepts, they can identify themselves 
with things valued through sensory images employed as concepts and 
through an immense variety and complexity of feelings; they have a capacity 
for intrinsic valuation minus linguistic concepts. 
As a Philosopher, I find the foregoing questions to be very troubling 
indeed. I sincerely hope that some of the papers presented in the future at 
this meeting will address some of these issues. In concluding, let me say 
again that I do not know how to answer the questions that I have raised, and 
I challenge you to think about them and share your insights with me. I offer 
these questions to you as a research agenda for the future. I am convinced 
that these ten questions must be answered if formal axiology is to develop 
a plausible theory of moral action and obligation. 
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A REPLY TO 
"TEN UNANSWERED QUESTIONS" 
Frank G. Forrest 
Traditional ethical theory focused on ultimate value dichotomies like good 
and bad, right and wrong, virtue and vice. Robert Hartman's primary 
contribution to axiology centered on the first of these, on developing 
formalistic patterns for identifying good and bad, as well as intermediate 
values between the extremes like fair, average, and poor. He promised that 
a teleological value calculus would emerge which, when skillfully applied, 
would help us to understand and distinguish between ethical right and 
wrong, virtue and vice. This calculus was to be based upon set theory and 
transfinite mathematics; but Hartman's development of the application of 
this formal framework to practical problems in ethics was very 
rudimentary. 1 
One axiologist in particular, Dr. Frank G. Forrest, has spent a number 
of years developing an applicable Hartmanean moral calculus based on set 
theory and cardinal arithmetic. The mature results of his years of effort 
were published in 1994 in Frank G. Forrest, Valuemetrics": The Science 
of Personal and Professional Ethics. 2 Earlier versions of Forrest's book 
had been available for several years to members of the R. S. Hartman 
Institute. 
A version of Forrest's response to Rem B. Edwards' "Ten Unanswered 
Questions" was originally presented to the 1992 meeting of the R. S. 
Hartman Institute. Jn the significantly revised version that follows, Forrest 
maintains that formal axiology: (1) employs cardinal number arithmetic, in 
which mere additions do not express value enrichment, but value exponents 
do, (2) does not give us an obligation to reproduce or any other duties, but 
allows us to assess the outcome of various courses of action like 
overpopulating the earth, (3) does not distinguish between duty and going 
beyond the call of duty, but can be used to assess the results of various 
alternatives like minimal decency and extreme moral sacrifice, (4) can 
analyze and assess the outcome of situations involving euthanasia or mercy 
killing, (5) does not generate concrete rules, but may analyze them and 
guide their application by the value creation principle: "Always do the most 
good, " (6) can be used to analyze and compare ethical rules with or without 
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the inclusion of various qualifications and exceptions, (7) can help 
distinguish between the adequacy or inadequacy of the moral rules it 
analyzes, (8) can account for human rights, (9) and can determine which 
moral sanctions are appropriate for various infractions. Also, (JO) the 
moral status of marginal human beings and animals depends upon factual 
and philosophical considerations about their properties and capacities. 
In the discussion to follow, I will assume these prenuses and 
understandings: 
(1) Intrinsic value exists only when persons are involved. Singular 
concepts are those words and only those words that apply to persons, 
including their proper names. 
(2) As persons, all normal people have the same degree of intrinsic 
goodness. What is different about people that permits us to classify some 
as good, some as bad, and some better than others, is their behavior, their 
mental and physical strength and dexterity, and how they fulfill their roles. 
(3) The independent mathematical system we use to account for value 
phenomena is cardinal number arithmetic. One may find this system in any 
set theory text book. Cardinal number arithmetic is simple but strange. In 
this discipline we find mathematical relationships that contradict and are 
inconsistent with finite number arithmetic. This situation exists because 
cardinal numbers include the numbers for infinity. Thus, our calculations 
disclose situations: (a) where a part is equal to the whole, (b) where a 
quantity may have more than one value, for example X may = a orb, (c) 
where an arithmetical operation produces no change and ( d) where 
arithmetical operations under certain conditions cannot be performed. 
(4) Cardinal number arithmetic models and accounts for value phenomena 
imperfectly. Therefore, in order to eliminate some loose ends and gaps, we 
must resort to several ad hoc operations in the application of this arithmetic 
as a frame of reference for the science of value. 
(5) Ordinary sound logic and formal axiology go hand-in-hand. 
1. Measuring Personal Enrichment 
Enrichment of our selves and others can be expressed mathematically. 
Unique individual selves have the characteristic cardinal number N1, known 
hereafter as the concept value index. Finite conceptual properties like 
knowledge have the value index n. Ifwe assume that advancing a person's 
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knowledge is a finite enrichment of the self, this situation can be expressed 
mathematically using exponents, as follows: 
R (Resultant) = N1 n = N1. 
However, in accord with (3) (c) above, repeated finite or even infinite 
enrichments of one's self do not move the value of the resultant beyond N1. 
Adding tt1 to itself any number of times still is tt1. In order to create a 
value of tt2, a person must intensely identify-with or fully give him or her 
self to something or someone. Thus, if a person passionately loves 
knowledge and intensely identifies himself or herself with it, we get: 
R = ntt1 = tt2• 
This shows that mere additions to knowledge do not really enrich a 
person's life, but the passionate love of knowledge does. So does loving 
another person, which can be expressed by substituting tt1 for n in the 
preceding formula. 
The basic rules of inference for exponents in cardinal number arithmetic 
may be found in my book: Valuemetrics•: The Science of Personal and 
Professional Ethics. 3 Understanding the various illustrations that follow 
requires awareness of one of these rules. When we combine concepts and 
their attendant value indexes (n, k, or tt1), the arithmetical operation that 
models these combinations is exponentiation. If the concepts are compatible 
and enhance fulfillment of one or both, the combination is a composition 
and the sign of the exponent is plus ( + ). If they are incompatible and 
obstruct fulfillment, the combination is a transposition and the sign of the 
exponent is minus (-). 
2. The Duty to Reproduce, Contraception, and Mass Murder 
Hartman's formal system does not place upon us an obligation to reproduce. 
Neither does it place any other obligation upon us. There are no moral 
commandments in formal axiology as such. On the other hand, this system 
is a means of analyzing the legitimacy of obligations and moral 
commandments. According to this system, having as many children as 
humanly possible would not infinitely enrich the world or the universe. 
This course of action, as the facts reveal, tends to degrade the planet and 
quality of life on it. Hartman's system indicates that we should limit the 
number of our children in accordance with the bounds of the earth's 
resources, space, and need for protection of the ecosystem. The fact that 
parts of the earth at present are sparsely populated does not negate this 
precaution. 
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On the basis of ordinary logic, we have obligations to actual persons, but 
not to unconceived persons. An unconceived person is a concept without 
a referent. Our responsibility to unborn persons, however, is a matter for 
which axiological analysis is appropriate. 
The value calculus that I have developed departs from Robert S. Hartman 
in at least one respect. Hartman represented extrinsic values-things, 
processes, and actions in public spacetime-by the value index "No" because 
he regarded them as having a denumerably infinite complexity; yet, he 
· admitted that our practical treatment of them is always finite. Therefore, 
in lieu of N0, I assign the value index "k" to things of extrinsic value. The 
number "k" represents finite but indefinitely large sets. With this in mind, 
we now can show by the following calculation that contraception is not 
morally equivalent to murder on Hartmanean grounds. When we arrange 
concepts according to valuemetrics syntax, contraception is: 
k k 
R,.: sperm prevented-from-uniting-with-egg. (Transposition.) 
Therefore: R1 = k-k = 1/k 
Murder is a person killing a person with malice aforethought. The value 
index of this concept combination is 1/N2• Ilk and 1/N2 are not equivalent. 
Therefore, contraception and murder are not equivalent. Contraception, on 
the other hand, is a transposition ( 1/k), and in and of itself is wrong. 
However, there are various circumstances that will justify it, such as 
counteracting over-population, wholesome enjoyment of sex without 
incurring unwanted pregnancy, and so on. Consider the following: 
R3: R1 (contraception) to counteract overpopulation 
We know that R1 = 1/k. However, in order to find the value index of R3, 
we first must determine the value index of overpopulation (Ri). Ifwe apply 
this illustration to one of the many locations in Africa today, the concept 
combination of R2, according to valuemetrics syntax, is: 
k N1 
R = ecosystem unable to support people-mass. (Transposition.) 
Therefore: R2 = N-k = l/N1 
Accordingly: R3: R1 (1/k) counteracts R2 (l/N1). (Transposition.) 
Therefore: R3 = (l/Ntf l/k = N1 l/k = N1 
A Reply to "Ten Unanswered Questions" 157 
In this equation N1 is greater than either of the input value indexes ( 1 /N1 and 
1/k). Consequently, this is an instance of value creation. We interpret this 
as follows. When we use a transposition, such as contraception (1/k), as 
in this example, and the outcome is either the creation of value or holding 
value neutral, then the transposition is justified. 
The justification of contraception to provide enjoyment of sex and at the 
same time insure that an unwanted pregnancy does not occur involves the 
following operations. 
-n k 
R1: unwanted pregnancy (Transposition) 
R1 = k-n = 1/k 
k 1/k 
R2: sex that unquestionably-will-not-result in R1 (Transposition) 
R2 = (llkrk = kk = k 
1/k k 
R3: contraception insures R2 (Composition) 
R3 = k 1 /k = n or k 
In this instance, cardinal arithmetic is somewhat ambiguous. However, 
R3 is not a transposition. Hence, in the final outcome, value has not been 
depreciated. Under these conditions, it is reasonable to assume that 
contraception is a justified transposition. 
Let us return to Edwards' question about mass murder. The model for 
killing a person is R = N1k = 1/N1, not R = N1 - N1 = N1• Therefore, his 
conclusion "-so it would appear that there is nothing wrong with murder 
as long as one person remains in existence"-is not a proper axiological 
deduction. Neither is it logical. 
Any rational person would agree that killing a million people is horrible 
and repulsive. However, if everybody felt that killing one persons is just 
as horrible and repulsive, the problems of murder and war probably would 
go away. And that would not be too bad. 
3. Duty and Supererogation 
The first paragraph of the third question in "Ten Unanswered Questions" 
contains four questions. The answers to these are: no, no, no, and none. 
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A Hartmanean ethics (I) does not distinguish between moral obligations and 
supererogations, or (2) between required and encouraged beneficial acts. 
(3) It places no requirement on anyone to be a saint or hero or (4) to make 
inordinate sacrifices for others. No distinction between minimal decency 
and supreme moral excellence is made. The formulae in Hartman's 
axiology do not express the distinction between the required and the 
recommended degree of morality. These are things that people ultimate 
must decide upon for themselves in determining what kind of persons they 
want to be. These things pertain to psychology and personality. They are 
outside the scope of formal axiology. What formal axiology does is this. 
It provides the insight to make the distinction between right and wrong, 
which, as C. I. Lewis says, "extends to every topic of reflection and to all 
that human self-determination or attitude may affect. "4 
Obviously this ideal is personal if a person adopts it and identifies with 
it as a guide for his or her behavior. This model points us in the direction 
of attaining the greatest goodness, but doing this does not require extreme 
personal sacrifice. In most instances, attaining the greatest goodness, 
creating value, produces personal satisfaction, not sacrifice. 
4. Euthanasia 
Ethical problems involving euthanasia can be analyzed by Hartman's formal 
axiology. We use the basic formula of Hartmanean algebra for this 
purpose. 
In my Valuemetrics": The Science of Personal and Professional Ethics I 
discuss passive and active euthanasia in some depth and show both the 
formulas and the factual considerations that are relevant for justifying both 
kinds of "mercy killing." I refer readers to that discussion for details.5 
Edwards claims to know philosophically but not axiologically whether 
euthanasia is justified, but this invokes the following counter question? 
What is the basis for a comparison of the rightness of the philosophical 
answer to the morality of euthanasia with the axiological answer? 
5. Generating Moral Rules 
The Hartman ethic would not generate a set of concrete moral rules. 
Instead it provides a mathematical logic applicable to many kinds of 
situations for obtaining moral guidance. Common sense maxims and 
commandments do not exist in this system. However, a moral principle that 
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has universal application, the value creation principle, is a logical appendage 
to the system. 
Obtaining the clear view that is lacking, as indicated in the last line of this 
question, requires understanding that formal axiology does not originate 
moral rules. Instead it is a system of logic for determining the degree of 
goodness of a rule. The rule itself and the system for analyzing it both are 
things of systemic value. The referents of the concepts that make up a rule, 
however, may be things of intrinsic, extrinsic, or systemic value. The value 
creation principle is a precise statement of the maxim "Always do good." 
However, formal axiology does not generate this principle. The value 
creation principle is only a guide in the application of formal axiology. 
The tools of analysis provided by formal axiology permit us to determine 
whether more good results from following simple moral rules than from not 
following them. For example, let us compare: 
k n -k n 
keeping promises (C) vs. breaking promises (T) 
R=kn=k R = k-n = 1/k 
Here, keeping promises produces more value than breaking promises, for 
k is greater than 1/k. Here and in what follows, (C) means that the concept 
combination is a composition, and (T) means that the combination is a 
transposition. 
k n 
telling the truth (C) 
R =kn= k 
k N1 
protecting persons (C) 
R = N,k = N, 
k k 
protecting property (C) 
T) 
R=kk=k 
k -n n 
vs. asserting that a falsehood is true (T & C) 
R = (n-n)k = (1/n)k = 1/k 
-k N1 
vs. killing persons6 (T) 
R = N,-k = l/N1 
k k n n 
vs. taking property without the right7 (C & 
1/k 
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Our calculations show that given each of the above choices, following the 
rules results in greater value than breaking them; and to that extent, the 
rules are justified. Yet, the situations to which we must apply moral rules 
are often so complex that qualifications of and exceptions to these simple 
rules must be considered, as I will show in discussing the next two 
questions. 
6. Complex Moral Rules with Qualifications and Exceptions 
Scientific axiology, as indicated previously, does not generate a simple or 
complex set of rules of ethics, but it can be used to analyze moral rules. 
However, we have a set of arithmetic rules, to wit; (1) rules for general 
finite and transfinite number exponentiation, 8 (2) rules for determining 
which concept is the base and which is the exponent in a basic equation,9 
(3) rules for transposing transpositions, that is, for redressing wrongs, 
injustice, badness, 10 (4) rules for general finite and transfinite roots, 11 and 
(5) rules for the justification of transpositions that transpose transpositions, 
that is, that bring good out of evil or prevent even greater evil. 12 
These rules are operational rules for applying Hartman's system for 
determining right and wrong, and for identifying possible exceptions and 
qualifications. This system reveals under what circumstances, if any, the 
destruction of infinite value is warranted. The basis for this possibility rests 
on the fact that a hierarchy exists within infinity. The mathematical 
expressions that show this possibility are given in the literature on this 
subject, including my book. 
If we understand that destruction of infinite value means "the killing of 
a person" or a "person dying," we can express this mathematically as 1/N1• 
This act is justified if (1) it contributes to the fulfillment of a situation 
expressed by N2 or (2) if it inhibits fulfillment of a situation expressed by 
1/N2• Sydney Carton's sacrifice of his life to save the Damey family, 
narrated in Charles Dickens' novel A Tale of Two Cities, is an example of 
the first. Destruction of the Iraqi army (killing Iraqi soldiers) to prevent 
them from continuing to murder the people in Kuwait is an example of the 
second. 
Example (1): 
R.: Sidney dies to save Lucie's love and happiness with Charles, where 
N1 N1 
R1: Lucie's love with Charles (C) 
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tt, -k 
R2: Sidney dies (T) 
R2 = tt,-k = 1/tt1, and where 
R3: R2 (1/tt1) to save R1 (Mi} (C) 
R3 = tt} 1M1 ~ M2 but > 1/n13 
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The words "to save" indicate that the relationship between R1 and R2 is 
compositional. If Sydney's purpose was no more than to save Lucie's and 
Charles' lives, then his sacrifice, while heroic, would not be justified. 
However, Sydney had a higher motive which, as the arithmetic reveals, 
justifies his action. The resolution of the equation for R3 comes under the 
Rules for General Finite and Transfisite Roots. These rules provide 
guidance for determining where wrongs and badness are justified. 
Example (2) 
R,,: killing Iraqi soldiers to prevent them-from-murdering-Kuwaiti-people, 
where 
-k tt, 
R1: killing Iraqi-soldiers (T) 
R1 = tt,-k = 1/tt1, and where 
lltt2 l/tt, 
R2: R, to prevent Iraqi-soldiers from murdering Kuwaiti people (T) 
The words "to prevent" indicate that the relationship between Iraqi 
soldiers murdering Kuwaiti people (1/tti} and R1 is transpositional. This is 
an example of the Rules for the Justification of Transpositions that 
Transpose Transpositions. These rules provide guidance for determining the 
justification of wrongs and badness that redress wrongs and badness. The 
use of penalties for infractions of the rules in sports and in the criminal 
justice system also are real world examples of the application of these rules. 
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7. Assessing the Adequacy of Moral Rules 
Although the Hartmanean system does not generate a set of moral rules, as 
I have repeatedly stated, it nevertheless can be used to determine whether 
a given moral rule, simple or complex, is adequate or inadequate. Consider 
some of the examples of complex rules given by Edwards in his sixth 
question: 
Example (1) 
Keep promises, except when you have promised to do wrong or evil 
The concept combination "keep promises" in and of itself without 
qualification is compositional and therefore ethically correct. However, in 
this case the promise is transpositional, a promise to do wrong. Keeping a 
promise of this nature materializes the wrong. Breaking it eliminates the 
wrong. The valuemetrics analysis of this situation is: 
~: violate a promise to commit murder, where 
n l/N2 
R1: promise to commit murder (C) 
R1 = (1/Ni}n = 1/N2, and where 
-k I /N2 
R2: violate R1 (T) 
R2 = (l/Ni}-k = N2k = N2 
Under the Rules for Transposing Transpositions, the concept combination 
"violate a promise to commit murder" creates value. Therefore, disvaluing 
a promise is ethically correct if the promise incorporates anything 
transpositional, a wrong or badness. However, if the promise incorporates 
something compositional, then to disvalue it (violate it) would depreciate 
value. This would be unethical. 
Example (2) 
Keep a promise, except when breaking it is necessary to save human life. 
In this example, we assume that the promise is to do something good and 
beneficial. Breaking the promise would depreciate value and hence would 
constitute a Transposition. The purpose of the following analysis, therefore, 
is to answer the following question: If implementing this Transposition does 
in fact save human life, would it be justified? 
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R,,: break a promise in order to save human life, where 
-k n 
R1: break a promise (T) 
R1 = n-k = 1/k, and where 
1 /k lt1 
R2: R1 to save human life (C) 
R - ... 1/k - ... 2 - "I - "I 
This situation is value neutral; it neither creates nor destroys value. 
Nevertheless, because it maintains value we may conclude that breaking a 
promise to save human life is justified. Keeping a promise while knowing 
that doing so would result in human death would certainly destroy value. 
Example (3) 
Tell the truth, except when lying is necessary to save a human life. 
This is another example of justifying a transposition. Lying, which is 
asserting that a falsehood is true, is a transposition having a value index of 
l/k. If telling a lie would in fact result in saving an innocent person's life, 
is it justified? The concept combination for this situation is: 
1 /k lt1 
R,,: lying to save a human-life (C) 
R 
This situation is also value neutral; therefore, lying to save an innocent 
person's life is justified. 
Example (4) 
Do not kill, except when necessary for self-defense. 
If we assume that the prohibition against killing applies to killing a 
person, and that self-defence applies to defending myself (or oneself) against 
being murdered, then the concept combination in this case is: 
R,,: killing a person to prevent that person from murdering me, where 
-k lt1 
R1 killing a person (T) 
R1 = 1t1-k = l/1t., and where 
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1/N1 N2 
R2 = R1 to prevent murder (T) 
R2 = (l/Ni}l/N1 = N}IN1 :s; N2 but > 1/n 
This is another example of the justification of a wrong to avert a greater 
wrong. Whereas killing a person to prevent that person from murdering is 
justified, if obstructing the murder can be accomplished compositionally, 
this would be a better solution, as the next example shows. 
Example (5) 
R,: curb a person to prevent that person from murdering me, where 
k N1 
R1: curb a person 
R1 = N1k = N1, and where 
R2: R1 (N1) to prevent murder (T) 
R2 = (N2rN1 = N2 
The assumption that "N2" in this example is better than " :s; N2 but > 1 /n" 
in the preceding example is based on the lack of ambiguity in R = Ni as 
compared to R ~ N2 but > 1/n. 
Example (6) 
Do not kill, except in the defense of loved-ones. 
If the stipulation concerning the purpose of the defense is also to prevent 
murder, then killing a person is justified. However, if the purpose of the 
defense is for some other reason, say defense against slander, and if we 
define slander as defamation of reputation (1 /k), then killing is unjustified, 
as the following analysis reveals. 
1IN1 1/k 
R: killing-a-person to defend against slander (T) 
This means that R is indeterminate, that it cannot be solved 
mathematically. Hence, we have no grounds in the axiological context to 
justify killing a person under these circumstances. 
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As the immediately preceding examples illustrate, formal axiology can 
analyze moral rules that incorporate exceptions and can determine which 
exceptions are justified and which are not. 
8. Hwnan Rights, Conflicting Rights 
Can formal axiology generate a theory of human rights? In the literature on 
this subject, human rights are defined as justified claims for things that meet 
the basic needs of people in sustaining and improving their lives. When we 
research the subject further, we find that rights apply to a broad range of 
human needs and wants, and they may be classified variously as natural 
rights, God-given rights, civil rights, and so on. We discover tha.t rights 
are a function of values; hence, a theory of rights is an extension or 
component of applied value theory. This suggests that human rights theory 
is inherent in formal axiology, as opposed to being generated by it. 
The names of all things conceived as rights are concepts. They are 
subject to the same procedures of axiological analysis as other concepts. 
Consequently, questions of hierarchy and conflicts among rights can be 
resolved by the same formulas as other axiological problems. The 
following examples illustrate how the formulas of axiology apply to rights. 
The word "right" belongs to the type of concept that has the value index n. 
n tt1 
R,: right to life (human life) (C) 
n n 
R,: right to freedom 
R = nn = n 
k lt1 
R,: respecting the right-to-life 
R 
-k lt1 
R,: Denying the right-to-life 
R = tt1-k = l/1t1 
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A conflict of rights such as the right to life versus the right to property 
can be resolved by the axiological framework. The value index for human 
life is N1, and the value index for property is k. N1 is greater than k; 
therefore, human life is a greater good than property. Thus, the right to 
human life has precedence over the right to protect property. This applies 
to the real world in the following example. 
If A denies B's right to property by stealing it, is B justified in denying 
A's right to life by killing him? The solution to this problem, incidentally, 
uses the same axiological method for determining just punishment under the 
retributive theory of criminal justice. 
1/N1 1/k 
R,: killing the offender (A) absolves the crime of theft (denying B's right 
to property) (T) 
R = (llkrlltt1 = kN1 = d 
Under the rules for Finite and Transfinite Number Roots, d means 
indeterminate. Therefore, we have failed to justify killing A. 
The preceding examples show how axiological principles and procedures 
for the solution of other value problems also apply to the solution of 
problems about rights. 
9. Moral Sanctions 
A theory of sanctions to support obedience to moral and legal rules and 
respect for moral and legal rights is also inherent in formal axiology, as 
opposed to being generated by it. The methodology for analyzing sanctions 
is the same as that for analyzing rights and other values, for both rights and 




R.: threat-of-imprisonment (denying freedom) to discourage lawlessness (T) 
R =(llkr11k = k11k = nor k 
Thus, under these conditions, threat of imprisonment is justified. 
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Example (2) 
~: social disapproval to discourage stinginess 
Whether or not social disapproval for stinginess is justified depends on the 
nature and degree of the stinginess. If stinginess is interpreted as very close 
guarding of possessions, then, as this analysis indicates, social disapproval 
is not justified because value is depreciated. 
1/k k 
~: social-disapproval to discourage very-close-guarding-of-possessions (T) 
R = k-l/k = 1/kl/k = 1/n or 1/k 
However, if stinginess is a marked lack of generosity equivalent to 
avaricious miserliness, then the stinginess is transpositional. This changes 
the situation, as follows. 
Example (3) 
1/k 1/k 
~: social disapproval to discourage lack-of-generosity (T) 
R = k-1/k = k1/k = nork 
Here value is gained, not lost; and this type of social disapproval is 
justified. This example demonstrates why sound ethical analysis requires 
clarity of concepts and knowledge of relevant facts. 
Example (4) 
N1 1/k 
~: pangs-of-conscience causing repudiation of dishonesty (T) 
Conscience causing repudiation of dishonesty is a case of value creation, 
and thus it is justified. 
One rule of syntax in formal axiology concerns the use of the concept 
"person," or "any of its derivatives," or a person's "proper name." The 
rule allows use of such a concept only when the meaning of a situation 
cannot be given without it. This keeps the number of alephs in concept 
combinations to a minimum. The concept combination in Example (4) does 
not contain the concept "person" or a person's name, yet the value index 
168 FRANK G. FORREST 
N1 is assigned to the concept "conscience." This is done because conscience 
is a major element in the complex humanness and self-identity of people. 
10. Marginal Hwnan Beings and Animals 
See attached Forms of Life: Moral Status Chart for my classification of 
marginal cases and non-human animals. I also am puzzled as to why a baby 
is number one on the HVP. 
There are certain animals whose intelligence seems to approach the human 
capacity to think and combine thoughts. I refer to certain apes, porpoises, 
and whales. They are a more complex form of life than, for example, 
insects and plants, but I do not think that we have sufficient evidence to 
assign to them any value index other than k. If this evidence is ever 
produced, then we would assign to them the value index N1• 
Since I assign the value index k to extrinsic things, processes, and 
activities and do not follow Robert S. Hartman in assigning them the value 
index No, the question arises why I do not assign ~ to non-human animals 
as having a kind of value that is intermediate between persons and things. 
I suggest that we assign k even to the higher forms of animal life in order 
to maintain a distinction between them and people under all conditions. If 
we assign No to these animals, this distinction disappears under certain 
circumstances. For instance, the care and protection that a mother whale 
provides for her offspring would then be expresses as R = No No = N1• In 
this situation, interaction between animals has the same value index as a 
person, with no person being involved. This discloses one of the drawbacks 
of cardinal number arithmetic. Perhaps Mark A. Moore's quantum wave 
model equation developed in the article to follow will permit us to assign 
different values to non-human forms of life without encountering this 
problem. 
FORMS OF LIFE 
Moral Standing Chart 
Irreversible coma 
II Pre-conscious-brain functioning fetus 
III Conscious-brain functioning fetus 
~ 
::ti 
IV Retarded persons {l 
v Baby ~ ... 




Class Functions Primitive Form of Vidx Moral Entitled to ~ 
~ 
Naturally Will Life Standing Human Rights z; 
~ 
no no artificial 1/A1 none no ~ 
IO 
II yes no vegetative k < person no i::: 
~ ... 
III yes yes human A1 person yes cs· z; 
• 
IV yes yes human 1IA1 person yes 
v yes yes human A1 person yes 
VI yes yes non- k < person no (we eat -human them) °' IO 
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Seven 
A QUANTUM WA VE MODEL 
OF VALUE THEORY 
Mark A. Moore 
Mark A. Moore, afonner student of Hartman's, is President of the Robert 
S. Hartman Institute for Formal and Applied Axiology. Identifying possible 
weaknesses in a moral calculus based on transfinite mathematics, in this 
essay he develops a different finitistic calculus based on the mathematics and 
the metaphysics of quantum wave mechanics. Moore develops this new 
finitistic quantum wave model value calculus in Sections 1-3 below; then he 
applies it in section 4. The first three sections were presented at the 1993 
meeting of the Robert S. Hartman Institute, and section four was presented 
at the 1994 meeting. Moore finds many areas of substantial agreement 
between his quantum wave model calculus and the transfinite calculus of 
Hartman/Forrest; but there are significant differences also. Moore identifies 
at least eight serious critical flaws in the transfinite value calculus. 
(1) The axiom that defines the system and the threefold hierarchy of value 
can differentiate eighteen binary value combinations. All eighteen are used 
in the Hartman Value Profile. However, the transfinite calculus can 
differentiate only eight distinct values. To illustrate, (using A for N, as 
Moore does here), 1 (or A/1), and E1 (or !(11), and s1 (or tfl), all yield the 
same resultant value of Ai- 1 This means that it is just as valuable to love 
a button or an idea as it is to love a person, and this is highly 
counterintuitive. 
(2) The value distinctions between good.fair, average, poor, and bad or 
no good get lost when the transfinite calculus is used. All extrinsic objects 
and processes have the value k, no matter whether they are good, fair, 
average, poor, or no good. Transfinite algebra does not do justice to 
gradations of value within the three intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic value 
dimensions. However, this does not happen in the quantum wave model 
approach. 
(3) Moore is skeptical about Hartman's rank ordering of some binary 
value combinations, and he offers a partly new hierarchy of binary values. 
For example, he reverses Hartman's ranking of s1 over F, suggesting that 
as he puts it, "the sacred nature of fonnal systems" ranks lower than "the 
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pos1t1ve uses of persons. " Moore regards his new rank ordering as 
intuitively more compelling. 
(4) Some of Hartman's critics like Pete Gunter and Robert S. 
Brumbaugh,3 questioned Hartman's limitation of basic values to three, 
intrinsic (persons), extrinsic (things), and systemic (ideas) and suggested 
that there might be intennediate or additional types of basic value. The 
need for an additional basic type of value is especially acute when it comes 
to non-human animals. Where neither Hartman nor Forrest can find any 
degree of intrinsic worth in non-human animals, and consistently classify 
them in the extrinsic value dimension along with rocks and doorknobs, 
Moore shows how to expand the initial threefold hierarchy of values into 
fourfold, fivefold, or however many it takes to make all the distinctions 
between kinds of basic values that need to be made. All animals are not 
equal in degree of psychic complexity.feeling, desires, volitions, cognitions, 
and capacity for valuation. 
(5) Where Hartman was unable to explain how to compare the value of 
a thing's having three properties of its five propertied concept with the value 
of a thing's having three properties of a three propertied concept, Moore 
has discovered how to do it and shows us in the coming pages. 
(6) Moore indicates that in fighting evil with evil (transposing 
transpositions), Forrest is forced to treat equals as if they were unequal.for 
example, ruining crops = killing insects. By contrast, the quantum wave 
model can show that these alleged equals are not really equal at all. 
(7) Moore can get a different numerical value for all eighteen binary 
combinations,- but the transfinite calculus gets only eight, as previously 
indicated. This means that the quantum wave calculus can distinguish 
eighteen, not just eight, distinct relations of "better than" and "worse than." 
It can also expand indefinitely on that. Important value distinctions or 
discriminations can now be made that the transfinite calculus cannot make, 
as Moore illustrates with many examples. Moore claims that "transfinite 
algebra does not provide enough resolution to deal adequately with the 
value landscape. " 
(8) Jn the preceding reply to Edwards, Forrest clearly shows that murder 
is wrong, but he does not reply adequately to the charge that the transfinite 
calculus implies that multiple murders are no worse than a single murder, 
since A1 - A1 - A1 - A1 - A1 - A1 - A1 = A1• Moore emphasizes that the 
quantum wave approach does not yield this highly counterintuitive result. 
Although this new finitistic model is in many ways superior to the 
transfinite model, in at least one important respect the transfinite calculus 
is superior. It preserves the incommensurability of the value of each person 
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with the values of things and concepts. In the finitistic approach, enough 
money, or enough barrels of oil, eventually equal or surpass the value of a 
human life; but no finite extrinsic or systemic values ever equal or surpass 
the intrinsic worth of a single human life, according to the transfinite 
calculus. A richer calculus is now required that somehow combines the 
transfinite with the quantum wave calculus, preserving the advantages of 
each while avoiding the liabilities of both. Mark Moore is now working on 
this! 
To his devoted followers, Robert Hartman's work represents a significant 
advance in the philosophical understanding of value. Hartman was not 
content to stop at philosophical understanding alone. His dream was to 
create a logic of value-a formal logic which not only formally differentiates 
types of values but also allows for calculations that combine the types of 
values so that the relative value of each combination can be compared. For 
Hartman, this enterprise represents three distinct parts, and the working out 
of each part exemplifies the process of creating a science. 
First, there are the foundations of value. In this stage Hartman provided 
us with what he calls the "analysis" of value. Hartman wanted to 
accomplish the reduction of the understanding of value to its most simple 
and generic meaning. Relying heavily upon G. E. Moore, Hartman 
concluded that the essence of all value is the concept of "Good." 
The second stage is the formal definition of the analytic simple concept 
"Good." This stage is called the "Axiom of Value." Hartman claimed that 
all true sciences have such axioms at their core. What makes this stage 
unique is the identification of a simple analytic concept, a concept whose 
meaning cannot be further analyzed, with a formal or mathematical process. 
In this way, the analytic concept can now be treated by the laws of 
mathematics. This formal treatment leads to the creation of theorems and 
hypotheses that can be formally derived and empirically tested. 
The third stage was described by Hartman as the "Calculus of Value." 
Here, the formal apparatus generated by the Axiom of Value is developed. 
This stage contains the ranking of value types and their respective 
combinations. 
Each of the three stages of Hartman's work find their own unique 
development and critique. Surely, stage one, the analysis of value, is a 
purely philosophical undertaking. As such, it should be critiqued as any 
philosophical work. This means that it can be historically placed along side 
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other significant attempts to understand the nature of value. It can also be 
critiqued for its philosophical and argumentative soundness. 
The second stage, the Axiom of Value, must be treated like any other 
so-called axiomatic work; namely, it must be judged for its logical 
consistency and usefulness in generating interesting and provocative 
theorems which are not only consistent with what we analytically believe to 
be true about value but also further our understanding and instruct us about 
subtleties of value that have been obscure. 
Finally, the third stage of value, the Calculus, must be judged on the 
merits of delivery. The Calculus must provide us with a mechanism of 
value calculation. Here the calculations must be judged on their ability to 
distinguish logically what has been formally distinguished in the Axiom, and 
for their ability to make precise and reveal differentiations of specific values 
and value situations. 
Importantly, a criticism of one stage is not an indictment of the entire 
program. Elsewhere, I endeavored to demonstrate that the third stage of 
Hartman's program, the Calculus of Value, is defective. 4 This, however, 
in no way represents a rejection of stages one or two. In fact, my 
objections to Hartman's calculus really depend upon the acceptance of stages 
one and two. In my earlier critique, I pointed out that two portions of 
Hartman's Calculus fail the simple test of consistency. 
First, the Axiom of value allows for the differentiation of eighteen binary 
value combinations. The calculus, however, only distinguishes eight 
different "numerical scores." This means, that ten of the formally distinct 
value combinations are really numerically indistinct. This implies that the 
Calculus does not do justice to the Axiom, and for me this implies that the 
Calculus is defective. Many axiologists are sympathetic with the argument 
from utility-that the Calculus is useful and therefore should not be tossed 
overboard. We owe Frank Forrest a great debt for the work he has done 
to codify value calculations. However, the simple fact remains that the 
Calculus does not do justice to either the Analytic or the Axiomatic stages 
of Hartman's work, and this must be rectified. 
Second, the Axiom requires that we employ a multi-valued logic in the 
Calculus. Valuations, according to the Axiom, are gradations of value. 
Values are sets which are fulfilled in a range of ways going from no-good, 
to poor, to average, to fair, to good. However, Hartman never delivered 
a calculus that actually does this with logical consistency. When he 
calculated the relative value of how an extrinsic value may be evaluated 
either systemically, extrinsically, or intrinsically he only employed the value 
mode of systemic value. There is no calculus based on the partial 
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fulfillment of extrinsic value. From the view of the Calculus, the extrinsic 
evaluation of any extrinsic value is the same, but we know from the Axiom 
and other parts of the Calculus that this is not logically consistent. 
I am critical of Hartman's Calculus of Value, and I believe that proper 
respect for science in general, and Hartman's lifelong work in particular, 
requires that all defective aspects be openly challenged and if possible 
replaced. This is science and not religion. Dogma within a science is a 
value transposition, and ultimately no good comes of it. 
Having said this, there is still a point to be made about being only 
negative. It is easier to criticize than to fix. I am sensitive to this; indeed, 
science does not stride forward merely by finding error, but in the discovery 
of new frameworks. This paper attempts to provide a constructive 
alternative to Hartman's Calculus of Value. As such, it must be evaluated 
by two important criteria: First, is this alternative genuinely consistent with 
Hartman's Axiom of Value. Second, is the calculus presented here logically 
consistent, interesting, and fruitful in its development and applications. I 
invite your healthy suspicions. 
1. A Review of Certain Aspects of Quantwn Logic 
Quantum mechanics is one of the great achievements of human intellect. 
Viewed simply, it is a part of physics. More specifically, it is the physics 
of the atom. Quantum mechanics may also be seen as a mathematical and 
logical system. This aspect was developed especially by John Von 
Neumann. To consider quantum theory only in its applications for physics 
and mathematics (as extraordinary as they are) would be an injustice, 
however, for it represents a new way of thinking about nature, about logic, 
and about process. 
Simply put, quantum mechanics challenges our notions of what it means 
to be located in space, what it means to be a member of a class or an 
element in a set, and what is means to endure through time. In this paper, 
I will focus on these larger, more philosophical aspects of quantum theory, 
and more formal aspects are only slightly discussed. 
A. Wave vs. Particle 
To grasp the importance of quantum theory, several critical aspects must be 
understood. These aspects center on the basic dualism of quantum theory, 
the duality of wave and particle in the interpretation of nature. 
At the end of the nineteenth century, physicists were content to think of 
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nature as composed of two parts: matter and fields. Drop an apple from 
a tree. The apple is matter; and it falls due to its attraction to a larger piece 
of matter, Earth. Connecting the apple in the tree and Earth is a field, the 
gravitational field. The complexity of the atomic world was yet to be 
discovered, and many physical fields and forces were still unknown. 
Physicists were content to treat matter and fields as separate entities. This 
began to change, first with the work of Clerk Maxwell, and later with 
Albert Einstein's demonstration that classical matter and fields are 
convertible to each other, and with Max Planck's proof that the 
interconnectedness of field and matter is a fundamental principle of the 
world of the atom, not merely a theorem of classical physics. 
Planck's initial work centered on the question of why hot things change 
color. That black body matter glows when heated was already known. 
Steelmakers had known for generations that iron turns cherry red at about 
1300 degrees, and this was a good way of knowing the temperature of a 
furnace. But why does this change occur? Planck discovered that atoms 
glow or give off color due to their vibrations. If one adds heat, vibrations 
increase in frequency, and this accounts for the change in color. There is, 
then, a direct correlation between the frequency of the atom's vibration, the 
amount of energy applied to the atom, and the color or frequency of the 
light emitted by the atom. All of this seems reasonable, but Planck also 
discovered that changes of the frequency of light emitted by the atom do not 
proceed in a linear fashion with increased energy input. Rather, there is a 
step function. Changes in output (light) occur only after sufficient 
additional energy has been absorbed. This step function, these packets of 
released energy, Planck called "quanta;" and the constant he discovered is 
called "Planck's Constant." 
The plot thickened when physicists turned to the nature of light. Work 
done by Christian Huygens and Sir Isaac Newton established that light is a 
wave (and thus a field). However, Arthur Compton demonstrated that light 
behaves like a particle. So, which is it? Is light a wave or a particle? 
While this controversy was boiling, Louis De Broglie submitted a doctoral 
thesis proposing that all particles of matter are associated with particular 
waves. Just as light waves have the properties of particles, particles have 
the properties of waves. Waves and matter are somehow interconnected. 
This duality was formally presented by Werner Heisenberg in 1925. 
Therefore, quantum theory is about the interchangeability of particles and 
waves; and it has two versions-a wave version developed first by Erwin 
Schrodinger, and a particle version developed by Werner Heisenberg. 
It may sound as if the problem was then solved: quantum theory supplies 
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the formal framework for the transition of wave into particle and vice-versa. 
But it is not so simple. In fact, the duality of the two states (wave and 
particle), and the contradictory ways in which each state behaves, are not 
reconciled. The problem is not solved, only presented in a more precise 
way. The problem is that matter can be validly seen as a wave or as a 
particle; but particles are very different from waves. It would be fine if 
we could show that matter is at one point behaving like a particle, and at 
different time it has changed its behavior and begins behaving like a wave; 
but this is not what happens. Matter behaves equally like a particle and a 
wave at the same time, and this challenges our common sense view of 
reality. 
l. As a particle, matter is simply located at a specific point in space. As 
a wave, matter is located generally along the entire volume of space the 
wave occupies. 
2. As a particle, matter interacts with other particles in a Newtonian 
fashion (rather like billiard balls colliding). As a wave, matter interacts by 
phase coherence. 
3. As a particle, matter and energy are conserved. When two particles 
of matter collide the energy released is equal to the energy lost in the two 
respective particles. When waves interact, the energy of the combined wave 
is equal to the square of the wave energies. An energy increase and deficit 
is created. 
4. As a particle, matter changes direction and loses energy after collision. 
As a wave, matter returns to its original amplitude and energy after 
interference. 
These are serious conflicts. They have not been reconciled by quantum 
theory today. To make matters worse, we are not free to accept one model 
or the other. We cannot be particle or wave theorists and let that be the end 
of it. The history of quantum theory is filled with attempts to explain away 
the conflict. In the Copenhagen Thesis, the "reality" of matter outside 
some experiment is not a meaningful question. This implies that 
measurement somehow interacts with matter, altering its natural condition. 
Measurement, then, is seen as a type of interference. However, in 1964 
John Bell showed that this and similar ways around the problem fail. Bell 
demonstrated, in what is now called Bell's Theorem, that without 
faster-than-light connections (which would violate Einstein's most basic 
principle of general relativity) a theory of matter based on a particle model 
cannot explain the facts as we know them. It is not a matter of choosing 
equally satisfying theoretical models. Neither side, by itself, can explain all 
the facts. We seem to be left with what Von Neumann calls a "miracle." 
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Understanding this constitutes one of the great achievements of human 
intellectual history. 
B. The Wave Nature of the Electron 
We have a rather good understanding of how particles behave, as explained 
by the mechanics of Newton. While there is subtlety in Newton's 
mechanics, there are no big surprises. What is surprising is how matter 
behaves in its wave form at the quantum level. In our everyday world of 
classical scale, the world we inhabit, we are familiar with the actions of 
matter on matter. There is great similarity between this world and the small 
atomic world when we think of matter as particle. However, as a wave, 
matter behaves very differently. Since we are less familiar with wave 
mechanics in general, and quantum waves in particular, I will comment on 
the nature of waves, and on probabilities and possibilities. Later I will 
show how important these topics are to our understanding of intensions or 
meanings of concepts. First we must tum our attention to the wave nature 
of matter. 
The wave nature of the electron is best demonstrated by examining what 
happens when an electron is fired through a single hole, and then through 
multiple holes. Today we are all familiar with the firing of electrons onto 
a phosphor screen (a television). If the beam of electrons is focused 
through a single hole, then we expect to see a single bright spot on the 
screen. If the intensity of the beam is increased, the spot brightens. So far, 
so good. If the diameter of the hole is decreased then the diameter of the 
spot likewise decreases. This is as expected. However, at a certain point, 
a strange thing begins to happen. Instead of getting smaller, the spot on the 
screen begins to expand. Not only does it expand, but it does so in circles 
of bright and dark areas which resemble a bull's eye target used by an 
archer. 
This pattern, called the Airy Pattern, was discovered by George Airy in 
1835 by looking at the effects of passing any type of wave through a hole 
or iris. Airy's pattern applies equally to waves of water, light, or sound. 
Airy noticed that the angular diameter of the bull's eye is: 
70*(wave length/the diameter of the iris). 
It has been suggested that the reason a beam of electrons forms the Airy 
Pattern is not because electrons are waves, but because a stream of 
electrons, trying to get through the hole, simply form a wave from their 
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collective flow. This, however, is not the case. If flow of electrons is 
slowed down by firing one each minute, the Airy Pattern will still be found. 
The wave nature is a part of the electron's intrinsic nature, and that's all 
there is to it. 
The same pattern appears when photons of light are passed through small 
holes. In the famous two-slit experiment, photons of light behave exactly 
like waves as they pass through both slits. With both slits open, the same 
wavy pattern arises. Even more interesting, with both slits open and twice 
the light reaching the screen, the brightest areas are not twice as bright, but 
four times as bright as with a single slit open. In other words, when waves 
cohere, the effect is double the expected; and when waves interfere, the 
effect is complete wave cancellation, or darkness. This curious 
phenomenon can be explained, but to comprehend it we must explore the 
nature of wave coherence and interference. 
C. Wave Mechanics 
To understand how waves behave, we need to know how they are 
measured. This is done in three ways. First, wave amplitude, the height 
of the wave, is determined. Second, frequency of period, the time it takes 
the wave to complete a cycle going from the top of the wave to the bottom 
and back to the top, is calculated. Third, the energy is gauged. The energy 
is also equal to the amplitude squared for any portion of the wave. In 
quantum theory, waves actually do not have energy but probability, which 
is equal to amplitude squared. The higher the amplitude, the greater the 
probability of a given state's occurring. For quantum theory, wave 
amplitude is a distribution of the probabilities of the possible states of a 
system. 
To understand what happens when two waves meet, we need only 
compare the phases of the respective waves. If waves are perfectly in 
phase, then the peaks and troughs are in complete synchronization. This is 
called coherence. Any deviation from perfect coherence is called 
interference. Interference can be partial or total, where the peaks line up 
with troughs, and vice-versa. In this case we have complete wave 
destruction. 
When waves meet, their amplitudes add. If they are in phase, then the 
resulting wave is the addition of both amplitudes. If they are completely out 
of phase, then one amplitude is subtracted from the other. All degrees in 
between are the result of the degree of phase. This process, called 
"superposition," works on a linear scale until very large amplitudes are 
180 MARK A MOORE 
combined, where distortion or non-linearity can set in. It is thought, 
however, that for quantum waves, non-linearity never sets in. After 
meeting, two waves may again separate. What is remarkable is that after 
separation, the two waves resume the original amplitude they possessed 
prior to meeting. It is as though nothing happened. 
As mentioned earlier, a wave's energy (or probability) is its amplitude 
squared. This means that a sea wave with an amplitude of four feet bas 
four times the (destructive) energy as a wave with an amplitude of two feet. 
Imagine the destructive power of a two hundred-foot wave! (One occurred 
in Valdez, Alaska in 1964). For quantum waves, probability is the square 
of the amplitude. If we imagine one quantum wave with an amplitude of 
2 and another with an amplitude of 4, the wave with amplitude of 4 is not 
twice as likely to occur, but four times more likely to occur. 
In the early 1800's, the French mathematician Joseph Fourier discovered 
that any wave can be uniquely expressed as a combination of sine waves. 
Fourier's analysis applies to musical instruments, for example. When two 
different instruments play the same note, their waves are different. These 
differences give a unique sound to each instrument. This explains why 
electronic instruments such as the Moog synthesizer can duplicate the 
sounds of many different instruments by duplicating the unique Fourier 
signatures for each instrument. Fourier's discovery is even more general 
than he envisioned. Not only can sound waves be analyzed as a composite 
of sine waves, but this magical analysis can be performed by using wave 
groups other than sine waves. There is no natural way to take a wave 
apart. For every type of wave, there is a way to analyze it. 
D. Types of Waves 
In general, there are three types of waves: impulse waves, sine waves, and 
spherical waves. Impulse waves are sharp spikes. They are infinitely 
narrow and one-dimensional. One impulse wave differs from another only 
in its location. Sine waves have a characteristic shape; and two dimensions 
are required to describe them properly. Finally, spherical waves consist of 
the vibrations of hollow spheres and exist in three dimensions. 
The analysis of a wave by wave type is a complex mathematical process 
that is best solved by today's high speed computers. The result of wave 
analysis in music is the compact disk or synthesizer. (Compact disks and 
synthesizers use impulse waves to create the various sine waves for each 
instrument and note. This can also be done by analogue.) However, the 
number of iterations necessary for the analysis of a given wave will depend 
A Quantum Wave Model of Value Theory 181 
upon the "familiarity" of the wave with the wave form used for the 
analysis. This "kinship" relation of wave to analysis is very valuable. This 
is similar to a prism through which light is passed. The complexity of the 
spectrum as it leaves the prism is a measure of the similarity of the prism 
to the light wave. If there is no change in the wave, then the prism and the 
wave are in complete one to one mapping. Max similarity is called "kin 
prism" and max dissimilarity is called "conjugate prism." The measure of 
dissimilarity is the bandwidth of the spectrum. The larger the bandwidth, 
the greater the conjugate wave, the greater the dissimilarity. 
2. The Relation of Quantum Theory to Value Theory 
What, it may be asked, does all of this have to do with value theory? Value 
theory is about what people desire; quantum theory concerns the atomic 
world. The answer is that quantum theory involves a multi-valued logic that 
describes the probabilistic behavior of particles of matter and the 
combinatorial aspects of waves of matter. Waves of matter must be thought 
of as the total possibilities of action, and quantum theory provides the logic 
for how these total possibilities combine. It may be objected that the 
quantum world is small, and its effects are not noticed in the world we 
know. This is only partially true. First, the proxy waves of photons of 
light from distant stars can be several meters wide, and thus they are not 
only creatures of the atomic world. Second, as Roger Penrose points out, 
quantum effects may be sufficiently robust to be experienced by the human 
brain. 5 To be serious about this comparison, we must do more than 
speculate. A direct comparison between value theory and quantum theory 
1s necessary. In the following discussion, I propose to make just this 
comparison. 
A. Wave Families: Types of Concepts 
For Robert S. Hartman, there are three types of concepts: Formal, 
Analytic, and Singular. Each type represents a value: Systemic, Extrinsic, 
and Intrinsic. Each type is differentiated by the way in which the intensions 
and extensions are related. For formal concepts, intensions and extensions 
vary directly, and each is a formal construct. In analytic concepts, 
intensions and extensions vary inversely. The predicates of analytic 
intensions consist of other predicates, and the extensions of analytic 
concepts are properties of things. In singular concepts, the intension and 
the extension are unified into a one-to-one mapping, a topology. This three-
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fold distinction is very similar to the different wave families: impulse, sine, 
and spherical. Impulse waves are like formal concepts in that they are one-
dimensional; only their position differentiates one from another. Sine waves 
are like analytic intensions in that they are two-dimensional, (and time is a 
third dimension). Finally, spherical waves are like singular intensions; they 
are by nature continuous in a fashion that is suggestive of intrinsic value. 
B. Particles and Waves: Intensions and Extensions 
For Hartman, the foundation of all value lies in the understanding of the 
nature of concepts. Concepts are composed of two aspects, intensions or 
meanings and extensions or properties to which meanings refer. Meanings 
consist of predicates, and things consist of properties. Concepts involve 
both. 
This distinction resembles the difference between the wave and particle 
nature of quanta. A wave is similar to an intension. A quantum wave is 
the possibility that a certain physical state will occur. Possibility squared 
is probability. For Hartman's theory, the intension represents the full range 
of possibility of the extension. The extension is some sub-set of properties 
named by a subset of predicates in the intension. The total value of these 
extensional sub-sets of properties that define extension is equal to nothing 
less than the total meaning of the concept. In both quantum theory and 
value theory, the intensional wave represents possibility and the extension 
represents probability. In fact, total meaning (possibility) is equal to the 
square of the probability. Probability is determined by the amplitude of the 
wave for any specification of properties. Total meaning for the intension 
is the square of the number of properties. 
C. Wave Interference and Value 
Intensional analysis is wave analysis. Since the intension is the measure of 
value, we ought to be able to apply the logic of wave interference to 
intensions. In fact, we can. First, the way values combine or blend is 
similar to how waves combine. Wave combinations are measured by 
amplitude and phase. If waves are out of phase, then the combination is 
destructive; if they are in phase, then the combination is constructive. 
Degrees of phase control the resulting combinatorial possibilities. 
Extensional analysis, on the other hand, is like particle analysis. 
Properties behave in a Newtonian fashion. Their combinations are 
probabilistic. 
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This is very much like value composition and transposition. The 
difference is that for Hartman, values are either completely in phase or 
completely out of phase. Although he speaks of partial concept fulfillment 
in extrinsic value, the combinations of value types are not partial; they are 
either completely in phase or out of phase. The "quanta" of value are 
unfortunately either "on or off," "plus or minus." Like waves, intensions 
have been combined and uncombined without destruction. This is not true 
for extensions. Once the two automobiles collide, the scars remain. 
Humpty Dumpty cannot be put together again. 
D. Heisenberg's Uncertainty Principle and Analytic Concepts 
A cornerstone of Quantum theory is the Uncertainty Principle. Simply 
stated, knowledge about a quantum event is possible but limited. As we 
increase knowledge in one area, we lose knowledge in others. The total we 
can know at a given time is limited and relational. Thus, knowing more 
about one area will limit what we can know about another. 
But of what are we uncertain? In The Emperor's New Mind, Roger 
Penrose points out that when we are considering merely the possibility of 
quantum activity, we are never uncertain. Uncertainty creeps in only when 
we try to determine probability. Remember, probability is the amplitude of 
the wave squared; it is possibility squared. (We can measure the amplitude 
at any point along the curve, not only at the maximum.) In the value sense, 
this is the level of total meaning or value. The Uncertainty Principle is then 
a Principle of Total Value. 
This is very much like the relation of intension to extension of analytic 
concepts. The greater the knowledge of the extension, the less the 
knowledge of the intension. (This may not be true of singular concepts, but 
we cannot speak strictly of "knowledge" when we encounter 
"singularities.") If a concept has three (expositional) properties, then we 
know that there is one way to have none of these properties (and be 
no-good), three ways to have one property (and be poor), three ways to 
have two properties (and be fair), and one way to have all three properties 
(and be good). Nothing is uncertain. However, since intensions and 
extensions vary inversely, the more we know with increased levels of 
specification, the less is known about higher levels of abstraction; thus, 
probability decreases. We cannot increase the level of specification and at 
the same time increase probability. 
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E. Conclusions 
Many aspects of quantum theory are similar to value theory. Upon 
reflection, however, this should not surprise us. Meaning, for Hartman, is 
a wave. Hartman does not develop this area of value theory, but it is 
subject to wave analysis. Like quantum theory, value theory requires that 
meanings be either in phase or out of phase; either there is composition or 
transposition. This alone should prompt us to look to wave mechanics to 
understand values better. In the final section of this paper, I will actually 
use principles of wave mechanics to calculate values. 
3. Quantwn Wave Model for Value Combinatio~ 
Quantum mechanics is a theory about the dual nature of matter. Matter is 
a simply located particle with a certain probability, and it is also a 
possibility or meaning wave. According to Von Neumann, this dual nature 
requires consciousness. From my perspective, it is the essence of value. 
The quantum proxy wave, the possibility of action, is the intension of a 
concept against which the extension, the particle nature of matter, is 
measured. These are value measurements, and they can be compared by a 
method of computing quantum wave vectors. 
A vector is a way of calculating amplitudes of the wave. The longer the 
vector, the greater the value. But quantum vectors are not ordinary. 
Waves can be in phase or out of phase. The dark areas in wave 
interference charts are areas out of phase; the most intense areas are areas 
in phase. We can apply these principles directly to value and valuation. 
Following Roger Penrose, the formula we shall use is similar to the 
calculation of a quantum vector. In general, a vector is an outcome of two 
input variables; it summarizes the result. Typically, this is done by 
allowing the two inputs to be sides of a right triangle, and the vector is the 
hypotenuse. The Pythagorean Theorem is the standard method. However, 
since quantum vectors are waves that can either be in phase or out of phase, 
the formula is a little more complex. The actual formula is: 
a2 + b2 = c2 + 2*(a*b*cosine theta) 
where theta is the angle of the vector. The cosine is derived by dividing the 
adjacent line segment by the hypotenuse, which in this case is the valuation 
of a value. 














This additional correction term accounts for the interference lines of 
bright to dark in the wave combinations of quantum mechanics. If theta = 
0 degrees, then the cosine = 1; the two waves are totally in phase; and the 
waves combine geometrically. If theta = 90 degrees, then the cosine = O; 
and the waves combine arithmetically. If theta = 180 degrees, then the 
cosine = -1, and the waves cancel each other. All cosines in between give 
varying degrees of wave amplification and destruction. 
A. Binary and Tertiary Value Combinations 
For us, the vector will summarize the axiological process of binary and 
tertiary compositions and transpositions of value. In the act of valuation, 
a base value is valuated. A vector can be calculated to summarize the 
overall resulting value. In tertiary combinations, the vector of the binary 
valuation is itself valuated; and a three-dimensional vector is created. There 
is, however, one important difference with quantum theory. In quantum 
mechanics, wave interference is a cancellation; but in formal axiology it is 
a transposition. Therefore, the dark areas in quantum mechanics are areas 
of transposition in axiology. Transpositional vectors measure the intensity 
of the darkness, just as compositions measure the intensity of the brightness. 
The next step is to assign an amplitude number for each of the types of 
values. There are three kinds of value, and each needs a number. For 
Hartman, these numbers are finite, infinite, and non-denumerably infinite. 
In my view, this is where Hartman gets into trouble. I choose to employ 
a very simple convention. Let the lowest value be represented by a single 
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unit of value, the next value by two units, and the highest value by three 
units. Thus, 
systemic value = 1 unit; 
extrinsic value = 2 units; and 
intrinsic value = 3 units. 
There are, then, 6 total value units since the sum of the above units is six. 
Systemic value is 1/6 (.167); extrinsic value is 2/6 (.333); and intrinsic 
value is 3/6 (.50). These numbers add to 1.0. Each represent base values 
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Using these units as input, we get the following unique ranking for the 
eighteen binary value combinations: 
BINARY VALUE COMBINATIONS 
HARTMAN 
RANK BASE V AL#l VECTOR VALUATION# 1 BASE VALUE 
1 I I 0.9239 The Sacred Nature of Persons ::i... 
2 E I 0.7965 The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things '° ;:: l:l 
4 I E 0.7353 The Positive Uses of Persons ::: 
3 s I 0.6542 The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems ;:: ;:s 
6 E E 0.6097 The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ 
5 I s 0.5695 The Rational Views of Persons ~ 
7 s E 0.4790 The Positive Uses of Formal Systems 
~ 8 E s 0.4249 Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
9 s s 0.2957 Rational Views of Formal Systems -
10 s -S -0.2957 Irrational Views of Formal Systems .s;, 
11 E -S -0.4249 Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things ;;.: i=-
12 s -E -0.4790 Negative Uses of Formal Systems ~ 
14 I -S -0.5695 Irrational Views of Persons ;;:! 
~ 
13 E -E -0.6097 Negative Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things I:) 
16 s -I -0.6542 The Total Destruction of Formal Systems ~ 
15 I -E -0.7353 The Negative Uses of Persons 
17 E -I -0.7965 The Total Destruction of Animate and Inanimate Things 
18 I -I -0.9239 The Total Destruction of Persons 
-00 
-..J 
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Vector length is an indication of value. Positive vectors are compositions 
and negative vectors are transpositions. There is a symmetry between 
positive and negative vector lengths. The worst transposition is equal and 
opposite to the best composition. These eighteen types represent the basic 
model for binary valuation. I indicate the base values as I, E, and S 
respectively. As examples of the three base value types, I choose the 
following: Intrinsic Value = Persons; Extrinsic Value = Animals and 
Inanimate Things; and Systemic Value = Formal Systems. The valuations 
(Val. # 1) of these base values are indicated by either a positive or negative 
I, E, or S. As examples of the positive valuation of the base values, I 
choose the following: Intrinsic Valuation = Sacred Nature; Extrinsic 
Valuation = Uses of; and Systemic Valuation = Rational Views. As 
examples of the disvaluation of the base values, I choose: Intrinsic 
Disvaluation = Total Destruction; Extrinsic Disvaluation = Negative Uses; 
and Systemic Disvaluation = Irrational Views. The Hartman ranking is 
also included. Notice that the Hartman ranking differs from mine in several 
places. For example, Hartman ranks "The Sacred Nature of Formal 
Systems" higher than "The Positive Uses of Persons." I reverse this order. 
Within transpositions, my method ranks "The Negative Uses of Persons" 
as worse than "The Total Destruction of Formal Systems." Hartman 
reverses this order. It is interesting to ponder these differences. 
In Hartman's system, there are only three types of base values and three 
types of valuations of these values. This leaves some value theorists 
uncomfortable about having to group animate and inanimate objects together 
into one category. The quantum model, on the contrary, offers the capacity 
to expand the base values at will. The following two tables represent two 
expansions of base values. The first table separates the animate from the 
inanimate and thereby creates four base values: Persons (11), Animate 
Things (12), Inanimate Things (E), and Formal Systems (S). As before, the 
four base values are given unit values and then normalized. These values 
are: 
S 1 Unit or .10; 
E = 2 Units or .20; 
12 = 3 Units or .30; and 
I 1 = 4 Units or .40. 
Here we have 10 total value units. The vector ranks are: 
BINARY VALUE COMBINATIONS 
(With Animate and Inanimate Things Distinguished) 
Hartman 
Rank Base Val#l Vector Valuation# 1 Base 
1 11 I 0.8500 The Sacred Nature of Persons 
2 I2 I 0.7728 The Sacred Nature of Animate Things 
2 E I 0.6896 The Sacred Nature of Inanimate Things 
4 11 E 0.6609 The Positive Use of Persons ::ti.. 
3 s I 0.5984 The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems !<::> s:: 
6 I2 E 0.5877 The Positive Use of Animate Things i::. ::s 
6 E E 0.5116 The Positive Use of Inanimate Things -s:: 
3 
5 11 s 0.4828 Rational Views of Persons 
~ 7 s E 0.4266 The Positive Use of Formal Systems 
8 I2 s 0.4010 Rational Views of Animate Things ~ 
8 E s 0.3250 Rational Views of Inanimate Things ~ 
9 s s 0.2504 Rational Views of Formal Systems ~ -10 s -S -0.2504 Irrational Views of Formal Systems ~ 
11 E -S -0.3250 Irrational Views of Inanimate Things ~ 
I2 -0.4010 Irrational Views of Animate Things -11 -S s:: 
~ 
12 s -E -0.4266 The Negative Uses of Formal Systems ~ 
12 11 -S -0.4828 Irrational Views of Persons ~ 
13 E -E -0.5116 The Negative Use of Inanimate Things ~ 
13 I2 -E -0.5877 The Negative Use of Animate Things 
16 s -I -0.5984 The Total Destructions of Formal Systems 
15 11 -E -0.6609 The Negative Use of Persons 
17 E -I -0.6896 The Total Destruction of Inanimate Things 
17 I2 -I -0.7728 The Total Destructions of Animate Things .... 00 
18 11 -I -0.8500 The Total Destruction of Persons 
IO 
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To take this analysis further, we may wish to distinguish between Plants and 
Animals within the category of" Animate Things" (11). We represent this 
as Animals (12), Plants (El), and Inanimate Things (E2). Above we 
included animate things as (I2) intrinsic value. We shall continue this 
practice here. None of this would change the ordinal arrangement of the 
value combinations measured by the vector; only what we call an item 
would change. By our process, these five categories are given a value unit 
and then normaliz.ed. 
S 1 Unit or .066; 
E2 = 2 Units or .133; 
El = 3 Units or .200; 
I2 4 Units or .266; and 
11 = 5 Units or .333. 
Now there are 15 total value units which yield new rankings. These 
rankings are found in the immediately following table on page 191. 
Next, we can generate the tertiary relations, as illustrated in the tables on 
pages 194-197. This is based on using the binary vectors as a base; then 
each of these vectors is valued by the three compositions and the three 
transpositions. These vectors are three-dimensional and create a unique 
ranking for all 108 tertiary combinations. Notice that I have consistently 
used the same descriptions to exemplify each of the 108 types. Notice also 
that the vectors come in pairs of equal length. For example, in the first two 
rows, "I I I" equals vector length of 1.2423 as does "I -I -1." This means 
that the intrinsic disvaluation of an intrinsic disvaluation is as valuable as the 
intrinsic valuation of an intrinsic valuation. This implies, for example, that 
the intrinsic commitment to the elimination of killing persons is as valuable 
as the intrinsic commitment to great love of persons. However, these two 
vectors are not identical; while they are the same length, they do not occupy 
the same space. In fact, they point in very different directions. I have 
indicated this difference by the category called "QUAD" for quadrant. On 
the chart on page 193, these vectors are clearly distinguishable. The 
disvaluation of transpositions is a positive value. These are found in 
Quadrant# IV. Valuations of compositions, which are also positive, are 
found in Quadrant# I. Disvaluations of compositions are found in Quadrant 
# II, and valuations of transpositions are found in Quadrant# III. Even if 
we were to include more complex axiological constructions, they would all 
be distinct vector lengths in distinct (many-dimensional) sectors. In this 
representation, I do not include separations of Extrinsic Value into 
categories of Inanimate, Plants or Animals. However, this could be done. 
BINARY VALUE COMBINATIONS 
(With Animals, Plants, and Inanimate Things Distinguished) 
HARTMAN 
RANK BASE VAL#l VECTOR VALUATION # 1 BASE 
11 I 0.7965 The Sacred Nature of Persons 
2 I2 I 0.7405 The Sacred Nature of Animals ::i... 
2 El I 0.6896 The Sacred Nature of Plants !O 
2 E2 I 0.6266 The Sacred Nature of Inanimate Things I:: !::. 
;::i 
4 11 E 0.6097 The Positive Use of Persons ... I:: 
3 s I 0.5596 The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems 3 
6 I2 E 0.5580 The Positive Uses of Animals ~ 
6 El E 0.5116 The Positive Uses of Plants ~ 
6 E2 E 0.4534 The Positive Uses of Inanimate Things ~ 
5 11 s 0.4249 Rational Views of Persons & 
7 s E 0.3892 The Positive Uses of Formal Systems ~ 
8 I2 s 0.3699 Rational Views of Animals ~ 
8 El s 0.3250 Rational Views of Plants -I:: 
8 E2 s 0.2735 Rational Views of Inanimate Things (1' 
~ 9 s s 0.2172 Rational Views of Formal Systems (1' 
<:l 
10 s -S -0.2172 Irrational Views of Formal Systems ~ 
11 E2 -S -0.2735 Irrational Views of Inanimate Things 
11 El -S -0.3250 Irrational Views of Plants 
11 I2 -S -0.3699 Irrational Views of Animals 
12 s -E -0.3892 The Negative Uses of Formal Systems 





RANK BASE VAL#l VECTOR VALUATION# 1 BASE 
13 E2 -E -0.4534 The Negative Uses of Inanimate Things 
13 El -E -0.5116 The Negative Uses of Plants 
13 12 -E -0.5580 The Negative Uses of Animals 
16 s -I -0.5596 The Total Destruction of Formal Systems 
15 11 -E -0.6097 The Negative Uses of Persons 
~ 
17 E2 -I -0.6266 The Total Destruction of Inanimate Things 
~ 17 El -I -0.6896 The Total Destruction of Plants 
17 12 -I -0.7403 The Total Destruction of Animals ~ 
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The tertiary rankings are as follows: -ID 
~ 
TERTIARY VALUE COMBINATIONS 
VAL VAL 
BASE #1 #2 VECTOR QUAD VALUATION# 2 VALUATION# 1 BASE 
I I 1.2423 I Total Commitment to The Sacred Nature of Persons 
-I -I 1.2423 IV Total Destruction of The Evil Nature of Persons 
E I I 1.1436 I Total Commitment to The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -I -I 1.1436 IV Total Destruction of The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E I 1.0973 I Total Commitment to The Positive Uses of Persons 
-E -I 1.0973 IV Total Destruction of The Abusive Uses of Persons 
E 1.0806 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Persons ~ 
-I -E 1.0806 IV Minimize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Persons 
~ s I I l.0369 I Total Commitment to The Sacred Nature of Fonnal Systems s -I -I 1.0369 IV Total Destruction of The Evil Nature of Fonnal Systems 
~ E E I 1.0042 I Total Commitment to The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -E -I 1.0042 IV Total Destruction of The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ 
s I 0.9747 I Total Commitment to Rational Views of Persons 0 0 
I -S -I 0.9747 IV Total Destruction of Irrational Views of Persons 
~ E I E 0.9719 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -I -E 0.9719 IV Maximize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
I I s 0.9642 I Fonnal Acceptance of The Sacred Nature of Persons 
-I -S 0.9642 IV Fonnal Rejection of The Evil Nature of Persons 
E E 0.9210 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Persons 
-E -E 0.9210 IV Minimize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Persons 
s E I 0.9085 I Total Commitment to The Positive Uses of FonnalSystems 
s -E -I 0.9085 IV Total Destruction of The Abusive Uses of FonnalSystems 
E s I 0.8685 I Total Commitment to Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -S -I 0.8685 IV Total Destruction of Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
s I E 0.8552 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Fonnal Systems 
VAL VAL 
BASE #1 #2 VECTOR QUAD VALUATION# 2 VALUATION # 1 BASE 
s -I -E 0.8552 IV Minimize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Formal Systems 
E I s 0.8427 I Formal Acceptance of The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -I -S 0.8427 IV Formal Rejection of The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E E E 0.8199 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -E -E 0.8199 IV Minimize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
;:i... s E 0.7885 I Maximize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Persons 
!<::) 
-S -E 0.7885 IV Minimize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Persons ;::: 
E s 0.7850 I Formal Acceptance of The Positive Uses of Persons :i ::s 
-E -S 0.7850 IV Formal Rejection of The Abusive Uses of Persons 
... 
;::: 
s s I 0.7694 I Total Commitment to Rational Views of Formal Systems :: 
s -S -I 0.7694 IV Total Destruction of Irrational Views of Formal Systems ~ 
s E E 0.7195 I Maximize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Formal Systems ~ 
s -E -E 0.7195 IV Maximize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Formal Systems 
~ s I s 0.7094 I Formal Acceptance of The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems 
s -I -S 0.7094 IV Formal Rejection of The Evil Nature of Formal Systems & 
E s E 0.6793 I Maximize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things .s;, 
E -S -E 0.6793 IV Minimize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
~ E E s 0.6685 I Formal Acceptance of The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things -E -E -S 0.6685 IV Formal Rejection of The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things ;::: "' s s 0.6318 I Formal Acceptance of Rational Views of Persons :;i 
-S -S 0.6318 IV Formal Rejection of Irrational Views of Persons ~ 
s s E 0.5845 I Maximize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Formal Systems ~ 
s -S -E 0.5845 IV Minimize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Formal Systems 
s E s 0.5510 I Formal Acceptance of The Positive Uses of Formal Systems 
s -E -S 0.5510 IV Formal Rejection of The Abusive Uses of Formal Systems 
E s s 0.5040 I Formal Acceptance of Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -S -S 0.5040 IV Formal Rejection of Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
s s s 0.3976 I Formal Acceptance of Rational Views of Formal Systems -'° CJt 
VAL VAL -BASE #1 #2 VECTOR QUAD VALUATION # 2 VALUATION # 1 BASE IO °' s -S -S 0.3976 IV Formal Rejection of Irrational Views of Formal Systems 
s -S s -0.3976 m Formal Acceptance of Irrational Views of Formal Systems 
s s -S -0.3976 n Formal Rejection of Rational Views of Formal Systems 
E s s -0.5040 m Formal Acceptance of Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E s -S -0.5040 n Formal Rejection of Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
s -E s -0.5510 m Formal Acceptance of The Abusive Uses of Formal Systems 
s E -S -0.5510 m Formal Rejection of The Positive Uses of Formal Systems 
s -S E -0.5845 m Maximize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Formal Systems 
s s -E -0.5845 n Minimize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Formal Systems 
I -S s -0.6318 m Formal Acceptance of Irrational Views of Persons a:: I s -S -0.6318 n Formal Rejection of Rational Views of Persons 
E -E s -0.6685 m Formal Acceptance of The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ E E -S -0.6685 n Formal Rejection of The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -S E -0.6793 m Maximize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ 
E s -E -0.6793 n Minimize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things a:: s -I s -0.7094 m Formal Acceptance of The Evil Nature of Formal Systems 0 
s I -S -0.7094 n Formal Rejection of The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems 0 
s -E E -0.7195 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Formal Systems ~ 
s E -E -0.7195 n Minimize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Formal Systems 
s s -I -0.7694 n Total Destruction of Rational Views of Formal Systems 
s -S I -0.7694 m Total Commitment to Irrational Views of Formal Systems 
-E s -0.7850 m Formal Acceptance of The Abusive Uses of Persons 
E -S -0.7850 n Formal Rejection of The Positive Uses of Persons 
-S E -0.7885 m Maximize Negative Effects of Irrational Views of Persons 
s -E -0.7885 n Minimize Positive Effects of Rational Views of Persons 
E -E E -0.8199 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E E -E -0.8199 n Minimize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E -I s -0.8427 m Formal Acceptance of The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
VAL VAL 
BASE #1 #2 VECTOR QUAD VALUATION # 2 VALUATION# 1 BASE 
E I -S -0.8427 II Formal Rejection of The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
s -I E -0.8552 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Formal Systems 
s I -E -0.8552 II Minimize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems 
E -S I -0.8685 m Total Commitment to Irrational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E s -I -0.8685 II Total Destruction of Rational Views of Animate and Inanimate Things 
s -E I -0.9085 m Total Commitment to The Abusive Uses of Formal Systems :ii.. 
s E -I -0.9085 II Total Destruction of The Positive Uses of Formal Systems K::> 
-E E -0.9210 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Abusive Uses of Persons I:: l:l 
E -E -0.9210 II Minimize Positive Effects of The Positive Uses of Persons :::: .. 
-I s -0.9642 m Formal Acceptance of The Evil Nature of Persons § 
-S -0.9642 II Formal Rejection of The Sacred Nature of Persons 
~ E -I E -0.9719 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E I -E -0.9719 II Minimize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ 
-S I -0.9747 m Total Commitment to Irrational Views of Persons ~ s -I -0.9747 II Total Destruction of Rational Views of Persons 
"' E -E I -1.0042 m Total Commitment to The Abusive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things -
E E -I -1.0042 II Total Destruction of The Positive Uses of Animate and Inanimate Things ~ 
s -I I -1.0369 m Total Commitment to The Evil Nature of Formal Systems ~ 
s I -I -1.0369 II Total Destruction of The Sacred Nature of Formal Systems -I:: 
-I E -1.0806 m Maximize Negative Effects of The Evil Nature of Persons "' 
-E -1.0806 II Minimize Positive Effects of The Sacred Nature of Persons ;;:! 
-E I -1.0973 m Total Commitment to The Abusive Uses of Persons ~ 
E -I -1.0973 II Total Destruction of The Positive Uses of Persons ~ 
E -I I -1.1436 m Total Commitment to The Evil Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
E I -I -1.1436 II Total Destruction of The Sacred Nature of Animate and Inanimate Things 
-I I -1.2423 m Total Commitment to The Evil Nature of Persons 
I -I -1.2423 II Total Destruction of The Sacred Nature of Persons 
-\0 
....;i 
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B. Extrinsic Value and Partial Fulfillment of Intensions 
One of the most important aspects of Hartman's work pertains to partial 
fulfillment of analytic concepts by extrinsic values. Extrinsic values fulfill 
analytic intensions by degrees. Most of our value decisions are based on 
comparisons or preference. Formally this represents the partial or complete 
fulfillment of an analytic intension. Hartman's approach is based on 
examining numbers of properties. The more properties represented by 
competing extensions (of the same intension), the better the value. 
It has been objected that merely counting properties is not sufficient. 
Some properties appear to be more important than others; their presence or 
absence is more serious. Even if we treat all properties as equal in 
importance, the problem of how to determine the relative value of two 
extensions of two different intensions would still remain. Hartman tells us 
that if an extension (a thing) has all five properties of a five predicate 
intension, then it is better than an extension having only four properties of 
the same intension. But how are we to compare the value of an extension 
having three properties of a five-propertied intension with an extension 
having three properties of a three-propertied intension? 
Before giving a solution to this problem, let us review some features of 
Hartman's program. Specifically, just how do properties add value, and 
how are we able to make value classifications of "good" and "bad" from 
the arrangement of properties? The answer lies in Hartman's treatment of 
Pascal's Triangle. 
C. Pascal's Triangle 
1 1 
1 2 
1 3 3 1 
1 4 6 4 
1510105 
Pascal developed this remarkable triangle to demonstrate number generation 
and computing odds. In reality it is a binomial distribution. It also serves 
as an exposition of combinatorial sets. It is the combinatorial aspect that 
interests us. Hartman points out two important elements of the triangle. 
First, the triangle accounts for the number of predicates contained in an 
intension. This is done by counting the rows of the triangle. Each row 
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represents a count of predicates. 
Counting Predicates Number of predicates 
on each row 
1 0 
I I 
I 2 2 
I 3 3 3 
I 4 6 4 1 4 
5 IO IO 5 5 
Each column represents two things: First, it represents the number of 
combinations distinguishable for any given number of predicates. For 
example, row three "I 2 I" (which is an intension with two predicates) 
has three value combinations: 1 is no-good, 2 are average, and 1 is good. 
In other words, the number of predicates in the intension directly determines 
the number of value combinations we can differentiate. Normally, we use 
five combinations: no-good, poor, average, fair, and good. In theory we 
could use many more, and the triangle gives a way of differentiating these 
combinations. Obviously, the more value categories we have at our 
disposal, the more precise the value differentiation; and this is determined 
by the number of predicates in the intension. 
Second, each row also determines the number of sub-sets within each 
value category. For example, the row "I 2 I" tells us that the category 
"no-good" has one subset, "average" has two subsets, and "good" has one 






I 4 6 4 
5 IO IO 5 







Each row multiplies by a factor of 2 the number of sub-sets in the previous 
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row. This means: 
1) The addition of one predicate in an intension doubles the amount of 
available information. 
2) The addition of one predicate in an intension adds one new value 
category. 
3) Each row carries all the information contained in every row above. 
These three aspects of Hartman's value triangle are important in dealing 
with problems of partial concept fulfillment, which can be solved by the 
method of vectors. Following Hartman, let us think of a no-good extension 
as the fulfillment of definitional properties only and a complete lack of 
expositional properties. Now we can characterize value fulfillment as a 
scale going from the limits of systemic value (definitional properties only) 
to complete fulfillment of all expositional properties. This scale is sensitive 
to the number of predicates in the intension. The greater the number of 
predicates, the greater the amplitude of the intension: 
Amplitude of Intension Wave: 
Max Fulfillment of Properties = l to 5: Normalized 
Max Number of Predicates = 0 Normalized = .1670 
Max Number of Predicates = l Normalized = .2336 
Max Number of Predicates = 2 Normalized = .3002 
Ma'.X. Number of Predicates = 3 Normalized = .3668 
Max Number of Predicates = 4 Normalized = .4334 
Max Number of Predicates = 5 Normalized = .5000 
Since an analytic intension can be partially or wholly fulfilled, we can also 
determine the amplitude of a partially fulfilled intension. Recall that each 
row of the triangle determines how many value categories are allowed, that 
is, how many ways there are to fulfill the intension. The greater the 
number of ways of fulfilling an intension, the greater the amplitude of the 
wave. Again, by referring to Pascal's Triangle, we can measure both the 
number of ways an intension can be fulfilled and the amplitude of the wave 
which fulfills the intension. 
A Quantum Wave Model of Value Theory 
Ways of Fulfilling the Intension 
for Each Row 
1 
1 1 
1 2 1 
1 3 3 1 








These ways of fulfillment can likewise be normaliz.ed: 
Amplitude of Intension Fulfillment: 
Fulfillment of Predkates = 1 TO 5 Normaliz.ed 
Max Number of Predicates = 0 Normaliz.ed = .1670 
Max Number of Predicates = l Normaliz.ed = .2336 
Max Number of Predicates = 2 Normaliz.ed = .3002 
Max Number of Predicates = 3 Normaliz.ed = .3668 
Max Number of Predicates = 4 Normaliz.ed = .4334 
Max Number of Predicates = 5 Normaliz.ed = .5000 
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By summing the relation between the degree of fulfillment and the number 
of properties contained in the intension, we can determine the exact 
amplitude for each predicate and its degree of fulfillment, as follows: 
Normaliz.ed Value Scale for Degrees of Extrinsic 
Value Fulfillment per Number of Predicates in Intension 
NUMBER OF DEGREE OF 
PROPERTIES FULFILLMENT AMPLITUDE 
5 0.5000 0.5000 0.9239 
5 0.5000 0.4334 0.8495 
4 0.4334 0.4334 0.8008 
5 0.5000 0.3668 0.7756 
4 0.4334 0.3668 0.7265 
5 0.5000 0.3002 0.7033 
3 0.3668 0.3668 0.6778 
4 0.4334 0.3002 0.6528 
5 0.5000 0.2336 0.6352 
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3 0.3668 0.3002 0.6034 
4 0.4334 0.2336 0.5818 
5 0.5000 0.1670 0.5751 
2 0.3002 0.3002 0.5547 
3 0.3668 0.2336 0.5302 
4 0.4334 0.1670 0.5175 
2 0.3002 0.2336 0.4804 
3 0.3668 0.1670 0.4617 
1 0.2336 0.2336 0.4316 
2 0.3002 0.1670 0.4084 
0.2336 0.1670 0.3575 
0 0.1670 0.1670 0.3086 
If we follow Hartman and represent these possibilities as sections of 
Pascal's Triangle, then there exits a clear order of relative value. The 
following representation of Pascal's Triangle assigns an ordinal rank to each 
position on the Triangle. "1" is that position which has the highest 
amplitude, and "21" has the lowest. 




19 16 13 2 
17 14 10 7 3 
15 11 8 5 3 4 
12 9 6 4 2 5 
This table shows that a good three-propertied thing (ordinal rank = 7) is 
better than an average four-propertied thing (ordinal rank = 8); a fair 
three-propertied thing (ordinal rank = 10) is better than a poor 
four-propertied thing (ordinal rank = 11); and a fair four-propertied thing 
(ordinal rank = 5) is better than a good three-propertied thing (ordinal rank 
= 7). 
This is an interesting pattern. If we connect the next best elements on a 
diagonal in the triangle, and count the subsets in each diagonal row, then we 
replicate the Fibonacci Ratio, or the Golden Section. This pattern is as 
follows: 
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D. Ordinal Ranking of Values 
Ordinal Subsets 
21 1 
20 = 1 
19,18 = 2 
17,16 = 3 
15,14,13 = 5 
12,11,10 = 8 
9, 8, 7 = 13* 
6, 5 = 21 * 
4, 3 = 34* 
2 = 55* 
1 = 89* 
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(Note: * means that all the elements in the diagonal row are not shown.) 
The Fibonacci pattern has shown itself to be one of the important ratios 
of how nature builds or develops itself through time. Growing organisms 
frequently display this pattern, and the Greeks were very keen on its 
embodiment of aesthetic proportion. It would indeed be significant if the 
Fibonacci Ratio is also a pattern of how meaning or relative value builds 
itself by the addition of predicates. It would define a pattern for how 
meaning adds to meaning. The vector analysis is similar to the Fibonacci 
pattern of how a certain number series adds. 
E. Comparing Ordinal Ranking of Values 
The above analysis is far too incomplete. From Hartman, we understand 
that the essence of valuation is property counting. By examining sets of 
predicates and their corresponding properties, we can determine overall 
value. This is deceptively simple, and with the aid of the algebra developed 
in this paper this can be seen. The particular properties a thing has are 
critical for determining its value. Each property has a different value per 
the level of differentiation. Various values per property and predicate 
permit the calculation of the relative value of individual elements within 
each subset. 
Let us assume that a concept has five predicates: A, B, C, D, and E. If 
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a thing has all five properties, this is better than having only four. 
However, it is not always so simple. In reality, these five properties 
represent subsets of property combinations. According to combinatorial 
algebra, five propertied things can be arranged in the following order: 
1 subset = null {O} (no expositional properties) 
5 subsets = singles: {A}, {B}, {C}, {D}, {E} 
10 subsets = couples: {AB}, {AC}, {AD}, {AE}, {BC}, 
{BD}, {BE}, {CD}, {CE}, {DE} 
10 subsets = triples: {ABC}, {ABD}, {ABE}, {ACD}, 
{ACE}, {ADE}, {BCD}, {BCE}, {BDE}, {CDE} 
5 subsets = quads: {ABCD}, {ABCE}, {ABDE}, 
{ACDE}, {BCDE} 
1 subset = pent: {ABCDE} 
Each of these subsets has its own unique amplitude. The amplitude, as 
you may remember, is determined by adding the squares of the amplitudes 
of each element contained in the subset. This can be done as follows: 
1) Determine the normalized amplitude of each predicate. From the 








2) Add the squares of each subset combination: 
The following table is a complete listing of all subsets by their unique 
amplitudes: 




-{AB}= .0390 {A}=.0540 
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This chart is very revealing. In general, the category "fair 
four-propertied" (ordinal rank = 5) is better than "poor-average 
five-propertied" (ordinal rank = 6), but it is not true that every sub-set is 
better. For example, the set {DE} of a five-propertied poor-average is, in 





Close inspection of the chart demonstrates that this is not an unusual 
occurrence. However, the average values for these sets of subsets agree 
with our original ordering of the sets. 
Average value for "five-propertied poor-average" = .2867 
Average value for "four-properties fair" = .3501 
F. Average Value for all Sets of Subsets 
0 
.0390 .0545 
.0501 .0723 .1446 
.0612 .0930 .1860 .2791 
.0723 .1167 .2334 .3501 .6992 
.0835 .1433 .2867 .4271 .6664 .9492 
This table points out the great variety of valuations and provides a very nice 
confirmation of the important principle that blanket value judgements cannot 
be made without knowing the details. A very nice value principle may be 
important in general, but its importance may vary in different situations. 
This is consistent with the principles of quantum mechanics. When I speak 
of value priority in general, I only speak statistically, not absolutely. 
Individual variations cause very significant changes in actual value. Our 
general picture covers a host of variations. 
4. Applications 
The measurement of relative value must find its way to the real world. This 
is an awesome undertaking. What seems clear on a theoretical level quickly 
runs aground on the uneven details of the world. This is true for two 
fundamental reasons: First, the real world contains perturbations which 
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defy measure. Newton's mechanics is a wonderful theoretical framework, 
and it has many exact applications; but if you want to predict exactly where 
a bullet fired from a rifle will land, then you are dealing with a level of 
detail over which measurement has scant control. It is not that we do not 
know that air currents, temperature, and moisture variations have an effect 
on the bullet's flight; the problem is that we cannot measure these effects 
with sufficient precision for accurate prediction. Second, when dealing with 
something as complex as values with a theoretical framework as new and 
untested as formal axiology, we are ill equipped to know which elements are 
relevant, and to what extent. So, applications are a quagmire. We must 
tread lightly, but let us try. 
In his excellent book, Valuemetrics": The Science of Personal and 
Professional Ethics, Frank Forrest makes a most important step in applying 
formal axiology to real world situations. In what follows, I rely extensively 
on this ground breaking work in which Forrest utilizes Robert Hartman's 
transfinite algebra. For Hartman, value relations are either compositions or 
transpositions. Compositions are value combinations which are good, and 
transpositions are bad combinations. In applying Hartman's algebra, 
Forrest created a decision procedure which arrives at conclusions that 
demonstrate whether a certain situation is a composition or a transposition 
of value. Forrest's decision procedure requires a technical analysis of each 
situation. Although some may take exception, Forrest bravely takes on 
difficult issues such as abortion.6 That there may be objections should 
surprise no one. After all, this is a controversial issue. My purpose is to 
inquire if Forrest's conclusions agree with the quantum wave model. 
There are three questions for comparison. First, do both methods agree 
on what constitutes compositions and transpositions? Second, do both 
methods agree on the value relations of "better than" and "worse than"? 
Finally, do both methods agree that transpositions are sometimes justifiable; 
and if so, under what conditions? 
A. Compositions and Transpositions 
Forrest utilizes a slightly different indicator for the cardinality of concepts 
than Robert Hartman. Hartman claimed that there are three type of 
concepts, formal, analytic, and singular, corresponding to three types of 
value. These concepts correspond to systemic, extrinsic and intrinsic value, 
respectively. The cardinality of each concept is as follows: 
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Formal = Finite, 
Analytic = Infinite, and 
Singular = Nondenumerably Infinite. 
Each type of concept or value can also be valued (composition) or disvalued 
(transposition); and their blending yields eighteen possible combinations. 
Forrest modifies Hartman's scheme in the following way: 
Formal = Finite and definite or "n", 
Analytic = Finite and elastic or "k", and 
Singular = Nondenumerably Infinite or "A" [N). 
Forrest correctly characterizes the eighteen combinations of composition and 
transposition as eight distinct cardinalities. These cardinalities are as 
follows: 
n -n = 1/n 
k -k , n -k ' k -n = 1 /k 
Forrest's rank order for the eighteen combinations of compositions and 
transpositions yields only eight distinct and different cardinalities. The 
quantum wave method, on the contrary, yields eighteen distinct rankings, 
as follows: 
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HARTMAN 
RANK BASE VAL#l VECTOR 
I I 0.9239 
2 E I 0.7965 
4 I E 0.7353 
3 s I 0.6542 
6 E E 0.6097 
5 I s 0.5695 
7 s E 0.4790 
8 E s 0.4249 
9 s s 0.2957 
10 s -S -0.2957 
11 E -S -0.4249 
12 s -E -0.4790 
14 -S -0.5695 
13 E -E -0.6097 
16 s -I -0.6542 
15 I -E -0.7353 
17 E -I -0.7965 
18 -I -0.9239 
Except for this difference, all combinations that Forrest recognizes as 
compositions and as transpositions agree with the quantum wave method. 
B. Better Than and Worse Than 
In formal axiology, compositions are better than transpositions; but axiology 
must provide a method for deciding on the relative goodness or badness of 
particular value relations. Forrest's analysis distinguishes eight cardinalities 
based on the eighteen binary value combinations. Four of these cardinalities 
are compositions, and four are transpositions. Ranking the eight 
cardinalities from best to worst yields the following scale: 
3) k k ' n k ' k n = k 
4) n n = n 
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5) n -n = 1/n 
6) k -k , n -k , k -n = l/k 
In this scale, 
A2 is better than A1; 
A1 is better than k; 
k is better than n; 
n is better than 1/n; 
l/n is better than l/k; 
1 /k is better than 11 A1; and 
l / A1 is better than l / A2• 
The quantum wave method offers at least eighteen, not just eight, different 
relations of better than and worse than. The vector length is the measure 
of value. The larger the vector, the better the value. The quantum wave 
method is not limited to eighteen binary value combinations. As earlier 
demonstrated, it can include distinct values and levels of value other than 
the primary intrinsic, extrinsic, and systemic values. 
C. Using Transpositions to Maintain or Create Value 
Ethics is sticky stuff. We are familiar with the dilemma of fifteen persons 
trying to occupy a ten-person life boat, or telling a lie to protect or save 
life. There are a variety of responses to these situations. Some hold the 
view that it is justifiable to commit a wrong act if the act results in a greater 
good. Others say that bad is never justifiable, no matter how good the 
intended outcome. Forrest clearly takes the view that doing wrong, 
committing transpositions of value, is justifiable in certain cases. 
Transpositions can create or maintain compositions of value, and these are 
justifiable. Forrest offers an interesting analysis of these cases. According 
to my understanding, Forrest employs the following principle: 
A transposition is justifiable if and only if 1) the two situations are 
causally related by necessary and sufficient conditions; and 2) the 
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cardinality of the transposition is equal to or less than the cardinality 
of a consequent transposition (except cardinalities which are A1). 
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This principle first tells us that a transposition is justifiable if it is the only 
way to maintain or bring about a composition. Second, it tells us that the 
cardinality of the transposition must not be larger than the composition. 
That is, it may be acceptable to do wrong to achieve a higher good, but it 
is not acceptable to do a greater wrong to achieve a lesser good. Forrest 
offers the following example. 7 
"an illegal rule that protects people's welfare" 
Forest contends that the use of the transposition, "illegal rule," is justifiable 
to protect the higher good of "people's welfare." He demonstrates this in 
the following way: 
l) "illegal rule" has cardinality of l/n; while 
2) "people's welfare" has cardinality of A,. 
Therefore, the illegal rule is bad, but not as bad as the good in people's 
welfare; it is, therefore, justifiable. 
What would the quantum wave model say about this example? To arrive 
at the answer we only need to sum the respective vectors. If the resultant 
sum is positive, then it is justifiable, if negative then it is not justifiable. 
1) "illegal rule" has vector = -0.2957; while 
2) "people's welfare" has vector = 0.7965. 
Adding 1) and 2) yields a positive number; and if 1) is the only viable way 
to protect 2), then it is justifiable. 
In another example, Forrest considers whether it is justifiable to kill 
insects to protect crops. 8 Forrest analyses this situation in the following 
way: 
1) "killing insects" has cardinality = 1/k; while 
2) "ruining crops" has cardinality = 1/k. 
Here the two cardinalities are equal; and, on Forrest's analysis, I) is 
justifiable. 
On the quantum wave model we find that the relevant vectors of both I) 
and 2) are -0.6097; both are equally bad. However, as noted above in the 
section dealing with partial fulfillment of intensions, the relevant details and 
properties involved are critically important to measure the vector. If we go 
no further than the analysis provided by Forrest, then we can only say that 
the two vectors are equal. Additional information may very well 
demonstrate that one vector is longer than another, and thus the issue is 
resolved. For example, if we add to the above description the fact that 
protecting crops is important to prevent malnutrition in people, then the 
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property loss for persons would certainly be much greater than the loss of 
some insects. But as long as the two vectors are exactly equal, I see no 
justification for concluding that the consequent justifies the antecedent. 
This is a critical difference between the two models. For Forrest, using 
a transposition to create or protect value of equal cardinality is justifiable, 
but for the quantum wave model it is not. If the two vectors are truly 
equal, then there is no justification to choose one over the other. The two 
situations are value-neutral. Moreover, in Forrest's algebra, only eight 
distinct cardinalities cover a multitude of value situations. This algebra does 
not provide enough resolution to deal adequately with the value landscape. 
In the quantum wave model, not only are there eighteen distinct value types 
(as opposed to eight); but, as was demonstrated above, inside each of the 
eighteen value types, there is infinite room for constructing vectors of 
varying length to account for diverse configurations of both the number and 
the relative importance of properties. 
Forrest also considers cases where using a transposition to prohibit other 
transpositions is not justified. We shall review two cases: 
The first example is: "lying to conceal illegal evidence. "9 Here 
1) "lying" is cardinality = 1/k; while 
2) "illegal evidence" is cardinality = 1/n 
Since 1 /k is smaller than 1/n, then lying in this case is not justified. 
The quantum wave model gives a similar result: 
1) "lying" has vector of -0.6097; while 
2) "illegal evidence" has vector of -.02957. 
Another example is: "harming a person m performing a medical 
experiment;" 10 
1) "harming a person" has cardinality = 1/A1; while 
2) "medical experiment" has cardinality = k. 
According to the quantum wave model: 
1) "harming a person" has vector = -0.7353; while 
2) "medical experiment" has vector = 0.6097. 
These results agree with Forrest's conclusions. 
In another case, Forrest considers "lying to prevent harm to an innocent 
person." 11 He finds this transposition justifiable because 
1) "lying" has cardinality = l/k; while 
2) "harm innocent person" has cardinality = l/A1 • 
According to the quantum wave model: 
1) "lying" has vector = -0.6097; while 
2) "harm innocent person" has vector = -0.7353. 
This confirms Forrest's results. 
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Forrest also considers capital punishment. He argues that capital 
punishment for murder is justifiable.'2 He presents this case as follows: 
1) "execution" has cardinality = 1/A1; while 
2) "murder" has cardinality = 1/A2 
The quantum wave model indicates that 
1) "execution" has vector = -0. 7353; while 
2) "murder" has vector = -0.9239. 
Again, Forrest's results are confirmed. However, in this case, there are 
alternative ways to describe the situation. Execution of a murderer is an act 
of killing. It is not clear that execution is merely the extrinsic disvaluation 
of a person. Perhaps it is an intrinsic disvaluation of a person; and, if it is, 
execution has the same cardinality as murder. Perhaps Jesus would agree. 
If the two vectors are the same, the quantum wave model does not support 
capital punishment unless additional details are relevant. 
First, for the quantum wave model, the subset of properties of a murderer 
are likely different from and less valuable than those of an innocent victim. 
Both are persons; and for Hartmanean algebra, both have the same 
cardinality. However, the quantum wave vectors for both persons are likely 
unequal. We might argue that a murderer's set of properties is not as rich 
as the innocent victim's set of properties; therefore, the murderer's vector 
is less than the innocent victim's. On this basis, killing a murderer as the 
only way to prevent the killing of an innocent victim would be justifiable. 
Second, on the quantum wave model, killing one person is not as bad as 
killing two or three persons. Wave vectors add; additional acts of evil 
increase overall evil. It is important to note this because it is not true for 
Hartmanean algebra. So, on the quantum wave model, execution is justified 
to prevent murder or additional murders only if this is the only alternative. 
It would be justified to kill Hitler; but this does not mean that execution is 
the best course of action. If incarceration could achieve the same. result, 
then execution would not be justified. The quantum wave model analyses 
this alternative in the following way: 
1) "incarceration" has vector= -0.7353; 
2) "execution of murderer" has max vector = -0.9293; while 
3) "murder one innocent person" has min vector = -0.9239; and 
4) "murder two innocent persons" has min vector = -1.8586, etc. 
(Quantum waves add.) 
Therefore, killing to prevent murder is justifiable if and only if 1) 
incarceration or interdiction is not possible, and 2) the vector of the 
murderer is less than the vector of the victim. Would it be justifiable to kill 
a murderer to protect another murderer? 
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I conclude with two general points. First, the quantum wave model 
confirms and agrees with Forrest's construction of Hartmanean Algebra in 
almost all cases. Second, the quantum wave model does not confirm 
Forrest's algebra in two areas. First, the quantum wave model offers a 
more detailed analysis of value relations. This allows for greater 
comparative analysis both of diversity of value types and particular 
differences within each value type. Second, the quantum wave model does 
not recognize that a transposition is justifiable merely because its vector 
equals the composition's vector. 
5. Conclusion 
In this essay, I try to lay the groundwork for the future development of 
Scientific Axiology. Building on what is good about Hartman's work and 
overcoming the shortcomings is not an easy task. Specifically, I have tried 
to relate the two-fold nature of the concept with the two-fold nature of the 
electron. Like an electron, a concept has a particle (extensional) and a 
wave (intensional) component. Thus, the intension or meaning of a concept 
can be analyzed via the wave amplitudes and vectors of quantum algebra. 
I have tried to show that quantum logic is plausible for value logic. 
I do not intend to say that I have proven some dynamic new connection 
between quantum theory and axiology, but I wish to explore this area. The 
problems in Hartman's axiology are formidable. However, if Formal 
Axiology is to become the science we wish it to be, these problems must be 
solved. I can only hope that my work will be viewed as an attempt to 
further our understanding, and I trust that it will receive critical attention. 
Only through scrutiny and criticism can we move forward. 
Finally, every principle and formula utilized in this paper can be 
expressed as a function in Fuzzy Logic. I direct attention to an important 
new book by Bart Kosko: Neural Networks and Fuzzy Systems. 13 Fuzzy 
Logic is actual value logic, especially for the gradations of value found in 
the extrinsic value domain. I stress the importance of Fuzzy Logic for 
Hartman's value theory, and I invite investigation of this most important 
new field. 
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